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Fall 1988

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Friendly Tyrants

Europe's Deteriorating Defenses

A Soviet Success Story

Why the U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine

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WHY THE U.S. CANNOT STOP SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE

by Rensselaer W. Lee III

The control of narcotics, once an issue far outside the diplomatic mainstream, has become a vital component of U.S. relations with Latin America. Indeed, eradicating drug production and export is officially the highest U.S. diplomatic priority in Colombia and one of the top priorities in Bolivia and Peru. U.S. economic aid is allocated accordingly: narcotics-related assistance rose from 30 percent of total aid to Colombia in fiscal year 1984 to over 90 percent in FY 1988. Moreover, Congress now ties foreign aid to recipient countries' drug-control efforts. Thus, in the last two years, the United States has withheld $17.4 million in aid from Bolivia, primarily because coca crop eradication targets were not met.

It is noteworthy that Washington does not practice drug diplomacy worldwide but restricts it largely to Latin America and the Caribbean. There is no serious threat to cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan (the world's largest heroin producer) or to stop supplying Stinger missiles to the *mujahidin* of Afghanistan (who cultivate opium). In these places, obviously, there are higher priorities than narcotics control.

Within Latin America too, there are priorities. Although Latin America supplies most of the marijuana, about 40 percent of the heroin, and all of the cocaine entering U.S. markets, cocaine is easily the biggest concern at the moment. The fight against America's cocaine epidemic — an estimated six million people regularly use this highly addictive drug — consumes the bulk of the federal government's drug-fighting resources. But the cocaine industry is a powerful antagonist. Having cultivated extensive ties with the economic and political power structures of the Andean countries, it poses a difficult challenge to U.S. policy.

Who Produces Cocaine?

The business of cocaine differs from one country to the next. In Colombia, five major trafficking syndicates headquartered in the cities of Medellín and Cali control — directly or through affiliate or-

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

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ganizations — an estimated 70 to 80 percent of that country's cocaine exports. Bolivia's cocaine trade is dominated by some twelve to twenty-five families, most of whom also run cattle ranches or commercial farms in the Beni, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz regions. In Peru, on the other hand, the industry is highly fragmented and, to a large extent, dominated by Colombian traffickers.

Colombia is clearly the linchpin of the South American cocaine industry. The Medellín-Cali syndicates, which control up to 60 percent of the world's cocaine, procure raw materials in Peru and Bolivia, manufacture refined cocaine in Colombia, ship it in large loads of 300 kilos or more to the United States, and market the cocaine wholesale within the United States. They may also be expanding into the even more profitable phases of distribution, where a kilo of cocaine is subdivided into small lots, adulterated with an inert substance, and sold in small packages for about double the wholesale price.

The big Colombian syndicates do not constitute a cartel in the sense of being able to maintain prices. Cocaine wholesale prices in the United States dropped from $55,000 per kilo in 1980 to $15,000 in mid-1988. Also, there is bad blood between the Medellín and Cali groups, stemming from Medellín's attempts to encroach on Cali's sales territory in New York City. Yet there is considerable business collaboration within each group — traffickers collaborate on insuring cocaine shipments, engage in joint ventures, exchange loads, and jointly plan assassinations. Moreover, cocaine barons share a common agenda that includes blocking the extradition of drug traffickers and immobilizing the criminal justice system.

The top tier of the Colombian cocaine elite comprises approximately one hundred people, many of them on the U.S. government's list of "extraditables." Seven men stand at the apex of the trafficking pyramid. Five are based in Medellín: Jorge Ochoa Vazquez and his brothers Fabio and Juan David; Pablo Escobar Gavíria; and José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha from the town of Pacho in Cundinamarca. Two are in Cali: Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santa Cruz Londoño. Pablo Escobar, Jorge Ochoa, and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha are reputedly three of the world's richest men: they made *Forbes*'s 1988 list of 125 non-U.S. billionaires.[1] By the end of the mid-1980s, the Medellín and Cali organizations together grossed about $2-$3 billion annually from international cocaine sales, primarily to the U.S. market. Two-thirds or more of that amount was profit.[2]

The 20-30 percent of Colombia's cocaine industry not under the syndicate is shared by scattered small processors and refiners, some of whom have links to guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

[1] Harold Seneker, "The World's Billionaires," *Forbes*, July 25, 1988, p. 88.

[2] David Henry, "Pablo Escobar Gavíria" and "Ochoa Brothers," in "How to Make $7 Billion in 7 Years," *Forbes*, October 5, 1987, p. 154.

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of Colombia (FARC). FARC may also have its own cocaine-processing capabilities in some regions. The small producers do not have access to the cocaine elite's distribution capabilities; they rely heavily on mules (hired couriers) to smuggle cocaine into the United States.

The Benefits of Cocaine

All together, South American drug traffickers earn an estimated $3-$5 billion each year.[3] Some $2-$3 billion remains abroad, stashed in offshore tax havens such as Panama and the Cayman Islands, or invested in U.S. real estate, securities, and business. In 1983, Colombian drug traffickers reportedly held $12 billion worth of assets in the United States.[4]

Between $1 billion and $2 billion annually may return to the principal cocaine-producing countries — Colombia ($200-$600 million), Bolivia ($250-$450 million), and Peru ($600-$700 million). In terms of these repatriated dollars, cocaine exports equal an estimated 4 to 12 percent of Colombia's 1987 legal exports, 23 to 27 percent of Peru's, and 53 to 95 percent of Bolivia's. Bolivian drug traffickers reputedly control two-thirds of the country's foreign exchange.[5] The economic impact of these funds is not clear, however, for the relationship between the drug industry and prosperity is far from direct.[6] When spending their repatriated dollars, traffickers tend to short-change core economic activities. As *The Economist* recently noted, "the economic impact of $1 billion spent bribing politicians and buying status symbols will usually be less than that of $1 billion spent building roads and electricity generators."[7]

And much is spent on bribes. Because cocaine is a criminal industry, the producers spend 10 to 20 percent of all operating expenses to create a secure climate for business operations. The money goes for weapons and private security forces, information networks, bribes to law enforcement officials, contributions to political campaigns, and "war taxes" paid to guerrilla groups.

Conspicuous consumption is another hallmark of the cocaine industry, giving rise to absurdly unbalanced development in the re-

[3] Author's estimate, reflecting assumptions about export volume, direction of international sales (United States vs. Europe), percentage of cocaine sold in Latin America, and U.S. wholesale and distribution prices.

[4] *El Tiempo*, February 17, 1986.

[5] Interview with Jorge Alderete, Ministry of Interior, La Paz, October 6, 1987; interview with Alexander Watson, U.S. ambassador to Peru, Lima, October 15, 1987; interviews with U.S. narcotics experts in Bogota, October 21, 1987; State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, March 1, 1988) hereafter INCSR; and R.W. Lee, "The Drug Trade and Developing Countries," *Policy Focus* (Overseas Development Council), June 1987, p. 10.

[6] Kevin Healy, "The Boom within the Crisis: Some Recent Effects of Foreign Cocaine Markets on Bolivian Rural Society and Economy," in *Coca and Cocaine*, ed. Deborah Pacini and Christine Franquemont (Peterborough, N.H.: Transcript Printing Company, 1986), pp. 101-143.

[7] "Colombia: The Drug Economy," *The Economist*, April 2, 1988, p. 63.

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mote South American jungle regions that cultivate coca. The town of Tocache in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley has six banks, six Telex machines, several stereo dealerships, a discotheque, and one of the largest Nissan outlets in Peru. Tocache also has no paved streets, no drinking water, and no sewage system.[8] In Medellín and Santa Cruz, cocaine capos flaunt ostentatious lifestyles — buying luxury high-rise apartment buildings, Mercedes-Benzes and BMWs, helicopters, and antiques. Last January, after a bomb exploded in front of Monaco, one of Pablo Escobar's Medellín houses, police reportedly discovered in the wreckage a veritable fortune in Ming dynasty vases, Greek sculptures, paintings (including works by Botero, Morales, and Obregón), and a collection of thirty antique cars.[9]

In the attempt to buy status, drug traffickers in South America, Jamaica, and Honduras also devote funds to social welfare programs, earning the traffickers a significant popular following. Pablo Escobar, for example, built 450-500 two-bedroom cement-block houses in a Medellín slum that has now been renamed the "Barrio Pablo Escobar." Reportedly he has built more public housing in Medellín than the government. Escobar also financed many other Medellín projects — sewer repair, educational facilities, clinics, and sports plazas. Carlos Lehder organized and funded a major earthquake relief effort in the city of Popayan and also built a housing project for the poor in his native Armenia, the capital of Quindío department. Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha donated an outdoor basketball court to his native town of Pacho, Cundinamarca, and repaired the façade of Pacho's town hall. Roberto Suarez, the "king of cocaine" in Bolivia, paves streets, restores churches, and donates sewing machines to poor women in his Beni home town of Santa Ana de Yacuma. Suarez reportedly provides college scholarships for needy students in the Beni region.[10]

The cocaine industry also generates genuine economic activity. It directly employs up to a million people in the Andean region. About 500,000-600,000 farmers (mostly in Peru and Bolivia) cultivate and harvest coca leaves. Several hundred thousand are engaged in downstream functions: macerating coca leaves, building maceration pits, buying and selling leaves or paste, refining and smuggling cocaine, building clandestine airstrips, and smuggling precursor chemicals (used to convert coca into cocaine). An estimated 350,000-

[8] Scott L. Malcomson, "Cocaine Republic," *The Village Voice*, August 26, 1986, p. 18; "Tocache: Some Things Go Better With . . .," *The Andean Report*, December 1985, pp. 242-43.

[9] "¿Quién Fué?" *Semana*, January 25, 1988, p. 24.

[10] Author's March 1988 trip to the Barrio Pablo Escobar and to Pacho. Hernán Gavíria Berrio, "Letter to Fabio Castillo," *Medellín Cívico*, April 1987, p. 13; "Civismo En Marcha," *Medellín Cívico*, March 1984, p. 2; Jorge Eliecer Orozco, *Lehder: El Hombre* (Bogota: Plaza y Janes, 1987), pp. 60, 120; "A Self-Styled Robin Hood," *Time*, February 25, 1985, p. 33; *The New York Times*, August 15, 1982.

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400,000 Bolivians (5-6 percent of that country's population) work directly in one phase or another of the trafficking cycle.[11] For many, however, these activities do not provide full-time work; in Bolivia, some farmers cultivate coca in the Chapare during the summer months and farm their traditional crops in the Upper Cochabamba Valley during the winter. Coca cultivation often makes the difference between subsistence and a decent standard of living.

Thus, drug-related business serves as an important economic safety valve, especially in Peru and Bolivia, providing income, jobs, and foreign exchange when the formal economy falters. According to a Bolivian government document, "Triennial Program of the Battle Against Drug Trafficking," while Bolivia's gross national product declined 2.3 percent per year from 1980 to 1986, production of coca grew an estimated 35 percent per year over the same period. The official unemployment rate more than tripled from 1980 to 1986 (from 5.7 percent to 20 percent), but so did the number of families reportedly growing coca.[12] During 1986, over 20,000 Bolivian miners lost their jobs; as many as 5,000 may have sought work in the coca fields. From 1984 to 1986, when world prices for oil, tin, and natural gas declined, Bolivia's exports shrank by 25 percent and Peru's by 20 percent; cocaine exports compensated for the loss.[13]

Cocaine production has an economic ripple effect. A proportion of drug traffickers' earnings goes for the purchase of the means of production (farm equipment, chemicals, and other tools of the trade) and export (clandestine airstrips, transportation, etc.). Local industrialists create new manufacturing capacity to provide goods, while new services (banks, law firms, and accounting firms) spring up to cater to the cocaine syndicates. Even the expenditures on conspicuous consumption have an effect. The demand for luxury housing has been a boon for building contractors and for producers of such construction materials as cement, bricks, and glass.

Some drug money is invested in quite ordinary economic outlets, though these tend to be in agriculture and services rather than in the more traditional areas, such as extraction, manufacturing industries, and infrastructure projects. The Rodríguez Orejuela family put together an extensive business empire in Cali which at one time included banks, construction companies, pharmaceutical companies,

[11] Rensselaer Lee, "Drugs," in *The U.S. Economy and Developing Countries: Campaign 88 Briefing Papers for Candidates*, ed. Richard Feinberg and Gregg Goldstein (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1988), p. 2. See also Congressional Research Service, *Combatting International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 32; and Institutio Nacional de Planificación, "Plan Nacional de Eliminación del Narcotrafico," (Lima, 1984), p. 4.

[12] Government of Bolivia, *Triennial Program of the Battle Against Drug Trafficking*, November 1986, pp. 5-6.

[13] *Latin American Regional Reports: Andean Group*, March 3, 1988, p. 8. Export data from author's conversations with U.S. Treasury officials, March, 1988.

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sports clubs, private security companies, automobile dealerships, twenty-eight radio stations, and two higher educational institutions, the Fundacion Educativa de Estudios Superiores and the Faculdad de Formación de Empresarios. Several of the Medellín-based traffickers (José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, Pablo Escobar, and the Ochoa clan) own dairy farms, cattle ranches, and horse ranches. In Bolivia, where the cocaine dealers are largely coterminous with the rural elite, traffickers invest drug profits into expanding herds, cross-breeding cattle, or improving cotton and sugar cane yields. Characteristically, the major drug lords also invest in executive air-transport services (which may be used for drug trafficking), restaurants, and resort hotels (especially on Colombia's Caribbean coast and on San Andrés Island).[14] Even while they remain theoretically dedicated to combatting drug traffic, Andean governments encourage the inflow of narcotics profits. As a Colombian banking official remarked in a 1986 interview, "Why should we drive all this money into the black market and into foreign banks?"[15] Toward this end, tax amnesties were declared in Colombia at the beginning of the last four presidential administrations. In Peru and Bolivia, traffickers who repatriate hard currency are protected by government decree from tax penalties and to some extent from criminal investigation. Such money now replaces the international loans which are no longer forthcoming from commercial bankers. Peru's nationalistic economic policies exclude it from receiving loans from any international sources, and Peruvian banking officials make no secret of their view that cocaine dollars partially substitute for foreign investment and bank loans.[16] In an apparent effort to draw in more cocaine dollars and to keep them in Peru, the government has overvalued the local currency (the INTI) and provided high INTI interest rates for depositors. In sum, drug dollars create pockets of prosperity, stimulate certain industries, stabilize the currency, and help finance exports. Were the industry suddenly shut down, economic chaos would reign in Bolivia and Peru, and possibly in Colombia too.

The Drug Producers' Clout

The cocaine industry's enormous wealth, its large popular base upstream, and its formidable organization downstream combine to give it great political influence in the Andean countries. It has two especially powerful constituencies: the farmers who defend their right to cultivate coca, and cocaine dealers who exert a range of influences over the criminal justice system and the state generally.

[14] Fabio Castillo, *Los Jinetes de la Cocaina* (Bogota: Editorial Documentos Periodistos, 1987), pp. 124-148.

[15] Interview with the author, April 1986.

[16] "Governments' Sweetheart Deals and Subsidies Attempt to Stop Widening the Gaps in the Financial Circuit," *The Andean Report*, October 1986, pp. 141-42.

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Coca Farmers. Farmers who cultivate illicit coca make up the most visible cocaine constituency, for they are highly organized and sometimes well armed. They can exert tremendous pressure on governments.

In Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, where more than 90 percent of farm income derives from coca cultivation, coca farmers are represented by provincial and district self-defense fronts (FEDIPs). FEDIPs are heavily influenced by the parties of the United Left (Izquierda Unida), and may also have been infiltrated by the Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru guerrilla movements.[17] FEDIPs lobby for the legalization of coca cultivation and challenge government eradication teams with sit-ins, demonstrations, roadblocks, and other mass mobilization tactics. The coca growers' opposition had much to do with the virtual halt of a U.S.-Peruvian eradication project in the Valley in 1987, when only 355 hectares were destroyed, compared to 2,575 in 1986 and 4,830 in 1985.[18] Unless Peru can move ahead with an aerial-spraying program, control of coca in the Upper Huallaga is largely a lost cause; unfortunately, to date there is no demonstrably safe and effective herbicide against coca. In Bolivia, the political dynamics are even worse, for 70,000 coca-growing families are organized into eight regional federations comprising several hundred syndicates. These receive direct political support from national mass membership organizations, including the 1.3-million-member Bolivian Workers Congress and its main affiliate, the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers.[19] In a country of only 6.4 million people, such support significantly deters narcotics control programs. U.S.-Bolivian efforts to pressure coca farmers by destroying crops or regulating the sale of coca leaves trigger organized resistance on a national scale. The Bolivian coca lobby has the power to shut down parts of Bolivia's fragile transportation system. For example, coca farmers and their worker-peasant allies have sealed off Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest city, four times since 1983 to protest various anti-coca policies of the Bolivian government. The Bolivian authorities did eradicate 1,000 hectares of coca last year, but only by undertaking a complex process of bargaining with federation and individual syndicates and by paying peasants $2,000 for each hectare eradicated.[20] Involuntary eradication on any significant scale is probably politically impossible in Bolivia.

Traffickers. U.S. officials sometimes characterize the narcotics industries as a direct threat to democracy in the Western hemisphere

[17] Raúl Gonzáles, "Coca and Subversion in the Huallaga," *Quehacer* (Lima), September-October 1987, pp. 55-72.

[18] *INCSR*, 1988, p. 109.

[19] Healy, p. 136; and Lee, "The Drug Trade and Developing Countries," p. 7.

[20] *INCSR*, 1988, p. 73.

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and as a danger to U.S. security interests in the region.[21] Such characterizations are not entirely accurate. To be sure, traffickers do not hesitate to use violence against government officials and public figures to promote their political objectives, such as deactivating the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty. But unlike leftist guerrillas, whose objective is to seize power, traffickers are not ideologically committed to destroying the political system in which they survive.

Nevertheless, when an industry as large as the cocaine one searches for protection, it spawns corruption on a massive scale. Cocaine traffickers can manipulate the key institutions of public life, including the political parties, the press, the police, the military, and the judiciary. Traffickers exercise enormous influence in such major cities as Medellín and Cali; they even dominate entire regions, including parts of Caqueta, Meta, and Guaviare in Colombia and much of the Beni region in Bolivia.

The strategy of self-protection operates on seven different levels. First, drug lords make large outlays for weapons and guard forces to protect laboratories, clandestine airfields, drug shipments, and key personnel. Traffickers are in general better armed than national police forces, use better communications equipment, and deploy faster aircraft.

Second, traffickers attempt to neutralize the effectiveness of law-enforcement institutions by paying police or military officers to overlook cocaine refineries or drug-smuggling operations. Chapare traffickers in Bolivia pay police $20,000-$25,000 for a seventy-two-hour window of impunity for loading major shipments by air, land, or river.[22]

Third, the drug lords maintain elaborate networks of informants that provide advance information of the exact plans for raids or checkpoints, thus enabling the traffickers to escape police dragnets and to live fairly comfortably in such major cities as Medellín and Cali. The Ochoa family of Colombia reportedly has informants in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[23] A few U.S. narcotics specialists in Bogota believe that the Medellín syndicates have infiltrated the U.S. Embassy, and that traffickers' informants read some of the Embassy's cable traffic.[24] The cocaine chiefs could conceivably be privy to secret U.S.-Colombian deliberations on drugs and plans for major anti-drug initiatives. No wonder that a Colombian

[21] *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1988; "Aboga Abrams por Más Ayuda a Gestiones de América Latina Contra Narcóticos," USIS news release in Spanish, Bogota, February 1986, p. 4.

[22] *INCSR*, 1987, p. 70.

[23] *El Tiempo*, January 10, 1988.

[24] Author's interviews with U.S. narcotics experts in Bogota, March-April, 1986.

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opinion survey taken in March 1987 reports that nearly half the population believes drug traffickers are too powerful to combat.[25]

Fourth, traffickers undermine the judicial system. When caught in the net, they pay the police to release them. Pablo Escobar, Colombia's biggest cocaine dealer, was arrested by accident in November 1986 at a police checkpoint in Southern Antioquia; he was quickly released after paying a bribe of some $250,000-$375,000.[26]

If traffickers cannot escape the police, judges presiding over drug trafficking cases in Colombia are offered the choice of *plomo o plata* (lead or silver) — death if they convict, a bribe if they set aside the charges. Not surprisingly, few judges opt to convict. In the past two years, criminal court judges either released from jail or dropped the charges against four major cocaine dealers: Gilbert Rodríguez Orejuela, José Santa Cruz Londoño, Evaristo Porras (a mid-level capo from the city of Leticia), and Jorge Luis Ochoa. In fact, Ochoa was released twice within sixteen months, and corrupt judges appear to have played a role on both occasions. Recently in Medellín, police arrested a middle-ranking trafficking chief implicated in the murder of Guillermo Cano (the editor of the Bogota daily *El Espectador*). After several days in jail, he was released because no judge in Medellín was willing to try the case.[27]

If traffickers do end up in jail, they usually can bribe their way out. The second time Jorge Ochoa escaped, according to a Western diplomatic source, his clan paid $3 million to get him out of jail and an additional $20 million to arrange every step of his escape route so that he would not be murdered or recaptured. At the moment of writing, no major traffickers are in jail anywhere in Colombia.

With respect to drug-trafficking cases, then, the Colombian criminal justice system has almost ceased to function.

The fifth level of self-protection exercised by the drug lords in Colombia includes influencing public opinion and the political process. Publications such as Carlos Lehder's *Quindío Libre* and the Escobar family's *Medellín Cívico* carry out an unremitting campaign against the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty, portraying it as "a monstrous legal absurdity" and "the ultimate surrender of sovereignty."[28] These publications depict drug dealers as progressive and public-spirited citizens. *Medellín Cívico* praises Escobar's "great human and social sensitivity" and his dedication to "redeeming the forgotten people of Antioquia."[29] Mafia-controlled columnists in more

[25] Author's interview with the staff of Invamer, a Colombian polling organization, Medellín, March 9, 1988.

[26] "El Dossier de Medellín," *Semana*, January 27, 1987, p. 25.

[27] *El Tiempo*, February 9, 1988.

[28] See, for example, "La Patria Acorralada," *Quindío Libre*, October 1, 1983; "No a la Extradición," *Medellín Cívico*, March 1984, p. 7; and Gilberto Zapata, "El Triunfo Es de Colombia," *Medellín Cívico*, July 1987, p. 3.

[29] Berrio, "Letter to Fabio Castillo."

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respectable publications convey the same message. In addition, as noted above, sponsoring public works and social services in communities that governments have failed to reach wins good will for the drug lords. Although the cost of such projects represents a tiny fraction of overall cocaine resources, the political impact is incalculable.

Sixth, cocaine traffickers become power brokers. In Colombia, where political campaigns are not funded from the state treasury, drug money is an important underpinning for the entire democratic process. Traffickers contribute indiscriminately to campaigns — often through front organizations — to hedge their bets. Pablo Escobar is affiliated with the Liberal party, but he gave money to both candidates in the 1982 Colombian presidential campaign.[30] Sometimes traffickers prepare their own slate of candidates for local political office, as does the "political group" of Evaristo Porras in Colombia's Amazonas Department.[31]

Seventh, and finally, the cocaine mafia protects itself by using violence to shape the laws governing narcotics control. In Colombia, its number-one political objective is to persuade the government to adopt a policy of not extraditing drug traffickers to the United States. Consequently, in the past year-and-a-half, henchmen have murdered prominent Colombian supporters of extradition: the editor of *El Espectador*, a Colombian Supreme Court justice, the former head of Colombia's anti-narcotics police (who was preparing a "black book" on the mafia's criminal activities), and most recently a Colombian attorney general. Violence and threats have paralyzed the Colombian criminal justice system and effectively blocked extraditions.

Relations with Guerrillas

Perhaps because of the cocaine industry's multi-front attack on the government's control, Washington expressed concern about a connection between the cocaine industry and Marxist guerrilla groups. Indeed, in its early days, the Reagan administration analyzed the drug problem within the framework of the East-West conflict. Administration officials spoke publicly and privately about a "deadly connection" and an "unholy alliance" between cocaine kings and guerrillas.[32] A U.S. government report in 1985 on Soviet influence in Latin America warned of an "alliance between drug smugglers and arms dealers in support of terrorists and guerrillas."[33] This report,

[30] "El Dinero Caliente Pretende Entrar en Politica," *Guión*, July 15-21, 1983, p. 21; and Jorge Child and Mario Arango, *Los Condenados de la Coca* (Medellín: Editorial J.M. Arango, 1985), p. 107.

[31] *Jinetes*, p. 105.

[32] USIS, "Aboga Abrams," p. 4; *The Washington Post*, November 14, 1987.

[33] Ibid.

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however, may have exaggerated the depth of the narco-guerrilla connection.

To be sure, drug dealers, especially the larger operators, do share some of the guerrillas' anti-establishment views: for example, they are both strongly anti-American. In Colombia, major guerrilla groups and cocaine syndicates oppose as "Yankee imperialism" the extradition treaty that allows traffickers to be tried in the United States under American judges and U.S. law. In both Colombia and Peru, therefore, guerrilla organizations have cultivated ties with coca growers.

In addition, the drug lords generally advocate a more egalitarian social structure. Pablo Escobar, for example, espouses the cause of slum dwellers and of "marginal people" in general. The Escobar family newspaper, *Medellín Cívico*, professes strong support for the Liberal party but has a decidedly populist orientation. Recent articles in the newspaper, though not praising the cocaine traffic as such, have criticized "the fabulous profits" of industrialists, claimed that "we are good friends of the working class," and advocated "employment for all, education for all, health for all, and bread for all."[34]

The nationalist-populist fervor of Colombian narcotics traffickers reached its most extreme form in the bizarre political philosophy of Carlos Lehder, who founded a political movement in his native department of Quindío — the Movimiento Latino Nacional (MLN). The MLN's *raison d'être* was campaigning against the extradition treaty, but the party also had a full-blown international political program that included the struggle against "communism, imperialism, neocolonialism, and Zionism" and favored the replacement of Colombia's traditional political parties with mass popular organizations. In the 1986 presidential elections, his party supported the extreme leftist UP candidate, while Lehder himself maintained ties with several Colombian revolutionary organizations, including the Quintin Lamé and the April 19th Movement (M-19). He may even have helped to finance the M-19's raid on Colombia's Palace of Justice in November 1985 — a raid culminating in a holocaust in which twelve Supreme Court justices and scores of other people were killed.

Lehder's extreme radicalism, however, was not shared by his colleagues, who generally prefer to work within the system. Many Colombian observers believe that the Medellín syndicates viewed Lehder as an embarrassment, were eager to cultivate a pro-establishment image, and consequently betrayed the trafficker to author-

[34] "Los Barrios Pobres y la Eradicacion de la Pobreza," *Medellín Cívico*, October 1986, p. 3; "La Paz Es la Justicia Social," *Medellín Cívico*, November 1986, p. 3; "Mientras el Pueblo Padece Hambre, Varias Industrias Se Enriquecen," *Medellín Cívico*, April 1987, p. 4; Berrio, "Letter to Fabio Castillo"; and "Existen Mas de Dos Milliones de Desempleados," *Medellín Cívico*, May 1987, p. 6.

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ities.[35] Lehder now is in jail in the United States, probably permanently.

At any rate, whatever ideology the drug lords may espouse, on the level of "turf," clashes with guerrilla groups have been common. Guerrillas increase the cocaine industry's overhead costs — traffickers must either pay protection money (war taxes) to guerrillas or make large outlays to guard their drug shipments, laboratories, supply routes, clandestine airfields, and exports. The Colombian cocaine leadership — which invests much of its new-found wealth in farms, ranches, and landed estates in Colombia's relatively unprotected hinterland — is vulnerable to extortion by FARC guerrillas.

Because their interests in these legitimate properties are similar to the interests of Colombia's traditional elite, drug traffickers have spearheaded efforts to organize ranchers and farmers to resist attacks by local guerrilla forces. When the FARC attempted to extort money from Rodríguez Gacha at his newly acquired ranch near Acacias in the Colombian Llanos, Rodríguez organized other landowners in the area into a self-defense league. A Medellín businessman who owns a farm near the Gulf of Uraba in Antioquia admitted in an interview that he and other landowners paid dues to the local chapter of Muerte a Los Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers), a trafficker-backed vigilante organization. The FARC subsequently gathered strength in the area, and the MAS group collapsed: now the businessman pays off the FARC.

More generally, the Colombian traffickers cooperate with businessmen, landowners, and right-wing elements of the military to wage a systematic extermination campaign against visible members of the extreme left: labor organizers, civil rights workers, intellectuals, and politicians. About one-third of the Union Patriotica (UP) mayoralty candidates (the UP is an umbrella organization for Colombia's Marxist groups) were massacred, many by drug traffickers in the six months preceding the March 1988 elections. According to Colombia's justice minister, Rodríguez Gacha paid 30 million pesos (about $120,000) to one of his henchmen to arrange the October 11 assassination of Colombia's foremost leftist leader, Jamie Pardo Leal, the head of the UP.[36]

In Peru, the Upper Huallaga Valley hosts many bloody confrontations between cocaine-trafficking gangs and Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. In mid- and late 1987, clashes were recorded in or near the Valley towns of Sion, Uchiza, and Paraíso. According to an article in Bogota's *El Tiempo*, Colombian crime syndicates recently dispatched 300 heavily armed traffickers to the Upper Huallaga Valley

[35] Orozco, *Lehder: El Hombre*, p. 235.

[36] *El Tiempo*, November 13, 1987. See also: *The Washington Post*, November 14, 1987, and Ayatollah, *El Tiempo*, November 15, 1987.

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to help Peruvian traffickers protect cocaine shipments and supply routes against Sendero Luminoso attacks.[37] The efforts by "Machis," one of the Valley's leading cocaine dealers, to organize residents of the Uchiza district against the guerrillas led to an ambush against him at Paraíso by Sendero Luminoso on October 10, 1987. Machis got the worst of it, and was encircled by the guerrillas. At this point, he let himself be rescued from certain death by the Peruvian anti-narcotics police flying in U.S.-piloted helicopters; he is now in a Peruvian jail.[38] Such evidence of narco-guerrilla hostility is no doubt viewed with some relief by the Peruvian authorities. A real alliance between the two groups would create an almost unmanageable political threat in the Upper Huallaga region.

Clashes with guerrillas have even led drug dealers to "develop certain forms of cooperation and tacit alliance with the state."[39] Thus, during a 1984-85 state of emergency in the Upper Huallaga Valley, Peruvian military commanders relied heavily on local cocaine dealers for information on the whereabouts, strengths, and weaponry of Sendero Luminoso forces. Conversely, Colombian military units occasionally protect cocaine laboratories against FARC extortion attempts; in a November 1983 incident, a Colombian Special Forces team from Villavicencio helped a cocaine trafficker move an entire laboratory complex from an area controlled by the First FARC Front to a safer location near the Brazilian border. The operation, which involved five officers and forty-three NCOs, required twenty-six days.[40] From the state's perspective, guerrillas present a larger threat, or at least a more obvious threat.

Narcos allied with guerrillas appear more dangerous than plain narcos, but the cocaine industry is essentially a para-establishment political force. Episodic and opportunistic links to Marxist guerrilla organizations are far less important than penetrations of legitimate economic and political institutions. The cocaine traffickers' vast financial resources, military and logistical capabilities, and power to corrupt represent a challenge to government authority — but not an ideological challenge to democracy. In the end, the narco-guerrilla theory advanced by Reagan administration officials such as former ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams was designed primarily to get the attention of Latin American governments.

[37] *El Tiempo*, February 22, 1988.

[38] Interview with staff of CORAH (Coca Reduction in the Alto Huallaga), Tingo María, October 12, 1987; interviews with U.S. pilots, Upper Huallaga Valley, October 13, 1987; interview with U.S. narcotics official, Lima, October 15-16, 1987; interview with General Juan Zarate of Peru's narcotics police, Lima, October 16, 1987; and *The Miami Herald*, October 14, 1987.

[39] Alfredo Molano, *Selva Adentro* (Bogota: El Ancora, 1987), p. 134.

[40] For accounts of this operation, see *Jinetes*, p. 235; and Fabio Castillo, "Operación Encubierta para Proteger Laboratorio de Coca," *El Espectador*, August 1, 1985.

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Why the Supply Cannot be Stopped

U.S. and Latin American efforts to curb the supply of cocaine have failed abjectly. Some 200-300 tons of cocaine may flow into U.S. markets yearly; as University of Michigan researcher Lloyd Johnston notes, "the supply of cocaine has never been greater in the streets, the price has never been lower, and [the] drug has never been purer."[41] The U.S. government supports a number of programs meant to reduce supply in the Andean countries, but these programs amount to perhaps $40-$50 million a year, a pittance when compared to the South American cocaine industry's earnings of $3-$5 billion a year. Yet more resources may not be the answer. Structural barriers block effective drug enforcement in poor countries, and such barriers could well be insurmountable.

First, Andean governments worry about the impact of successful drug-control programs. The consequences would be exacerbated rural poverty and new legions of the unemployed, both of which would strengthen anti-democratic or communist movements. Imagine 200,000 coca-growing peasants marching on Bolivia's capital, La Paz. In Peru and Colombia, the war against drugs has proved difficult to reconcile with the struggle against communist insurgency. The threat of eradication alienates coca growers from the government and enhances the appeal of insurgent groups. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, for example, the U.S.-backed eradication effort has doubtless driven many peasants into the ranks of Sendero Luminoso.

Second, many Latin Americans see the economic benefits of drug trafficking. Colombia's controller general, Rodolfo Gonzales, has publicly hailed the contribution of drug dollars to national economic growth. Leading bankers in Peru talk about the importance of cocaine earnings in stabilizing the country's currency. Bolivia's president Victor Paz Estenssoro remarked in 1986 that "cocaine has gained in importance in our economy in direct response to the shrinking of the formal economy."[42]

Third, Latin Americans tend to see U.S.-imposed drug enforcement measures as infringements on their national sovereignty. According to a recent poll, two-thirds of Colombians oppose the extradition of drug traffickers to the United States.[43] This feeling may be heightened because some of the leading candidates for extradition, such as Colombia's Pablo Escobar and Bolivia's Roberto Suarez, provide support for charitable activities and so are popular in their countries. Arresting and extraditing such traffickers would be difficult

[41] Quoted in *The New York Times*, April 12, 1988.

[42] "Reactivación Económica por Dinero Caliente," *El Espectador*, October 3, 1987; "Directive del BCR del Peru Habla Sobre Narcodolares," *El Comercio*, October 8, 1987; *The Washington Post*, July 17, 1986.

[43] *The Washington Post*, February 2, 1988.

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politically. Officials undoubtedly recall the violent anti-American outbursts in Honduras following the April 1988 extradition of Juan Matta Ballestreros, a narco-philanthropist who cultivated a Robin Hood image.

Fourth, governments often exercise little or no control over territories where drug production flourishes, for these are remote from metropolitan centers, relatively inaccessible mountainous or jungle terrains which are patrolled by guerrillas or other hostile groups. In this way, drug traffic encourages territorial disintegration. The Peruvian government, for example, is losing control over the Upper Huallaga Valley, the region which ships its most important export, coca paste, to Colombia and in return receives money, weapons, and some economic leadership. Colombian aircraft maintain this connection by flying in and out of Peruvian airspace with virtual impunity. Colombian middlemen increasingly buy paste directly from peasants in the Valley rather than through Peruvian dealers. The Upper Huallaga is becoming less a part of Peru and more a part of Colombia.

Finally, corruption severely undermines criminal justice systems in cocaine-producing countries. Law enforcement in Latin American countries often represents simply a way to share in the proceeds of the drug trade: the police take bribes not to make arrests and seizures. When the police do make successful busts, the drugs are often resold on the illicit market.

These barriers mean that anti-drug activities in Latin American countries are largely cosmetic. Governments draw up elaborate plans to eradicate coca — the police make a few highly publicized arrests and cocaine seizures, fly around the countryside in helicopters, terrorize villages, and knock out an occasional cocaine laboratory — but with little effect. The core structure of the cocaine industry remains, and the industry's agricultural base continues to expand. Farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley plant four or five acres for every hectare of coca eradicated, according to a professor at the Agrarian University of Tingo María, the capital of an important cocaine-growing province in the Valley.[44]

At the same time, governments resist the only effective method for controlling coca cultivation, herbicide. Herbicides toxic enough to kill the hardy cocaine bush may also be dangerous to agricultural crops, wildlife, fish, and even humans. The herbicide tebuthiuron ("Spike"), manufactured by Eli Lilly, is "one of a class of toxins that has caused liver damage and testicle tumors in rats." Lilly has refused to sell the herbicide to the State Department, apparently fearing a rash of liability lawsuits stemming from improper use.[45]

[44] *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1987.
[45] *The Washington Times*, June 8, 1988.

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As a result, Bolivia has ruled out chemical eradication entirely. In Colombia, an experimental spraying program has been halted because the government is reportedly afraid of "criticism by environmentalists, the political opposition and peasants involved in drug cultivation." In Peru test spraying has been underway since October 1987; however, the Peruvian government's willingness to move toward full-scale chemical eradication seems contingent on assurances "that the herbicide is not harmful to other plants, animals and human beings." Given the recent publicity surrounding "Spike" and other toxic chemicals, the Peruvian government may opt to remain at the testing stage indefinitely.[46]

The U.S. Policy Dilemma

A 1988 Department of State report noted that Latin American governments do not yet recognize that coca growing and cocaine trafficking "pose serious threats to their own survival."[47] Be that as it may, many Andean leaders are concerned that the suggested cures would be worse than the disease.

To a degree, that concern must also be the concern of Washington, which wants to encourage stable, economically viable governments in the region; to promote democracy; and to suppress leftist insurgent movements. America's war against its drug addiction is not necessarily compatible with these other priorities, at least in the short run. In fact, the argument can be made that the United States and its Latin American allies have a common interest in minimizing the intensity of the drug war. Yet this may be hard for Washington to do — particularly in an election year.

The Reagan administration is being pilloried by its opponents for not making drug control a top foreign-policy priority. Legislators and local officials demand reprisals against governments that tolerate the narcotics industry; U.S. Senator John Kerry (Democrat of Massachusetts) and New York City Mayor Edward Koch want to send troops to Colombia to root out the Medellín cartel.

These critics are responding to real public pressures. A *New York Times*/CBS News poll shows that Americans perceive drug trafficking as a more important international problem than arms control, terrorism, Palestinian unrest in Israel, or the situation in Central America. Another poll reports that Americans perceive stopping the drug dealings of anti-communist leaders in Central America as more important (by a vote of three to one) than fighting communism in the region. A third poll notes a public preference for U.S. government policies that reduce the supply of illicit drugs entering the United

[46] *INCSR*, 1988, pp. 8, 75, 91; and *The New York Times*, June 28, 1988.
[47] *INCSR*, 1988, p. 8.

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States over policies that focus on persuading Americans to stop using drugs.[48]

Nevertheless, the State Department report is certainly correct if it means that the status quo is not in the long-term interests of the Latin American countries. At issue is not so much democracy as the deterioration and de-modernization of political and economic institutions. As U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Charles Gillespie recently remarked, "The traffickers have already penetrated the fabric of Colombian life .... [T]his penetration will lead not to the downfall of Colombia and its institutions but rather to a serious and lasting corruption."[49] Other political problems include the governments' weakening hold on their territories, their deteriorating reputation, and discrimination against their citizens and products.

Unfortunately, there may be no useful way to upgrade the war against cocaine that is not counterproductive. Virtually every prescription under discussion carries major disadvantages.

Enhancement of drug-fighting capabilities in producer countries. Under this proposal, Andean governments would be provided with firepower, transport, communications, and intelligence support to establish their authority in drug-trafficking zones and destroy the cocaine industry's infrastructure. But the prevailing pattern of corruption in Andean countries makes many U.S. observers skeptical of the utility of such buildups. RAND economist Peter Reuter has suggested that better-equipped governments might mean no more than greater payoffs from the drug traffickers.[50]

"Americanization" of the war on drugs. In this approach, the U.S. receives permission to take over drug enforcement that producer countries cannot perform. Examples to date include Operation Blast Furnace, the U.S. Army-supported operation against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia in the summer of 1986, and the trial of Colombian drug traffickers in U.S. courts. Americanization works to a point — Blast Furnace virtually shut down Bolivia's cocaine industry for three months — but such operations carry extreme political risks for host governments. All segments of Bolivia's political establishment condemned the operation and no leader with less stature than Victor Paz Estenssoro could have survived the political fallout. (The Colombian and Peruvian governments have declined U.S. offers of military assistance.) Extradition is widely unpopular in Colombia and anathema in most of Latin America. Last June the Colombian Supreme Court struck down legislation enabling the government to implement the extradition treaty with the U.S.

[48] *The New York Times*, April 10, 1988.
[49] Quoted in *The Los Angeles Times*, February 21, 1988.
[50] Congressional Research Service, *Combatting International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy*, Report for the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 13.

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Income replacement. "If we are to make a difference in cocaine control," declares a Department of State report, "a massive infusion of economic assistance will be required."[51] Such assistance compensates countries for the economic and social costs of shutting down cocaine production. Possible measures include hard currency loans to compensate for the reduced flow of dollars and lowering import barriers for legitimate products, such as textiles and sugar.

But what about the hundreds of thousands of small farmers who cultivate coca? A coca farmer in the Bolivian Chapare can net up to $2,600 per hectare per year, over four times what he can earn from cultivating oranges and avocados, the next most profitable traditional crops.[52] Thus crop substitution offers few attractions. The U.S. government is now indirectly paying $2,000 for each hectare of coca eradicated in Bolivia, but the Bolivian government estimates that the social costs of eradication — the cost of redirecting farmers into the licit agricultural economy — would be at least $7,000 per hectare.[53] For Bolivia, where coca grows on 50,000-70,000 hectares, the cost of total eradication would be a mind-boggling $350-$490 million. Even if the money were available, it might be misspent; there are persistent rumors that some coca farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the Chapare have used the cash payments for eradication to underwrite the costs of planting new coca fields in other locations.[54]

Sanctions. Perennially popular with Congress, this course of action includes withholding aid, prohibiting trade, cutting off international lending, and restricting the flow of travelers. Yet the record shows few cases where sanctions have achieved the desired objective. To cut off aid to the Andean countries would probably provoke intense anti-Yankee feeling, poison the diplomatic atmosphere, and reduce the resources available for anti-drug campaigns.

In addition, sanctions are a blunt instrument for specific problems. Thus, when Jorge Ochoa was released from a Colombian jail on December 30, 1987 (the second such release in sixteen months), the U.S. government singled out Colombian passengers and products for special customs checks at U.S. ports of entry. Yet the Colombian government had no jurisdiction over the criminal court judge who ordered Ochoa's release, and it had taken extraordinary measures to ensure that Ochoa could not escape from jail. Hence, the U.S. sanctions were misplaced — they will not bring Ochoa back to jail, nor will they make Colombia's criminal justice system less porous. Worse,

[51] *INCSR*, 1988, p. 8.

[52] Gerald Owens, "Costs of Production: Coca," Unsolicited report to AID, December 31, 1986, p. 6.

[53] Peter McFadden, "New Eradication Program Winning Over Coca Farmers," Associated Press, December 31, 1987.

[54] Interviews with Peruvian officials, Upper Huallaga Valley, October 10-14, 1987. (In Peru, farmers get up to $300 for each hectare of cocaine destroyed.) Also, telephone interview with a U.S. expert on Bolivian rural development, June 26, 1988.

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they doubtless added to the unpopularity of the war against drugs. As Carlos Mauro Hoyas, Colombia's recently murdered attorney general, remarked, "Reprisals against innocent tourists create anger and resentment as well as a sort of solidarity with the drug bosses, not as traffickers but as fellow Colombians."[55]

Negotiating cutbacks in drug production. This approach requires a dialogue with the Escobars, the Ochoas, the Rodríguez Gachas, and the other chief executives of the cocaine industry. The idea of a dialogue has enormous public support in Colombia. Supporters include a number of distinguished figures: a former head of Colombia's State Council (the country's top administrative court), a former acting attorney general, two Catholic bishops (of Popayan and Pereira), and several congressmen and academics.[56] The traffickers themselves made a formal offer to the government in 1984 — to withdraw from the cocaine industry, dismantle their laboratories and airstrips, and repatriate their capital. In return, they wanted guarantees against extradition, which would have amounted to a safe haven in Colombia. The Colombian government has said officially that it will not negotiate with traffickers.

Certainly, selective amnesty arrangements for criminals can and have been tried as tools of law enforcement. (The United States has its own witness protection program, for example.) Cocaine chiefs could reveal much about the structure and operations of the international cocaine industry — its supply channels, distribution networks, personnel policies, financing, and the names of corrupt U.S. officials who abet the trade. They could also provide information about guerrilla operations, for the two often use the same territory, the same clandestine methods, the same smuggling channels, even the same overseas banks.

Yet it is hard to see how the proposal would work in practice. One problem is timing: when the traffickers made their original offer to the government, they were under great pressure. Colombia had a functioning extradition treaty with the United States, and traffickers were being tried in military courts, which have a higher conviction rate than civilian courts. Thanks to Colombian Supreme Court decisions, neither of these conditions is operative today, and the Barco government does not have a great deal of bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the country's cocaine syndicates.

[55] *The New York Times*, January 13, 1988.

[56] See, for example, "Hay que Hablar con los Narcos Dicen 2 Obispos," *El Tiempo*, February 13, 1988; "Lo nico que Hacemos Es el Oso," (an interview with Alfredo Gutiérrez Márquez, then acting attorney general) *El Tiempo*, February 22, 1988; Richard Craig, "Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South American Source Countries," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Summer 1987, p. 4; M. Arango and J. Child, *Narcotrafico Imperio de las Cocaina* (Medellín: Editorial Percepción, 1984), pp. 13-14.

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Further, monitoring an amnesty arrangement — the repatriation of capital and the shutting down of a multi-billion-dollar industry — would present fundamental problems. How many Colombian and American law enforcement officials would it take to oversee such a program, and who would monitor the monitors? Too, the traffickers might be unable to deliver on their promises. Is the cocaine industry so tightly structured that a few kingpins can command a larger number of lieutenants to order an even larger number of subordinates to stop producing a product that earns so much? Possibly, but an amnesty might constitute little more than a retirement program for the chief executives of the cocaine industry. They would have to make a practical demonstration of their market power — say, by shutting down 80 percent of Colombian cocaine production for a six-month period. Amnesty is at best a futuristic option — the idea has some theoretical merit, but it would be extremely difficult to implement.

These difficulties suggest that curbing the supply of cocaine from producer countries may not be effective, no matter how much money the United States government devotes to overseas programs.

Are there better ways to spend the U.S. drug-enforcement dollar? The options seem to be increased interdiction, stepped-up enforcement against drug dealers and pushers, and such demand-reduction steps as stiffer penalties for users, "Just Say No" programs, and drug testing. Many U.S. experts expect these measures also may not work very well.[57] Moreover, as the national controversy over drug testing indicates, there are political and legal limits to controlling drug consumption, just as there are limits to controlling production in the Andean countries. Short of legalizing cocaine use (which carries the danger of stimulating even more addiction) or changing the habits and preferences of U.S. consumers, there seems to be no way out of the cocaine morass.

The solution, if there is one, lies not in the Andean jungles but in the United States. The six million people who now consume cocaine must be persuaded to change their habits and preferences. Perhaps they will grow tired of cocaine and switch to designer drugs; or perhaps they will find more productive and healthy forms of recreation.

[57] *The New York Times*, April 12, 1988.

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1988	Stephen M. Walt *The Origins of Alliances* Cornell University Press
1987	Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. *The Army and Vietnam* The John Hopkins University Press, 1986
1986	Bruce G. Blair *Strategic Command and Control* Brookings Institution
1985	Barry R. Posen *The Sources of Military Doctrine* Cornell University Press
1984	John J. Mearsheimer *Conventional Deterrence* Cornell University Press
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WHO WILL STAFF NATO?

by Susan L. Clark

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has relied on a combination of conventional and nuclear forces since it adopted a strategy of flexible response in 1967.[1] In recent years, a number of events — including the Soviet Union's achievement of nuclear parity with the United States, the U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (the INF treaty), and growing concerns about the devastation that could be wrought by nuclear weapons — have caused the Alliance to place more emphasis on conventional forces. Also important in this regard is the call for a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons by prestigious commentators[2] and appeals for improvement in the West's conventional capabilities such as those by NATO's former supreme allied commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers.[3]

While NATO has made some significant improvements in its conventional forces, most defense analysts are not satisfied with current trends. If projected into the next decade, they yield grim prospects. For one thing, it is becoming increasingly evident in both the United States and Western Europe that future levels of defense spending are unlikely to match the efforts of recent years. In this environment of growing financial constraints, the monies available for conventional force improvements will not be able to keep pace with requirements. In addition, manpower, a major component of conventional capability, is especially worrisome because of future demographic constraints.

Unless significant changes in national recruitment policies are implemented to compensate for the impending demographic crunch, there is virtually no possibility that NATO will maintain current force levels through the end of this century. This would result in a signif-

[1] This paper looks at fourteen of NATO's sixteen countries, including France but excluding Spain and Iceland. It is commonly accepted practice to incorporate French figures into NATO military calculations, although France formally withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. Spain does not appear likely to join NATO's integrated military structure, and Iceland possesses no armed forces.

[2] McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982.

[3] Bernard W. Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 151 ff.; also, "Former NATO Chief Calls for Force Improvements to Offset INF Cuts," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, December 14, 1987, p. 24.

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TABLE 1

NATO'S CONSCRIPT POOL

Nation	1987	1990	1995	2000	Percentage of Change, 1987–2000
Belgium	381	360	318	310	−18.6
Canada	1,054	981	922	944	−10.4
Denmark	208	190	179	149	−28.4
France	2,214	2,179	2,027	1,900	−14.2
FRG	2,626	2,221	1,543	1,524	−42.0
Greece	400	388	360	364	−9.0
Italy	2,417	2,281	2,120	1,677	−30.6
Luxembourg	14	13	11	11	−21.4
Netherlands	634	614	487	455	−28.2
Norway	171	170	148	132	−22.8
Portugal	436	435	433	391	−10.3
Turkey	2,808	2,924	3,087	3,309	+17.8
U.K.	2,394	2,229	1,802	1,788	−25.3
U.S.	9,650	9,522	8,646	9,329	−3.3
Total NATO	25,407	24,507	22,083	22,253	−12.4
Total European NATO	14,703	14,004	12,515	11,980	−18.5

NOTE: Males, 18–22 years old, in thousands
SOURCE: Based on data prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the World Population 1986 project.

icant weakening of the West's conventional defenses. But financial and demographic constraints make it unlikely those changes will be made; the result is major problems for the future of NATO's military manpower.

Demographic Trends

The changing number of males between eighteen and twenty-two years old is the foundation for studying the impact of demography on military manpower since this is the segment of the population most often drawn upon for conscript service. For fourteen of NATO's sixteen member countries seen as a unit, the number of these military-age men will decline more than 12 percent by the end of this century, from roughly 25.4 million to 22.3 million. For the European countries alone, the decline is even greater, amounting to a loss of 18.5 percent. Table 1 illustrates these trends for each country, as well as for the fourteen as a whole.

Some countries will face much more severe declines than others, with the pattern following clear geographic lines. The North American armies will encounter moderate but not severe shortages. In the south of Europe, only Italy will see a significant drop in the number of its young men, while only Turkey will see growth in this population

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TABLE 2

PROJECTED MILITARY MANPOWER LEVELS, 1987–2000, ASSUMING CONSTANT POLICIES

Nation	Current Number Active-Duty Personnel per 100 18–22 Year Olds*	Active-Duty Manpower in thousands				Percentage of Change, 1987–2000
		1987	1990	1995	2000	
Belgium	24	91	86	76	74	−18.7
Canada	8	83	77	73	74	−10.8
Denmark	14	29	26	25	21	−27.6
France	25	557	548	510	478	−14.2
FRG	19	486	411	286	282	−42.0
Greece	52	209	203	188	190	−9.1
Italy	16	388	366	340	269	−30.7
Luxembourg	5	.7	.7	.6	.6	−14.3
Netherlands	17	105	102	81	75	−28.6
Norway	22	37	37	32	29	−21.6
Portugal	16	68	68	68	61	−10.3
Turkey	23	654	681	719	771	+17.9
U.K.	14	324	302	244	242	−25.3
U.S.	22	2,144	2,116	1,921	2,073	−3.3
All NATO	20	5,178	4,995	4,500	4,535	−12.4

* When calculating projected manpower levels, this figure is carried out to two decimal places.

SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1986–1987* (London: IISS, 1986); Data prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the World Population 1986 project.

group. The brunt of the problem will fall on the central and northern regions of Europe. Taking NATO as a whole, by the year 2000, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom will all see the number of their eighteen-to-twenty-two-year-old men decline by over 20 percent. These numbers are not speculative; the males in question have already been born.

NATO has maintained a fairly steady level of active duty manpower over the past decade.[4] The 1986 total of about 5,200,000 military personnel differs by only 2 percent from the total in 1975. Admittedly, there was a decline in these figures during the late 1970s (in good part because of U.S. declines), but increases during the first half of the 1980s essentially made up for those losses.

Owing to the impending demographic constraints, this consistency cannot be expected to be repeated in the coming decade. Based on current ratios between the numbers of young men and the numbers of active-duty personnel, table 2 illustrates what NATO force

[4] According to data reported in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual publication, *The Military Balance, 1986-1987* (London: IISS, 1986).

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levels *could* look like by the year 2000, if no new policies are implemented. (The purpose of this table is illustrative; it is not intended to pinpoint exactly what the forces will look like in a decade.)

Before examining possible solutions to the demographic problem, however, it is useful to look at the military manpower issues and problems in some of these countries. Specifically, the largest contributors of conventional forces are examined: the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Turkey, and the United States.

Trends in Individual Countries

Federal Republic of Germany. The most difficult demographic problems will be in West Germany. At present, the Bundeswehr inducts 250,000 men annually. Of the men reaching draft age each year, some 77 percent are judged to be capable of military service. But, of these, 20 percent receive conscientious-objector (CO), head-of-family, or religious exemptions. If present criteria are maintained, 1988 will be the last year in which West Germany has more men in its draft pool than it needs. In fact, by the mid-1990s, the pool will number only about 150,000.[5]

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The problem is compounded by the steady increase that has taken place in the 1980s in applications for CO status. Apparently the government believed that by forcing conscientious objectors to serve for a longer time than soldiers (twenty months instead of fifteen, as of January 1, 1984), young men would be deterred from seeking CO status. But this has not proved to be true, perhaps because procedures for obtaining CO status were simultaneously eased. Previously, one had to justify one's request at a hearing of a county board, which could accept or reject the application. Now, the applicant submits a letter requesting CO status and it is automatically granted. The decision has thereby been taken out of the state's hands and

[5] Pascal Boniface and François Heisbourg, *La Puce, les Hommes et la Bombe* (Paris: Hachette, 1986), pp. 80-81; see also, "West German Army Officials See Forces Shrinking in '90s," *Army Gazette*, February 20, 1987, p. 4.

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placed in the hands of the individual.[6] In 1986, 59,000 young men applied for and received CO status.

United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom will not face a demographic crunch as severe as the FRG's, its reliance on an all-volunteer force creates different problems. Recruitment rates have remained adequate, so far, primarily because they correlate directly with high unemployment. But the public cost of enlisting volunteers is much greater than the cost of conscripts, so the problem in the United Kingdom is primarily financial. Further, as the manpower pool declines, military service will have to be made more attractive in order to keep up recruiting levels. Yet it is unlikely that the defense budget will be big enough to pay for these added benefits. From 1981 through 1987, the total number of service personnel declined by about 4 percent. Declines will undoubtedly be greater given that the manpower pool will shrink and that the commitment to maintain real growth in the defense budget will no longer be met.[7]

France. Among countries of the central region, France probably faces the fewest problems in meeting its manpower requirements, in part because of its decision in the 1984-88 defense plan to reduce force levels by some 37,000 troops. Its services currently absorb 260,000 men per year, a rate that can be met under present policies until the mid-1990s. But beginning in 1994, France's pool of young men eighteen to twenty-two will be 2 to 12 percent smaller than present policies require. Nevertheless, this may well be overcome without lengthening the period of conscription.[8] One French policy that might be applied in other countries is the so-called long voluntary service, which might more accurately be called "conscript recruitment." In 1985, some 10 percent of conscripts chose to extend their term of service by six to twelve months.[9] If this program continues to be relatively popular, it will probably provide France with sufficient additional manpower to make up for demographic shortfalls in the mid-1990s.

Italy. The Italian government recognizes that the country will face problems maintaining the size of its current force, with its annual accession rate of approximately 300,000 men. But popular sentiment against conscription has induced the government to emphasize raising the number of volunteers in the military while reducing the number of conscripts. In 1985, the Italian Ministry of Defense cut the number of conscripts by approximately 25,000 and plans to make

[6] Karl Feldmeyer, "Many Changes; Little Effect — The Right to Conscientious Objection and the Position of the Bundeswehr," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 10, 1987, p. 12, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *West Europe Report* (hereafter JPRS-WER) 87-034, April 22, 1987, p. 89.

[7] Secretary of State for Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, Parts 1 and 2* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987), p. 23 (Part 2) and p. 52 (Part 1).

[8] See Boniface and Heisbourg, *La Puce*, p. 87.

[9] Ibid.

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further reductions. These cuts are supposed to be offset by dramatically increasing the number of volunteers from 3,000 to 70,000 and by seeking women to fill administrative positions.[10] Yet, if volunteers are to enter and stay in the military in sufficient numbers, service has to be made more appealing. Italy has long had a problem retaining its officers and NCOs, because of low wages and a lack of interest in the military life.

The key problem associated with reliance on volunteers is the issue of cost. One analysis projects that creating a force of 70,000 volunteers will neccessitate a 60 percent increase in personnel costs.[11] It is uncertain whether the government is willing to make such increased payments.

Turkey. Turkey represents the exception to the general pattern of manpower trends within the Alliance. At a time when the military services of most other NATO nations face an impending shortfall in young men, Turkey's services face an annual excess of 200,000-250,000. This surplus could climb to 800,000.[12] Accordingly, the Turkish government has been examining a proposal to accept payment in lieu of military service. Those arguing against the idea say that the richer and better-educated will choose this option, leaving the armed forces with less-qualified conscripts. There has also been some discussion about adopting a volunteer system. In any event , Turkey will certainly continue to contribute its share (and perhaps more) to NATO's military manpower. The central difficulty for Turkey lies in quality rather than quantity; it is in Turkey's interest as well as NATO's for Turkey to develop a more professional, better-equipped, and better-trained force, rather than one with ever-increasing numbers of conscripts.

The United States. In the early 1990s the United States will need to recruit 60 to 75 percent of its eligible men (versus the current 50 percent) to meet current force level needs and staff the new positions created by the defense build-up of the Reagan years.[13] Two other factors may well combine to produce troop cuts: budgetary constraints and burden sharing (i.e., the need for all members of NATO to do their "fair share" in contributing to the West's defense). In many U.S. circles, the belief exists that the United States has been overburdened by NATO, while the Europeans have gone along for the ride. As defense budgets grow tighter in coming years, the pressure will build within these circles to change this imbalance. Coupled

[10] Antonio Ciampi, "Volunteer or Conscript? Major Changes Loom For Italy's Forces," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 20, 1986, p. 1442.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Coskun Kirca, "In Politics: Equality in Payment in Lieu of Military Service," *Hurriyet*, February 6, 1987, p. 17; and M. Ali Birand, "Excess in Military Cannot Be Solved This Way," *Milliyet*, February 6, 1987, p. 9; both as translated in JPRS-WER-87-046, pp. 111, 113.

[13] Boniface and Heisbourg, *La Puce*, p. 91.

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with the improbability that any NATO country will meet the commitment of an annual 3 percent real growth in its defense budgets, a groundswell of public support will likely develop in the United States to "bring the boys home."

Possible Solutions

Clearly, without changes in policy, many NATO countries will suffer considerable declines in their active-duty manpower. There are, however, several methods by which the states can maintain active-duty strengths. Six approaches come to mind.

Make conscript service longer. One of the most obvious policy alternatives is to extend the period of conscription. The key difficulty is political. In many NATO countries, conscription is unpopular, so that even if governments wished to extend service time, they would find the political cost too great. West Germany is a case in point. The current conservative government has passed a law extending the term of conscription from fifteen to eighteen months, effective 1989. The Social Democratic party has, however, vowed that should it be re-elected it would return to a fifteen-month term. This three-month extension should add another 36,000 troops to West Germany's total force levels.

Some countries (including Portugal and Italy) are actually planning to reduce the term of conscription. In the case of Portugal, demographic declines are not significant enough to cause serious manpower shortages. In Italy, however, the demographic constraints would suggest lengthening the term of conscription for the army and air force, rather than shortening the term for the navy. But because conscription is so unpopular in Italy, the government seems to feel that making voluntary service more attractive (through pay increases and the like) is the best way to raise force levels.

For countries with an all-volunteer force, the corollary to extending conscription terms would be to keep volunteers in the service longer by making military life more attractive. Naturally, this requires an even larger portion of the defense budget — one that will be hard to obtain if overall defense budgets continue to receive smaller increases, and in some cases even shrink. In Great Britain, for example, manpower costs for military personnel have averaged about 25 percent of the defense budget during the 1980s.[14] Yet as manpower competes with equipment procurements (namely, the Trident and Tornado) for increasingly scarce resources the percentage of funds devoted to manpower will probably have to be reduced further.

Tighten exemptions. Alliance countries that engage in conscription could obtain more men by reducing the exemptions. At present,

[14] Secretary of State for Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987. Part 2*, p. 9.

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exemptions include medical reasons, conscientious objections, religious objections, student status, and being the head of a household.

The West German authorities have altered the medical and age criteria, with significant results. In October 1984, Defense Minister Manfred Wörner reduced the medical requirements for conscripts. The 1985 German *White Paper* notes that, since these criteria were amended, the percentage of those judged "fit for military service" increased from 76.5 percent in 1980 to 81.9 percent in 1984, and that "increases by another one to two percent seem possible."[15] In addition to altering medical criteria, the German government has also extended the ages at which men are available, so that they can now be drafted until they reach the age of thirty-two (rather than twenty-eight). Also, as of 1988, married men can be taken into the service. According to one government estimate, changes in medical criteria should add another 12,000 troops, while tightening deferments and exemptions should account for an additional 6,000.[16]

The German government is also trying to make CO status less appealing by further extending the duration of CO service when the duration of conscript service is extended in 1989. When conscripts are made to serve eighteen months, conscientious objectors will have to serve two years, as opposed to the current twenty months. As noted above, however, the first extension of CO service did not bring down the number of CO applications, apparently because of a simultaneous easing in the procedures for obtaining CO status. Since the next extension of CO service will not change the ratio between the two terms of service, which the first did, it seems unlikely to have significant impact.

In all, according to the West German Ministry of Defense, another 69,000 men could be obtained if acquiring CO status were made more difficult and if the conscription criteria were altered in the ways discussed above.[17] But this is probably an optimistic figure. And even if the current conservative government succeeded in tightening exemptions, what would be the political cost of such a move?[18] Implementing such changes would provide the peace movements and leftist parties with a new weapon. The government cannot afford to ignore the likely opposition to such changes.

In other Western countries, conscientious objection does not have as significant an effect on manpower, although its role may grow if peace movements continue to increase in popularity. In France and Italy, part of the appeal of conscientious objection until

[15] Federal Minister of Defense, *White Paper 1985: The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces* (Bonn: Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1985), p. 244.

[16] Bundesminister der Verteidigung Informations-und Pressestab, "Die Bundeswehrplanung für die 90 er Jehr," Material für die Presse (Bonn, October 17, 1984), p. 15.

[17] Cited in Boniface and Heisbourg, *La Puce*, p. 84.

[18] Ibid.

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recently has been that many applicants have not had to perform comparable labor. Now, however, in both countries the alternative service programs are working more efficiently, allowing fewer men to escape performing any type of service, which may lead to reductions in the number of future CO applicants. Moreover, the Italian Ministry of Defense implemented new restrictions in 1986 on exemptions granted to university students, recognizing that many students remain enrolled year after year to avoid being conscripted.

The easing of physical criteria makes sense for virtually every country that faces demographic constraints. The modern military has plenty of jobs for those judged incapable of strenuous labor. There are another two ways to fill administrative slots: recruiting more women into the forces and substituting civilians for military personnel.

Bring in more women. The use of women in the armed forces varies from country to country. Some forbid women even to volunteer, while women make up approximately 9 percent of United States and Canadian forces. In the United Kingdom and France the figure varies between 2 and 5 percent. In virtually all instances, the question of increasing women's role in the armed forces focuses on filling additional administrative and other non-combat positions.

In West Germany, women can serve only in the medical service as officers. One proposal, considered and rejected by the Defense Ministry several years ago, would let women fill more logistics and support roles. However, any expansion of a female role in the military beyond what is currently allowed (i.e., voluntary service only in positions that do not require carrying arms) would require parliamentary action to change the Constitution. Given the limitations imposed by the Constitution, studies conducted in West Germany have concluded "that a maximum of probably 12,000-14,000 jobs could be done by women and that the figure might be as low as 8,000."[19] It seems that a firm consensus has formed against including female volunteers in the Bundeswehr, even though the head of the Ministry of Defense's Planning Staff, Hans Ruhle, suggested in January 1987 the possibility of drafting women for communication and combat support jobs.[20] Statements such as Ruhle's are probably designed to convince West Germany's NATO allies of the seriousness of their problem and of the government's determination to do everything to avoid drastic force reductions.

Only Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway theoretically allow women to serve in all assignments, combat and non-

[19] " . . . German Army Looks for Men," *International Defense Review*, No. 2, 1984, p. 119.

[20] Quoted in James A. Russell, "Germans Make Plans to Draft More Troops," *Defense Week*, January 26, 1987, p. 12. See also Stephen-Andreas Casdorff, "Lean Years," *Loyal*, June 1987, pp. 6-9, as translated in JPRS-WER-87-076, p. 70.

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combat and, in fact, only Denmark has made serious moves toward observing this policy, inspired in part by the women's liberation movement and in part by the shortage of service-age men. Following a successful four-year experiment, the Danish parliament authorized the navy to recruit women "for front-line naval assignments on an equal basis with men for all but submarine duty."[21] Following the completion of comparable experiments in the Danish army and air force, the Danish government has announced that all assignments in its armed forces will be open to women effective July 1, 1988, with the exception of fighter pilot positions.[22] Other NATO countries have been studying the experiments to judge the likely success or failure of similar efforts in their own forces,[23] but as yet there are no indications that the prevalent "no combat" rule will be altered.

Substitute civilians. Placing civilians in more support roles would free military personnel for combat roles. But this alternative presents a difficulty also encountered in the option of recruiting more women: owing to the emphasis on enhancing front-line capabilities, the number of positions that could be filled by civilians is relatively small and probably declining. In the case of West Germany, indeed, "all tasks in the Bundeswehr that are not of a strictly military nature are [already] discharged by the civilian personnel of 176,000 women and men."[24] Thus, the potential for increasing civilian participation seems limited. To the extent any alterations are feasible within NATO, the most likely service to be affected would be the army, which always has the highest percentage of conscripts and usually a lower percentage of civilians.

Enlist conscripts for extended terms. A successful policy recently implemented in France allows conscripts to enlist for a longer term of service in return for greater benefits, primarily pay. This option has the advantage of retaining trained personnel, which enhances NATO's readiness. In Italy drafted personnel are given a similar option of two- or three-year terms of service.[25] In its effort to increase the number of draftees recruited for extended active duty from about 9.5 percent to 12 percent, West Germany has increased pay and benefits for conscripts.[26]

Change the active/reserve mix. West Germany has gone farthest in altering the balance between active-duty forces and reserves. In

[21] Karen DeYoung, "Danish Women Approaching Equality in Armed Forces," *The Washington Post*, September 21, 1987.

[22] See "Danish Forces Open Doors to Women Recruits," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 12, 1988, pp. 424-25; also, "Danes to Let Women go into Combat," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 5, 1988, p. 3.

[23] "Denmark's Women Soldiers on Front Line Also," *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 9, 1987, p. 27, as translated in JPRS-WER-87-056, p. 66.

[24] Federal Minister of Defense, *White Paper 1985*, p. 238.

[25] *La Republica*, December 12, 1986, p. 2, as translated in JPRS-WER-87-052, p. 92.

[26] Casdorff, "Lean Years," p. 70.

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addition to adopting measures to extend the period of reserve service, the Federal Republic has detailed a reorganization of the Bundeswehr's peacetime organization which is due to take effect in the 1990s. At that time, the military will contain 456,000 active-duty personnel, 15,000 reserves filling military training positions, and 24,000 reservists in an improved state of readiness. The total strength of the Bundeswehr will, thereby, remain at 495,000 troops. In addition, regular reserves will also increase in number. These numbered 850,000 in 1985; in 1995, the military plans to have 1,270,000. But approximately one-third of the reservists called up failed to report in 1985.[27] This raises important questions of reliability.

Clearly, the Federal Republic wants to send a message to its allies that it will do everything it can to strengthen the West's conventional defense, in this case by keeping up its force levels. At issue is whether juggling the numbers to keep totals the same is going to benefit the Alliance. It can be argued that this is better than nothing. But it can also be argued that, given West Germany's strategic location, an increased reliance on reserves to fulfill defense commitments to NATO may well result in at least a partial abandonment of forward defense.[28]

For the United Kingdom, the substitution of reserve personnel for active-duty personnel is possible but likely to be controversial. There are two components to British reserve forces: the Regular Reserves (former military servicemen who do not train during peacetime) and the Volunteer Reserves, including the Territorial Army (volunteers who serve for three years and receive limited training on weekends or weekday evenings, much like the U.S. reserve system). Utilizing British reserves more extensively presents problems. Substituting Regular Reserves for active-duty troops requires a change in policy, whereby these reserves would be obliged to serve in peacetime. Given that the military is wholly voluntary, such an action would appear difficult to implement; it would also make regular military service less attractive to future prospective recruits. On the other hand, the Volunteer Reserves — like their U.S. counterparts — do not possess the military experience and training enjoyed by active-duty personnel, so that while assigning them to formerly active-duty positions would not require such a major shift in policy, the readiness capability of the active-duty force would suffer.

Of all the alternatives discussed, rearranging the active/reserve ratios could well have the most negative impact on NATO's readiness for conventional war.

[27] Lieutenant Colonel Manfred Engelhardt, "Reservist Concept for the 1990's. Thoughts on Outlining Conditions and Objectives," *Truppenpraxis*, January 1987, p. 28, as translated in JPRS-WER-87-036, p. 61.

[28] Boniface and Heisbourg, *La Puce*, p. 86.

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Soviet Bloc Demographics

Clearly the trends in Western Europe's manpower pool are a cause for concern. Yet they must be seen in perspective, for the Soviet bloc too has considerable demographic problems, albeit of a different sort and dimension from NATO's problems. Trends within the Soviet Union obviously have the greatest significance, for the USSR accounts for more than 75 percent of all the Warsaw Pact's armed forces.

Evidence of the Soviet Union's concern with its demography began to appear at the beginning of the 1980s. A book by V.D. Kozlov, published in 1982, indicated that the issue had begun to affect party policy. "As a result of the unevenness of demographic processes in various areas of the country and the over-all reduction in the natural growth of the population, the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has postulated the question about the need to conduct an active demographic policy in the USSR in the coming decades."[29] As Kozlov's statement suggests, Soviet demographic concerns pertain both to the total population and to the relative sizes of various ethnic groups.

In 1985, the overall birthrate in the USSR was 2.4, compared to a rate of 4.4 in 1939. This decline is attributable in good part to the urbanization of the population; two-thirds of the USSR's population now live in cities, and in large cities the birthrate is only 1.5.[30]

Moscow has implemented several policy changes to meet current force levels, necessitated by these demographic trends. First, in 1980 the Law on Universal Military Obligation was amended "to specify that school deferments applied only to schools on an approved list."[31] The amendment went into effect in 1982 and was intended to lower deferments significantly. Evidently that did not happen, for the prestigious Moscow State University was dropped from the list of qualifying schools two years later.

The controversy surrounding these measures has now reached the pages of *Literaturnaya gazeta*, which printed opposing views on the law.[32] The first article criticized the drafting of first- and second-year college students into the armed forces, reasoning that the economy and state as a whole were losing talented people, because most conscripts would not return to college. The authors proposed exempting particularly bright or talented students, arguing that Soviet

[29] V. D. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR: Etnodemograficheskii obzor* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1982), p. 209.

[30] A. Antonov, "Should Families Be Small or Large?" *Pravda*, August 11, 1987, p. 3, as translated in JPRS-UEA-87-032, pp. 95-96.

[31] Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 3d edition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 322.

[32] See the roundtable, "Pochemu u nas malo po-nastoyashchemu obrazovannykh lyudei?" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 13, 1987; and, Colonel-General M.A. Gareev, "Eshche raz ob obrazovannosti: Est' drugoe mnenie," ibid., June 3, 1987.

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society needed them more as professionals than as soldiers. Colonel-General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev then responded that over 85 percent of drafted students later return to school. Further, he reasoned, the universities actually benefited from this new law because it weeded out students attending college simply to obtain deferments. Finally, Gareev observed, the technological challenge and threat posed by the West means the armed forces need talented people as much as do the civilian professions.

The Soviets also appear to be turning in a limited way to the conscription of women. As the manpower pool began to decline in the 1980s, the military increased the number of female recruits. Apparently feeling that the response was not adequate, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1985 decreed an amendment to the military draft law that "provides for draft registration of women with 'medical and other [i.e., communication, computers, clerical] specialized training.' Such women between the ages of nineteen and forty could be required to undergo military training and be 'accepted on a voluntary basis into active military service.' "[33]

According to an analysis in *The Washington Post*, bringing women into the Soviet military appears designed in part to "offset the influx of non-Russian speakers [into the armed forces] from less developed republics."[34] In 1984 the "Reform of General Education and Vocational Training" laws approached the same problem from a different angle, by seeking improvements in the Russian language skills of non-Russian Soviets.[35]

As for the ethnic distribution of births, a 1987 *Pravda* article explains that in the six predominantly European republics of the USSR (the RSFSR, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSRs), the average number of births is below 2.15 — the minimum for replenishing the population. In contrast, the four Central Asian republics, which constitute just 10 percent of the country's population, account for one-fifth of all births and one-third of its entire demographic increase.[36]

The change in the composition of the USSR's armed forces has led to language, cultural, and political problems. The expanding role of high technology in the armed forces creates a need for well-educated, Russian-speaking military personnel; as a rule, the Muslims are neither fluent in Russian nor as well educated as the Slavs.

But beyond language, ethnicity in the Soviet Union also raises questions of political reliability. The war in Afghanistan has made

[33] Dusko Doder, "Soviets to Accept Women as 'Volunteers' in Military," *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1985.

[34] Ibid.

[35] "Educational Reform to Boost Military Efficiency," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 31, 1987, p. 149.

[36] A. Antonov, "Should Families Be Small or Large?"

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Soviet leaders aware of problems associated with relying on non-Slavic forces, particularly Muslims. Thus, Admiral Aleksei Ivanovich Sorokin wrote of the impact of the USSR's "unsatisfactory demographic situation" on Soviet combat capabilities in February 1983. He noted that demographic trends affect the Soviet armed forces in terms of the "quantity and location of conscripted and reserve contingents" and the nationalities making up these contingents. Sorokin concluded that "matters must be organized so that the consequences of the unfavorable demographic situation in the country are overcome and compensated for, and do not affect the combat might and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces."[37]

The same concern about loyalty and reliability pertains to the non-Soviet soldiers of the Warsaw Pact. It is significant that slightly more than half the Pact's standing divisions in Central Europe are non-Soviet. Since reliability depends on the threat and the interests involved, if non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations perceive a conflict to be in the Soviets' interest, but not their own, the Soviet Union probably would not be able to count on their support. In a survey of the East European allies, Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes conclude that "the Czechoslovak army must be regarded as unreliable under almost any circumstances. . . . Against NATO, the Bulgarian army is the only one which could be relied upon in almost all circumstances. The Germans are partially reliable, and under some circumstances, the Poles would fight." Hungary's reliability "can be considered minimal at best" and Romania would seem unlikely to get involved against the West.[38]

One key difference diminishes the demographic problem facing the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the NATO countries will generally experience the greatest declines in their pool of young men between 1995 and 2000, the low point for this population in Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was reached during the early to mid-1980s. Through the end of the century, Warsaw Pact countries (again, with the exception of the GDR) will see increases in their conscript pool (see table 3).

Moreover, as authoritarian political systems, Soviet bloc states find it easier than do the West's democratic governments to field relatively large forces, even from shrinking population pools. In the final analysis, demographic problems in the Soviet Bloc center on questions of quality more than quantity.

Is Arms Control More Likely?

Now that the United States and Soviet Union have signed an INF agreement, and attention is turning to strategic nuclear arms, the importance of conventional forces will grow. The problems re-

[37] A. I. Sorokin, "Vooruzhennye Sily razvitogo sotsializma," *Voprosy filosofii*, February 1983, p. 11.

[38] Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1980, pp. 290-291.

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TABLE 3

WARSAW PACT CONSCRIPT POOL

Nation	1987	1990	1995	2000	Percentage of Change, 1987–2000
Bulgaria	312	326	346	323	+3.5
Czechoslovakia	547	561	698	644	+17.7
GDR	649	582	465	582	−10.3
Hungary	355	376	438	387	+9.0
Poland	1,279	1,312	1,540	1,670	+30.6
Romania	938	1,107	983	964	+2.8
USSR	10,459	10,476	11,373	12,184	+16.5
Total Warsaw Pact	14,539	14,740	15,843	16,754	+15.2

NOTE: Males, 18–22 years old, in thousands.
SOURCE: Based on data prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the World Population 1986 project.

viewed here suggest the possibility of new interest in an arms control agreement dealing with conventional issues. Many would argue that there can be no realistic hope for such an agreement between East and West in the foreseeable future. Yet recent events indicate that new life is being breathed into conventional arms control negotiations. In an attempt to replace the moribund Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact began in February 1987 in an effort to conduct negotiations in the framework of the "Atlantic to the Urals," thereby expanding the zone encompassed by the MBFR negotiations.[39]

At the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting in 1986, Gorbachev proposed a phased troop reduction of up to 500,000 men by the early 1990s, beginning with a reduction of 100,000-150,000 within two years. In 1987, the military newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* published an article in which Major-General V. Tatarnikov said, "Only radical reductions in armed forces and armaments can lead to the attainment of stability in Europe."[40] This statement from a high-ranking military official implies not only that the Soviets are willing to talk about conventional arms control, but also that the military will play a role in these negotiations. Moreover, based on the experiences of the first three years of his tenure, it should be expected that Gorbachev will continue to generate new ideas and proposals which will likely pose serious challenges to the West.

[39] For a recent discussion of this effort, see David Yost, "Beyond MBFR: The Atlantic to the Urals Gambit," ORBIS, Spring 1987.

[40] Major-General V. Tatarnikov, "Etap otvetstvennosti predstoit," *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 2, 1987, p. 3.

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Gorbachev's emphasis on the need to concentrate on domestic economic improvements, coupled with a shrinking labor force, may make the notion of cutting the size of a costly standing army appealing to the Soviet leadership. But the greatest incentive for the Warsaw Pact to engage in serious military manpower reduction efforts lies in the propaganda gains to be derived from such a move. One of the West's prevailing criticisms of the Gorbachev leadership has been that although the style of Soviet actions and diplomacy has unquestionably changed in the past three years, little has been witnessed in the way of substantive changes to prove the new Soviet approach and "new thinking." Entering into serious negotiations on conventional forces in Europe — the present asymmetry of which is a constant source of concern to the West — would serve as proof of changes in the substance of Soviet policy.

While the underlying reasons for working toward mutual manpower reductions are not identical, it is in the interests of both East and West to reach such an accord over the next decade. In light of the recent agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and the current bargaining over strategic nuclear weapons, a viable balance of conventional forces in the European theater will become more important to the security of this region and the world.

Implications

The key problem for NATO in the 1990s lies in the likelihood of conventional force reductions by several NATO countries. Arguments will probably be made in Europe that because the costs (both economic and political) of maintaining current forces are prohibitive, cuts must be implemented. Demographic trends will contribute to these pressures to reduce conventional manpower. If such cuts are made, it is likely that Americans will call with increased vigor for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe. Such actions must be rejected on both sides if NATO is to maintain a viable conventional deterrent; otherwise, NATO will find itself with a reduced readiness capability and even greater imbalance in the East-West conventional force ratio.

Maintaining NATO's conventional force levels hinges in part on the political willingness of member states to do so. Although in 1987 conservative governments were returned to power in the United Kingdom and West Germany, and all the governments of the key countries are firmly committed to a strong NATO defense, this picture may well change in the next decade. If socialist parties come to power in some of these countries, two changes in their security policies might result. The governments might reverse steps taken to avoid a unilateral reduction of conventional forces; and they might begin to drift toward neutralism in their foreign and security policies.

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But not everything is politics. Economic considerations will also play a central role in determining future manpower levels in Western Europe. Only modest economic growth rates are anticipated in the United States and Western Europe through the next decade.[41] Thus, no real growth in these countries' defense budgets can be expected in the 1990s. These factors will make it more difficult to maintain current levels of military manpower. As Robbin Laird puts it:

> Hard choices in the security area will be avoided for political reasons. The preoccupation with economic development and political stability will decrease [the] focusing [of] attention on security issues. The various budgetary and demographic downturns in key Western European countries will create pressures for making choices and trade-offs to ensure the most effective defense posture possible. But political and economic pressures will reduce the desire to make such tough choices.[42]

This creates a dilemma: if NATO's conventional forces are reduced in the next decade (primarily because of demographic problems), the viability of the Alliance's conventional deterrent will be decreased just as NATO is relying more on that option.

Nor is the problem of conventional manpower just one of numbers. It is also one of force mix and force orientation. With impending shortages, it is probable that more Western countries will resort to solutions such as the West German government has adopted, placing greater reliance on reserve forces to fill positions currently staffed by active-duty personnel. While this solution may maintain numbers at the desired level (and in the case of West Germany, even this is open for debate), there is no doubt that increased reliance on reserves will decrease the readiness of NATO forces and, therefore, the viability of conventional deterrence.

Finally, in terms of force orientation, the one region that will not experience particular demographic constraints — the southern flank — is probably the least focused on the Soviet threat in Western Europe. Italians have been shifting some of their attention away from Western Europe and toward the Mediterranean, while tensions between Turkey and Greece continue unabated, with no prospects for a solution. Realistically, the Alliance cannot hope to solve its manpower problems by relying on the region that will have the fewest demographic constraints.

Any movement to effect a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe must be examined carefully. To begin with, it is fraught with dangers: a reduction in intermediate nuclear forces combined with even a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops will lead to the conviction among Europeans that the United States is beginning to decouple from Western Europe. Second, many "burden sharing" calculations

[41] Robbin F. Laird, "The Decade Ahead for the Western Alliance," *American Foreign Policy Newsletter*, August 1987, p. 2.
[42] Ibid., p. 4.

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fail to consider the hidden costs — economic and political — of Western Europe's conscripted forces.[43]

Third, if the United States decides to withdraw troops from the continent but wants to maintain them as active-duty forces, the initial and long-term costs of such a move will prove greater than leaving the troops in Europe. Clearly, there would be costs of transporting the troops and their dependents back to the United States. There would then be a need to increase the entire infrastructure support system in the United States in order to keep the troops on active-duty status. Finally, there would be the additional costs of having to improve and augment transport capabilities to be able to return these troops to Europe in the event of hostilities. Thus, unless the government decides to decommission the forces, there will be no economic savings; and, given the trends in the arms control arena, it would seem unlikely that the U.S. government would choose to completely decommission these forces. As Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat of Indiana) asks, "Can NATO remain secure if INF systems in Europe are eliminated and there are large, unilateral reductions in U.S. troop levels? The likely answer is 'no'."[44]

U.S. actions on troop withdrawal will likely depend heavily on the measures adopted by other Western Alliance countries to maintain the size of their forces. The Alliance must adhere to a policy of a two-way street. Demographic constraints coupled with arms control developments in the nuclear field make the need for U.S. troops in Europe greater than it has been since the end of World War II. At the same time, West Europeans must do everything in their power to maintain the size and readiness of their conventional forces. If the United States perceives West European governments to be failing in their commitment to this obligation — by failing to show sufficient political or economic resolve — proponents of U.S. troop withdrawals will almost certainly seize this as a pretext to implement a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops.

However it begins — a U.S. troop withdrawal or force cuts in one or several European nations — the ripple effects will be significant. If the European countries do not do enough for their own defense, the United States will probably retaliate through troop withdrawals. If the United States withdraws troops, sentiment within many European countries will be that their demographic constraints compel them to make reductions of their own. And particularly in the case of a West German reduction in forces, it is a virtual certainty

[43] For an excellent treatment of this issue, see David Robertson, "Fair Shares in NATO: Problems of Assessing Defence Burdensharing," *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1986* (London: RUSI/Brassey, 1985).

[44] Lee H. Hamilton, "Policy Review Needed: Why U.S. Troops in Europe?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 24, 1987.

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that other European countries (mainly in the northern and central regions) would follow with similar reductions. The result in either case will be a reduced viability of NATO's conventional option.

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NATO NEEDS A NEW MISSILE

by Andrew Goldman

Tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe have recently assumed more importance than ever before in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The reason lies with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, under which an entire class of weapons, the intermediate-range missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union, are being dismantled. These missiles have dominated the military situation in Central Europe in recent years, so their removal naturally turns NATO's attention to the nuclear weapons still permitted there by the treaty, battlefield launchers with a range of up to 300 miles.

Yet an examination of those weapons and the procedures for using them shows that they are technically and operationally incapable of performing their mission of deterrence. To restore that deterrent, NATO must modernize its land-based tactical nuclear missiles; to carry out that modernization and make it effective, NATO must also begin to transfer control of these weapons to the Europeans.

Inadequate Lances

After the U.S. government withdraws all its cruise missiles and Pershing missiles in 1992, it will have roughly 4,000 nuclear warheads committed to NATO for use on or near the Central European battlefield. Three kinds of platforms will remain to deliver these weapons:

- 1,200 "dual-capable" aircraft that can carry either nuclear or conventional weapons;
- 80 short-range (i.e., less than 300 miles) mobile Lance launchers (range: 70 miles) for nuclear missiles; and
- 3,000 "dual-capable" artillery launchers — 203-mm howitzers and 8-inch howitzers — which fire to a maximum range of 15 miles.

The "dual-capable" aircraft have available 1,700 heavier-yield nuclear warheads. The Lance launchers have available a few hundred.[1] The howitzers have available 1,500 lighter-yield nuclear warheads, mostly artillery shells.

[1] *Military Balance 1987-1988* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988); and William Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Thomas Cochran, *Nuclear Weapons Databook Project Working Paper: Implications of the INF Treaty (NSD 87-3)* (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1987).

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

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While impressive on paper, these launchers, missiles, and warheads suffer from three major weaknesses. And even with the most capable of these weapons systems, the Lance, these weaknesses cripple the European deterrent.

Limited range. The central military drawback of this arsenal, from which others flow, is the limited range of the Lance launchers: it is only one-quarter of the 300-mile range allowed under the INF treaty. But given that the launchers must be far enough back to escape the first blow of Warsaw Pact forces, Lance missiles would be able to hit only forces in or just entering NATO territory. If called upon, the Lance would fail to achieve its mission — namely, striking significant Soviet military targets on Warsaw Pact soil, including the rear of an attacking column, and thereby convincing the Soviets to pull back their forces.

As General Bernard Rogers, former commander of NATO forces in Europe, has said: "We want to use nuclear weapons, not on our own soil. . . We want to use them on Soviet or non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil, striking significant Soviet targets, so that the Soviets feel that pain. And they say, all right, we give up."[2] The limited range of the Lance denies NATO this all-important option. As General Rogers concluded on another occasion: "Should we expect these residual [nuclear] forces to conjure up a perception of pain in the Soviet mind? Hardly."[3]

Urgency. The Lance's limited range is exacerbated by its status as a nuclear weapon. Moreover, it is a first-use weapon, one of those with which NATO would cross the nuclear threshold when confronting a conventional attack. Ideally, therefore, NATO should be able to hold back from using the Lance as long as there is hope NATO's conventional forces can repel the Warsaw Pact attack. Yet this restraint must be conditioned on NATO's certainty that, if the time comes to cross the nuclear threshold, battlefield nuclear launchers can carry out their missions successfully. Lance's limited range might thus force NATO to a first-use of nuclear weapons while the conventional battle was still in doubt — for fear the nuclear option would not exist if needed.

American control. Just how early NATO might have to begin turning to nuclear weapons becomes more evident when we consider the procedure for releasing such weapons. According to one report, "The U.S. President alone can release U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe for use, following appropriate consultations with the Allies."[4] A 1975

[2] General Bernard Rogers on "This Week with David Brinkley," August 30, 1987.

[3] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, Exec. Rept. 100-15, p. 388.

[4] Defense Secretary James Schlesigner, *The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 7.

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Library of Congress study, which has never been officially challenged and is still considered authoritative, says,"[I]t seems clear that the President's order would always control."[5] This presumption is indirectly confirmed by the fact that, as all NATO governments recognize, no NATO member besides the United States has the power to order NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to release nuclear weapons, even in cases where a nation's survival is at stake.[6]

Although France and Britain have independent nuclear forces, the French nuclear forces are officially outside of NATO's military command and would not be stationed on the Central European battlefield at the initiation of hostilities. British weapons committed to NATO either have U.S. warheads that are under American control, or they are assigned to SACEUR and are therefore under American control.

The strategy for using the nuclear weapons, including the Lance, begins with advice offered by individual corps commanders in the field. These corps commanders are supposed to propose preplanned packages of 100-200 weapons based on options used in peacetime exercises.[7] Unfortunately, these release procedures take so long (estimated at anywhere from twenty-four to sixty hours) that the weapons would probably be taken out by Warsaw Pact forces before being launched.[8] The procedure appears insufficiently effective to maintain deterrence.

To remedy this weakness, the Alliance should embark on a comprehensive program that creates a credible land-based European deterrent. A longer-range missile would presumably be less vulnerable to the first wave of a Warsaw Pact conventional attack, since the missile would not need to be placed so close to the front. Accordingly, the lengthy launch procedure, while still a problem, would not be nearly as threatening to NATO commanders.

But though NATO agreed in its 1983 modernization decision (the so-called Montebello decision) to upgrade the Lance's capabilities to a longer-range launcher, this plan is still in a preliminary development stage, without even an agreement on whether the successor should be a land- or air-launched missile. There is, however, no need for the Alliance to be so far behind in the matter. The United States has ready for development a nuclear version of the Army Tactical Missile system (ATACMs) that can be fired from the Multiple-Launch

[5] Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons (United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 7.

[6] *Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 9.

[7] U.S. Army, *FM100-5* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 7-12.

[8] Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Managing Nato's Tactical Nuclear Operations," *Survival* (January/February 1988), p. 65.

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Rocket System (MLRS), and would have a range up to 280 miles. (The drawback is that the United States is currently working only on a non-nuclear version of the ATACMs, since Congress does not want to fund a nuclear version until the complete Alliance endorses the need for it,[9] an endorsement which the Alliance has, for political reasons, been unable to give.)

"The Shorter the Range, the Deader the Germans"

NATO's chief difficulties, therefore, are political, and these political difficulties are chiefly West German. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly made clear his reluctance to commit his party, the conservative Christian Democrats, to a NATO modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. As the Christian Democrats' parliamentary floor leader, Alfred Dregger, said in a speech at Johns Hopkins University on May 5, 1988, "We reject proposals for compensating for the loss of intermediate-range systems with short-range systems."[10] There appear to be three main motives for this position.

German angst. Kohl and Dregger pointed out in early 1988 the grave concern many West Germans have that modernization would mean the Federal Republic was being "singularized" as the battlefield of a nuclear war. This term expresses the Germans' fear that their country — and their country alone — would serve as a battlefield for nuclear war. Kohl's party has thus been wary of supporting modernization in order to appear sensitive to this deep-seated concern.

An analogous concern troubles Europe generally, and this concern is a fundamental dilemma in NATO's strategy that has never been resolved. Europeans worry about a nuclear war being confined to Central Europe. Members of NATO have long conspired to skirt the issue by linking Europe to America's strategic arsenal. But in September 1979, Henry Kissinger said aloud what so many had previously spoken about only *sotto voce*: "Of course, the U.S. president will threaten massive destruction in a crisis, but will he do it? We must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of mutual suicide."[11]

Given the anxiety felt by West Germans, modernization has turned into something of a political liability for Bonn's Christian Democrats. Pleas for "peace" from the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SPD) have played upon German worries, thereby casting the conservatives — along with the Americans — as obstacles to a safer Europe. Feeling the political sting of this, Dregger and his deputy,

[9] House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1989: Report to Accompany H.R. 4781*, 100th Cong., 2nd. sess., 1988, H. Rept. 100-681, p. 453.

[10] Speech by Alfred Dregger; text provided by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.

[11] "The Future of NATO," in *NATO: The Next Thirty Years*, ed. Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 3.

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Volker Rühe, have felt compelled to echo platitudes about not having Germany "singularized" in a nuclear war. Dregger himself, in the speech at Johns Hopkins University, repeatedly expressed his "aversion to short-range nuclear systems." And Rühe coined the frosty apothegm, "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."[12]

German pride. Non-German members of NATO have made this domestic problem worse for the Christian Democrats by their suspicious response to Bonn's cautious comments. They berated the West Germans for having lost their nuclear nerve. It took nothing short of a major policy declaration by Kohl just to dispel fears running rampant in the Alliance. He told a high-level gathering in Munich: "There is an angst in the Federal Republic of being singularized. But just because there is this fear of being singularized it doesn't mean we are drifting out of NATO. My God, no!"[13]

Kohl and his party have thus been forced to defend modernization as a way to prove their Alliance loyalty. This in turn has provided further political ammunition to the SPD, which is no longer led by Atlanticists such as former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. They have been nudged aside by men like Oskar Lafontaine, the premier of Saarland, who talks about making Germany neutral. Leading members of the SPD have apparently concluded modernization will be an enormous political liability for the conservatives. Egon Bahr, one the SPD's foremost arms experts, boasted in April, "If the CDU undertakes new rearmament, it will lose the 1990 elections."[14] So, when Kohl attempts to pass the NATO loyalty test, his opposition makes political hay by portraying Kohl as kowtowing to the United States.

When Kohl attempts to pass the NATO loyalty test, his opposition makes political hay by portraying Kohl as kowtowing to the United States.

Evasion. In light of these problems, and considering the stakes for NATO, other Alliance members have clouded their own support for modernization in order not to offend German public opinion. The result is a ballet in evasiveness by many governments. The Alliance is trying to have it both ways — saying that modernization is important and also saying that there need be no commitment to modernize. A key section of the communiqué issued after an April 1988 meeting

[12] London, May 14, 1987.
[13] *The New York Times*, February 7, 1988.
[14] "Nuclear Weapons are Irreplaceable," (in German) *Der Spiegel*, April 4, 1988, pp. 16-19; text given in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: West Europe* (Washington, D.C.), April 6, 1988, p. 4.

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of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group said that the Alliance will keep its nuclear forces "up to date where necessary."[15] That statement was just vague enough to please everybody. Similar linguistic acrobatics were displayed in the United States during the INF Treaty hearings before Congress, when Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch noted, "The Treaty does not create the need for modernization, nor does it obviate it."[16] Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono said his "support of the Treaty is not contingent upon modernization. However, the modernization of our . . tactical . . nuclear forces is critical."[17] Britain, too, has danced around the modernization question. Lord Carrington, NATO's former secretary general, has said, "We must live for the foreseeable future with nuclear weapons at the most modern level if we want a stable and war-free Europe and a strong alliance." At the same time, though, he warned of an "over-concentration" of these weapons in Germany.[18]

The Political Answer

This evasion must come to an end. West German conservatives realize that, in the wake of an INF withdrawal, NATO's choice is between effective nuclear weapons and much more money for new conventional weapons. They also know that no Alliance member is willing to spend the great sums of money needed to boost conventional forces. The conclusion is obvious: the nuclear arsenal must be the West's effective deterrent.

Kohl hinted at this conclusion when he said: "[T]he denuclearization of Europe . . does not correspond to the security interests of the alliance and hence cannot be the subject of negotiation. . . . I therefore reject a third zero solution for nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 kilometers."[19] These remarks signal the Alliance that Germany will, despite its reluctance, continue to undertake the burden of basing nuclear weapons on its territory. But it needs to be said with equal clarity that not every nuclear weapon is necessarily an effective nuclear weapon and that NATO's dependence on tactical nuclear forces translates into improvements in those forces.

Thus the question arises: How can German leaders sell nuclear modernization without losing political power — which would move their country sharply leftward, possibly toward neutralism? Several solutions offer themselves:

[15] "The Final Communiqué of the Spring 1988 Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting," Brussels, April 28, 1988.

[16] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The INF Treaty*, p. 33.

[17] Ibid.

[18] "Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 5, 1988; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: West Europe* (Washington, D.C.), May 11, 1988, p. 1.

[19] Speech by Kohl at the International Wehrkunde Conference, February 6, 1988; text provided by the German Information Center, New York.

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Straight talk from the chancellor. It is worth recalling the origin of the 1979 INF decision and the West German agreement to deploy some of these forces. In a highly publicized 1977 lecture,[20] Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke of Europe's deteriorating deterrent in the wake of the SALT I Treaty. He argued that this deterioration posed a risk of nuclear war for West Germany, given that it appeared unlikely the United States would use its strategic arsenal to protect Western Europe. In Schmidt's opinion, this situation posed too great a risk, and his solution was what eventually became the INF deployment. Thus, Schmidt did not set the INF decision in motion out of an altruistic concern for other Alliance members; his motive was to shore up the nuclear deterrent in Europe for the sake of West Germans.

Chancellor Kohl needs to make the same point today. Tactical nuclear weapons now in Germany once again do not offer a credible deterrent. On their own, they would be overrun by Warsaw Pact forces or they would devastate West Germany. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that their use would automatically trigger the American nuclear shield. Modernized launchers, by contrast, would reduce the nuclear risk for Germany, for they have at least some hope of inflicting sufficient pain on a Warsaw Pact invasion (therefore deterring it), and they would land outside West Germany.

Eliminate nuclear artillery shells. But such a statement by Kohl is not enough. With the INF Treaty signed and START negotiations proceeding, the deployment of new weapons must take place within the context of arms reduction. The good news is that the goals of modernization and limitation can be accomplished simultaneously. If NATO wants to help the Christian Democrats sell modernization, its best strategy will be to strike a deal with the West Germans. Allow them to get rid of the 1,000-plus nuclear artillery shells in return for accepting a dramatically fewer number of modernized, land-based launchers. The argument for modernization would then be that it not only offers a more credible deterrent and a lessened nuclear risk for West Germany, it also offers a unilateral reduction by the Alliance of its nuclear artillery.

Alfred Dregger hinted at this approach in his Johns Hopkins speech: "We do not reject short-range systems as such, but we want to have only as many as are absolutely necessary. . . It is clear that the greater the range of a modernized version of the Lance the fewer [of the shortest-range shells] will be needed."

Place NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons under European control. The U.S. government should offer to work out an arrangement whereby the control of NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons would

[20] Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* (January/February, 1978), pp. 3-4.

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eventually be placed in European hands, presumably British and French. How such a transfer of control can be accomplished is a question that cannot be answered in advance, but the search for answers should begin because Europeanization would strengthen the military efficacy as well as the political acceptability of tactical nuclear weapons.

Militarily, the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be more credible once Europeans controlled them; this arrangement would make them a more effective deterrent. West Germany is only 130 miles wide at its narrowest point; consequently, the territorial integrity of France would be immediately threatened by any Warsaw Pact crossing of the West German border, something that is certainly not the case for the territorial integrity of the United States. Paris's willingness to respond with nuclear weapons would therefore be greater than Washington's, and Moscow knows this.

The West German leaders themselves, specifically the Christian Democrats, must call for the modernization of Europe's tactical nuclear weapons, combined with a reduction in their number.

Politically, giving Europeans control over nuclear weapons would remind them that NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are in Europe to defend Europe. So long as these weapons are controlled by the American president alone, Europeans will see them as American weapons placed in Europe to serve American purposes. So long as that sense endures, the security interests of Europeans will conflict with their pride, a conflict easily exploited by the Left.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, most of those who debate the question of modernization seem to be transfixed by schemes that begin and end with a crude counting of the weapons, numerically matching East and West, as if equality of numbers were all deterrence required. But it is not. Attention must be focused on the ability of NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons to perform the tasks expected of them. Also, as former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has pointed out, "[The] basic question that's at the background of every arms reduction agreement . . . . is what's left after the agreement is signed and ratified and put into effect? . . . . and [then] making sure that what's left is enough for deterrence."[21]

[21] Department of Defense Transcript of Secretary Weinberger's remarks in Monterey, California, November 3, 1987, p. 5.

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NATO can restore an effective nuclear deterrent to Central Europe by deploying a land-based tactical nuclear weapon in West Germany that substantially exceeds the Lance's seventy-mile range. To achieve this objective, the West German leaders themselves, specifically the Christian Democrats, must call for the modernization of Europe's tactical nuclear weapons, combined with a reduction in their number. Dregger's speech is a first, small step in that direction.

The other Alliance members — particularly the Europeans — can do their part by pushing quietly but hard for Kohl's party to pursue this idea. At the same time, it is essential that other Alliance members are not publicly ahead of Bonn in calling for this modernization. If they are, the conservative Bonn coalition will likely resist modernization, lest it be portrayed by the SPD opposition as an obsequious servant of the Alliance. The other Alliance members should also let the West Germans take the credit for insisting that a reduction in nuclear artillery shells accompany the modernization package. For its part, the U.S. government should actively portray the modernized weapons as European weapons, then explore ways actually to hand control over them to the Europeans.

This approach has two benefits. It shores up the Central European deterrent that was effectively gutted by the INF Treaty; and it builds on Helmut Schmidt's INF precedent, further accustoming Europeans to the idea that they ultimately must determine and deploy the weapons needed for their defense.

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SOVIET SUCCESS STORY: THE THIRD WORLD

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

In the 1970s détente collapsed because of Soviet covetousness in the Third World. In the late 1980s, an active Soviet policy might again jeopardize better relations between the superpowers. Although Gorbachev's pronouncements have de-emphasized liberation struggles and the Third World, his diplomacy there shows an intensity of engagement as great as at any time since Moscow began its assertive policy in the mid-1950s. American policy makers should take account of these endeavors, or at least be aware of them, and not once again be surprised when they come to fruition.

There is certainly no reason to be surprised by Moscow's Third World policy, for we know a great deal about it — its instruments, priorities, successes, and failures. We know that the impact of this policy has been profound, affecting regional politics, Third World domestic developments, and, as noted, the superpower rivalry. Though differently manifested in different countries and regions, several important elements of this Soviet policy can be examined in a way that cuts across geography:

- the anti-American basis of Soviet policy;
- the credibility of the Soviet Union as a patron;
- the unimportance of the Soviet economic model;
- the militarization of Third World politics;
- the sponsorship of hostilities.

An assessment of these themes leads to important conclusions about the U.S.-Soviet competition and its future prospects. In particular, Soviet success in this sphere suggests that no major changes in its long-term policies are likely to be forthcoming.

Working Against the United States

In the mid-1950s, the Kremlin shed Stalin's ideological and political fetters on alliances with bourgeois-nationalist regimes. Rather than trying to subvert such regimes, it offered to support them "what-

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ever their complexions, provided they be nonaligned, that is to say, at odds with the Western world."[1] This policy established a congruence between Moscow's goals and the dominant political currents of the Third World. It enabled Moscow to deprive the United States of unchallenged access to Third World nations, while it enabled leaders like Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasser to counter Washington's arming of their regional rivals.

In the short term, then, Moscow simply offered diplomatic normalization and ambitious aid programs to promote strategic denial. But its policy was also attuned to the future, where it saw prospects for more tangible military and economic advantages over the United States. For example, the Soviet Union might gain access to national liberation movements, as it did through African and Arab clients; or a nation's military might come to depend on Soviet advisors, as Afghanistan's did. In any event, Moscow could anticipate that some advantages would eventually accrue to its anti-Western strategy, and consequently Third World requests for assistance were generally acted on favorably during the Khrushchev period.

Among Third World elites this new policy was made possible by a differentiation between local communism and Soviet communism. They continued to view local Communists, and even those of their countrymen who had merely studied in the Soviet Union, as politically untrustworthy quasi-tools of a foreign power.[2] But they began to look favorably on the Soviet Union itself and its new policy toward Third World governments. As experience showed that the Soviets would not use a larger presence to conduct subversion, the elites came to appreciate the many ways that economic and military ties to the Soviet Union enabled them to pursue their preferred domestic and foreign policies.

They appreciated, too, that close ties to the Soviet Union do not create controversy, as ties with the United States so often do. While anti-Soviet outbursts are not unknown in the Third World, they tend to be expressions of official displeasure over a particular issue rather than spontaneous eruptions of popular anger. Anti-Sovietism (unlike anti-Americanism) simply does not translate into a prescription for exercising or acquiring power. Neither rulers nor their domestic opponents have found it to have demagogic potential, perhaps because no convenient targets of Soviet influence — comparable to American companies, schools, mores, culture, and consumer items — can be singled out and manipulated as a focus of nationalist rage. On balance, this benefits the existing leadership, for it means that domestic op-

[1] Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Ni paix ni guerre: Le nouvel empire soviétique ou du bon usage de la détente* (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), pp. 20-21.

[2] For example, see Vladimir Sakharov, *High Treason* (New York: Ballantine, 1980), pp. 147-148, 266; Aleksandr Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962), p. 69.

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ponents cannot use a pro-Soviet regime's policy toward its superpower patron as part of an effort to unseat it.

Thus, Third World elites themselves desired Soviet entry into their regions as a means of expanding their options, and desired it enough to surmount the difficulties of dealing with Moscow. They learned to treat Soviet personnel and property gingerly, as Moscow showed a toughness that conditioned the way even unfriendly governments and groups behaved toward it. No minister of a government friendly to the Soviet Union would dare do what was done to the United States when a Zimbabwean minister in Harare attended the U.S. embassy's celebration of its national holiday on July 4, 1986, and, in former President Jimmy Carter's presence, denounced the government as imperialist. Among Third World regimes, which are primarily authoritarian systems, a respect for Soviet forcefulness often contrasts with a lack of sympathy for the vagaries of the democratic process, specifically, for a U.S. policy that is frequently hobbled or directed against them by unpredictable congressional actions. Third World elites have few illusions about the Soviet Union, and vice versa, but both sides understand what is expected.

Soviet Reliability

Perhaps it was this frank and reliable pragmatism that most facilitated the Soviet Union's transition from pariah to patron. Its readiness to provide economic, military, and political support won it a reputation as a credible ally — dependable, consistent, and capable. It has openly supported major clients who requested assistance against external attack, against pressure from a U.S.-backed regional adversary, or against internal threat. Once committed, Moscow has stayed the course, almost irrespective of military and economic costs or the adverse effect on its relationship with the United States. A friendship treaty does not seem to be required for this commitment. Any client considered important is rendered assistance appropriate to the threat. Indeed, in most instances in which the USSR went to the brink of war (Cuba, Egypt, and Syria), no formal commitment to defend the client existed. Yet Moscow did not equivocate. In response to situations of obvious threat to a client, it has been forceful, unambiguous, and unwavering. Despite difficulties and occasional policy differences, a Soviet connection therefore remains a coveted link in the Third World.

There are a few developments in the offing, however, that may tarnish the Kremlin's unblemished record. Mozambique faces a serious threat from an insurgency supported by South Africa. Moscow has to be reluctant to pour resources into an unstable country so far from the Soviet Union and so near South Africa. The 1986 death of Mozambique's president, Samora Machel, and his replacement by

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the more pragmatic foreign minister, Joaquin Alberto Chissano, probably reinforces the Kremlin's reluctance. Judging by Moscow's very limited and somewhat irrelevant assistance to date, it seems increasingly doubtful that the Soviet leadership will extend itself to live up to the spirit of the 1977 friendship treaty.

Afghanistan offers another case in which Soviet adherence to the spirit of a friendship treaty may be tested. If the leadership in Kabul invokes the treaty when suddenly faced with an imminent end to Soviet military involvement and the collapse of its regime, Moscow probably would not do much to help — something Najibullah or the regime of Najibullah may already know.

To be sure, neither of these treaties requires an automatic armed Soviet response. But they did create an expectation in their signatories — and other prospective signatories — that Moscow would take appropriate action to safeguard the client if threatened by external enemies. Now, though each is in some danger of being overthrown, neither the Mozambican nor the Afghan regime seems to expect much direct combat support from the Soviet Union. Thus, Moscow's reputation for dependability may soon be diminished.

To date, however, Moscow has come to the aid of clients as often as necessary — in the case of Egypt, three times between 1967 and 1973. Each time, its involvement was by invitation and its response was prompt. Sadat's complaints notwithstanding, every client on whose behalf Moscow has mounted a rescue operation has retained power and staved off the need to make peace with a regional rival. Moreover, when dispatching arms and combat troops, the Soviets have been careful not to make clients fearful of domestic meddling. They act discreetly, with minimum publicity and internal dislocation, and with no attempt to blackmail the client for concessions.

Of course, basic to the Soviet Union's credibility as a patron-protector is its ability to undertake military operations in the Third World. Its continually improving ability to project conventional power, therefore, has likewise improved credibility. The Soviet naval buildup is well known, but Soviet air power, air defense systems, armor, and artillery have been the most pertinent means of servicing Third World clients. Time and again, Moscow has demonstrated that it has the weapons and the will to shield clients and project power appropriate to the threat. Its efforts on behalf of Syria, in 1982-83, are but the most recent example.

Several other characteristics contribute to Moscow's credibility as a patron, such as its easy acceptance of force as a feature of politics, both international and internal. It does not become unhappy with clients when they use force, nor does it preach to them about peace and freedom. Given lavish Soviet arms transfers, this makes high-

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tension politics an allowable, indeed a feasible, option for a protected client.

Neither does Moscow seriously pressure clients to change policies with which it disagrees, as when Asad expanded into Lebanon in the mid-1970s and made efforts in the 1980s to create an alternate PLO to compete with Yasir 'Arafat. As far as can be determined, there seems to be no Soviet-Third World analogue to U.S. pressures on its ally Turkey in 1964 over the question of Cyprus, to the U.S. abandonment of Pakistan in its 1965 war with India, or to the U.S. control of arms shipments in order to force modifications in Israel's policy toward Egypt and in Lebanon. Nor does Moscow intrude itself as an "honest broker" in situations where it had intervened militarily on behalf of one of the parties to the conflict. It resists pressuring clients to accommodate regional rivals, partially out of fear of alienating the client and partially out of the perception that Soviet aims can be served just as well by the perpetuation of regional conflicts. Whatever the reason, Moscow sees its longer-term regional objectives as dependent on the preservation of close ties with a prime client. Again, the result is that Moscow's credibility as a patron is high.

Finally, credibility is a relative conceit. It depends in part on how Third World actors compare Soviet and American performance. If dependability and consistency are the benchmarks against which prospective clients in highly explosive regional settings make political judgments, it is likely the Soviet Union would rank higher than the United States. If other considerations — domestic, economic, cultural, historical — enter into the equation, the Soviet Union's ranking would be lowered. Ultimately, each client regime chooses a patron for a variety of reasons, including availability, but the Soviet Union's proven staying power must certainly weigh heavily.

The Unimportance of the Soviet Economic Model

One might suppose that a principal consideration for a Third World nation, when choosing a superpower patron, would be the patron's perceived ability to promote economic development. But this has not been the case. In fact, a lack of confidence in the Soviet model for economic development has not much affected Moscow's involvement in the Third World. Political relations are flourishing, even though the Third World's experience with the USSR has led to disenchantment with Soviet economic policies, and with socialism generally.

In the 1950s and 1960s, many first-generation leaders of former colonies sought rapid economic development through heavy industrialization on the Stalinist pattern: the steel mill was a symbol of modernity. The USSR's willingness to help finance and construct industrial projects in the public sector dovetailed with the new lead-

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ers' vague beliefs in the efficacy of a centralized, planned, highly nationalized, urban-oriented economy, which they saw as the salient characteristics of the Soviet model. Hopes for a quick end to poverty, as well as their belief that a capitalist colonial system had kept them in bondage, predisposed them to socialism and to the Soviet experience.

The attempts failed everywhere. Moscow may not have pushed these governments along what it calls the non-capitalist path of development, but it encouraged them. Accordingly, their failure is Moscow's failure as well, and indeed Moscow's credibility as an economic model may be perhaps the greatest casualty of its involvement in the Third World.

Today, the USSR's own difficulties, in addition to its inability to help Third World countries overcome their backwardness, are seen as indications of serious flaws in socialism, or at least in the Soviet variant. Only an occasional political zealot will, for a time, impose on a hapless people a model of socialism reminiscent of Stalin's policy in the 1929-1938 period. Pol Pot in Kampuchea in the mid-1970s and Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia in the 1980s are tragic examples.

These rulers excepted, there is little chance today of finding an elite that looks to the Soviet Union for a blueprint of how to modernize its economy. The proposition that the Soviet strategy for economic development exercises "a deep influence on the underdeveloped countries"[3] is no longer credible even if one singles out for illustration countries with promising combinations of resources and manpower (India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Turkey); or regimes which have attempted disastrous and costly campaigns to collectivize agriculture (Ethiopia, Grenada, Madagascar); or, like Madagascar, taken a "great forward leap" (*investissements à outrance*); or, like both Madagascar and Grenada, tried to construct a heavy industrial base.

Within the Soviet Union, successive Soviet leaderships still proclaim economic achievement as a route to enhanced Soviet prestige and influence in the Third World. And in a general way Soviet leaders may even believe this. But the formulations have become predictable, like standard rhetorical flourishes.[4] They are not to be confused with the substantive strategies of Soviet foreign policy in the Third World.

[3] For such an approach, see Norton T. Dodge and Charles K. Wilbur, "The Relevance of Soviet Industrial Experience for Less Developed Countries," *Soviet Studies*, January 1970, pp. 331-32; and Bernard P. Kiernan, "The Nature of Communism in the Emergent World," *The Yale Review*, Spring 1970, pp. 321-32.

[4] In October 1965, one month after the adoption of extensive economic reforms, *Pravda* editorialized: "In building socialism and communism, the socialist countries make the most important and decisive contribution to the world revolutionary movement. This is what determines their vanguard role in the contemporary revolutionary struggle." (*Pravda*, October 27, 1965.) In 1986, at the CPSU's 27th Congress, Gorbachev argued along the same lines.

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Indeed, with each passing year, economic assistance becomes less and less important in the overall Soviet transfer of resources to developing countries (excepting, of course, the special cases of Cuba and Vietnam).

The USSR, it is now generally recognized, offers a mechanism to develop power, not wealth. But for some, this suffices. As Kwame Nkrumah insisted, "seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will follow." This pre-eminence of the political over the economic signals a frustration with economic development to provide a successful focus for the activities of second- and third-generation postcolonial elites. Though Third World elites still proclaim their commitment to economic development, their actions tell a different story. Some leaders are sincere, but most are unwilling to make modernization their primary objective. Abstractly, they may want to modernize their countries, but not at the cost of power, which they covet more. To paraphrase what G. K. Chesterton said of Christianity, it is not that development was tried and found difficult, but that it was found difficult and not tried.

Thus, the diminished interest in the Soviet model of socialism has not affected the desire of Third World leaders for closer ties with the Soviet Union, or the ability of the Soviet Union to satisfy the desires of Third World leaders. On the contrary, as Soviet weapons become easier to obtain than economic aid, these leaders are subtly induced to shift their priorities and to seek fulfillment abroad in conquest rather than at home in production. Among Soviet clients or those who seek Soviet support for their regional ambitions, military considerations become ever more prominent, and with this comes a heightened interest in taking what Moscow is best equipped to provide, namely, the wherewithal for a potent military structure and police state.

By contrast, governments that do not look to the Soviet Union for a larger military force are those who believe that development is important and recognize that economic progress is essential for their own security and retention of power. In the late 1980s these would include Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Ivory Coast.

The Militarization of Politics

Over the long term, Soviet military assistance has led to the militarization of politics in the Third World, and in fact this appears to be one principal function of such aid. Soviet arms continue to affect interstate crises and conflicts, but they also corrupt democratic values, foster coups, and misdirect lives and resources. As noted, regimes nurtured by Soviet arms tend to focus on the establishment of personal power rather than on the construction of economically

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viable nations, and this is a goal Moscow now aims to achieve. On occasion, Moscow may use arms to obtain hard currency or negotiate barter agreements for the goods it needs, as in the early 1980s when it exchanged arms for wheat with the Argentine military dictatorship.[5] But primarily it supplies arms because of the political impact of those arms.

Ironically, there is no evidence that this militarization was Moscow's aim in the mid-1950s when Khrushchev sold weapons to Egypt and Afghanistan. Khrushchev simply began acceding to the arms requests of courted regimes regardless of the effect of the arms buildup on the government's domestic or regional policy. Moscow knew that the arms were sought for offensive purposes, not for defense. But it was willing and eager to serve as an uncritical supplier and abet a major redirection of priorities and scarce resources away from internal development and toward high-risk foreign policies. Thus did a profligacy of weapons corrupt Mohammed Daoud Khan, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sukarno, Mohammed Siad Barre, and others, with doleful consequences for their countries.

Arms also led, often, to the weakening of traditional civilian elites and authority, promoting military groups in their place. Given the fragility of post-colonial civilian regimes, the narrowness of the democratic base on which most of them rested, and the ease with which the military could mount coups, the proliferation of military regimes may not have been avoidable. Nevertheless, Moscow's arms policy undermined civilian rule for many of the early post-independence leaders.

Militarization does not trouble Moscow so long as a regime remains anti-imperialist, meaning anti-American. That is the only ideology that matters. In fact, Moscow may well prefer to deal with military elites. After all, civilian leaders tend to be more committed to internal development and to emphasize the struggle against socioeconomic conditions, a struggle in which the West has far more to offer. A Mengistu is easier to cosset than a Mugabe; an Asad or a Qadhdhafi easier than a Corazon Aquino or a Chadli Benjadid.

So, in Africa, Moscow's clients are soldiers more often than not, and Soviet aid consists almost exclusively of military resources to help them retain control over a restive population. Moscow exploits their lack of legitimacy, their consequent vulnerability, and their readiness to make concessions to the patron underwriting their arrogation of power. This helps explain why the Soviet-Cuban military intervention on behalf of Ethiopia aroused so little criticism from African leaders. The preoccupation of Africa's soldier-leaders with preserving do-

[5] Robbin F. Laird, "The Latin American Arms Market: Soviet Perceptions and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982," *Soviet Union*, No. 3, 1985, p. 297.

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mestic stability makes them tolerant of Soviet intervention in their region, so long as it benefits status quo rulers of their own ilk.[6]

The more a nation is militarized, in turn, the more Moscow becomes the logical patron, for it has no compunctions about a friendly regime's treatment of its own subjects. Between 1977 and 1985, for example, the Soviets provided the rulers of Ethiopia with about $4 billion in weaponry. This enabled Mengistu to maintain an army of approximately 300,000, a force more than six times the size of that maintained by Haile Selassie. But "all costs for operating this swollen military machine have had to be squeezed out of the country's own meager resources"[7] — and this during a period of drought and famine.

The process that encourages a Third World leadership to pursue a military line is insidious. Only a handful of countries have the potential to undertake large-scale military expenditures — the oil-rich Middle East countries, India, Egypt, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina.[8] In most cases, with no justification in national security, expenditures on arms have drained the economies of scarce resources needed for modernization.[9] Militarization tends to make countries politically unviable by aggravating existing cleavages and perpetuating backwardness. When Third World leaders play the power game, their countries are most frequently the losers, while the Soviet state is the principal winner.

Soviet analysts never discuss the quantities or character of Soviet arms transfers or speculate on their consequences for domestic or regional developments in the Third World. They explain the perpetuation of regional conflicts and the aggravation of socioeconomic problems with a modernized variant of Lenin's theory of imperialism — neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism:

> Having found it impossible to reshape the political map of the world as it did in the past, imperialism is striving to undermine the sovereignty of liberated states in roundabout ways, making particularly active use of economic levers. . . . Imperialism's neocolonial policy is one of the main reasons for the emergence of so-called regional conflicts and the fact that they remain unresolved.[10]

[6] Olajide Aluko, "African Response to External Intervention in Africa Since Angola," *African Affairs*, April 1981, p. 175.

[7] Paul B. Henze, "The Dilemma of the Horn," *The National Interest*, Winter 1986, p. 65.

[8] A recent study of arms production and procurement in the Third World, carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, is Michael Brzosha and Thomas Ohlson, eds., *Arms Production in the Third World* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986).

[9] In Peru, for example, Soviet sales of weapons to the military dictatorship that ruled from 1968 to 1980 added significantly to the country's overall foreign debt. (*The New York Times*, July 24, 1983.) The impact of military expenditures on economic development and modernization is still in its infancy. A recent study that grapples with the range of interrelated problems is: Saadet Deger, *Military Expenditures in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), see especially chapter 10.

[10] K. Brutents, *Pravda*, January 10, 1986, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, January 14, 1986, p. CC5.

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Even the occasional, cursory references to arms transfers prepared primarily for Western publication give no details. Witness the contribution of Dr. Yevgeny Primakov, the director of the USSR's Institute of World Economy and International Relations, to a symposium on "The Superpowers in the Middle East" organized by the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. His only mention of the subject was to say that the Soviet Union sells arms to some of the countries of the Middle East to help them in "their struggle against the expansionism of Israel."[11] He gave not a hint of the more than $30 billion in arms sold to Libya and Iraq, countries distant from Israel; or of the copious quantities of weaponry supplied a bellicose Syria.

Sponsoring Hostilities

If Soviet policies perpetuate regional animosities, Soviet arms institutionalize hostility.[12] Without the dangerous levels of arms that have inundated the Third World since the 1960s, local wars would be far less probable and local politics quite different. Yet Soviet leaders show no hesitation about supplying arms to those who are bound to use them for aggressive purposes. Its quest in the early 1970s for naval support facilities in Somalia offers a clear instance of a readiness to funnel weapons to a military dictator in order to retain privileges, despite evidence that the arms were for aggression.[13]

One can go further. By their arms policy, the Soviets are often responsible for making war a feasible option for rulers bent on conflict rather than accommodation. In his maiden speech at the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 1985, Soviet foreign minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze declared: "It is not the fault of the Soviet Union that local conflicts break out and are raging in various regions of the world."[14] But the record since the late 1960s tells a different story. A list of the major wars between Third World countries would show that most were made possible only because of the stockpiles and assured supplies of Soviet weapons: Egypt's war in Yemen, 1962-67; Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, 1969-1970, and 1973; Ethiopia and Somalia since 1977; Vietnam and Kampuchea since 1978; the Yemens in 1979; Iran and Iraq since 1980; Libya and Chad in the 1980s. With the exception of the Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1971, every major

[11] Yevgeny M. Primakov, "The Soviet Union's Interests: Myths and Reality," *AEI Foreign and Defense Review*, No. 1, 1986, p. 31.

[12] The same argument has been made about American arms transfers, though the examples (notably Pakistan's war with India in 1965 and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982) are fewer.

[13] Richard B. Remnek, "The Soviet-Somali Arms for Access Relationship," *Soviet Union*, No. 1, 1983, pp. 74-75.

[14] *The New York Times*, September 25, 1985.

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local war between Third World protagonists during the past twenty-five years was started by a Soviet-armed state.

With the exception of the Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1971, every major local war between Third World protagonists during the past twenty-five years was started by a Soviet-armed state. While Moscow did not create regional rivalries and tensions, which are the legacies of history, it is responsible for their eruptions into local wars.

Thus, while Moscow did not create regional rivalries and tensions, which are the legacies of history, it is responsible for their eruptions into local wars. According to Dimitri Volskiy, a leading Soviet journalist, "attempts to hinder the natural, law-governed course of events in the Third World" are what "creates hotbeds of tension there fraught with dangers of not only a local but also a global nature."[15] True. And it is the "unnatural" system-destabilizing intrusion of vast quantities of Soviet weaponry to clients whose purposes are clearly aggressive that is the single most salient catalyst of local wars in the Third World.

Take the case of Syria. Hafiz al-Asad's truculence — and the concomitant growing threat of another Arab-Israeli war — would lack all credibility without the surfeit of Soviet weapons at his disposal, the promise of more, and of protection as well. Restricted to levels of weaponry commensurate with Syrian resources and constrained by the absence of an undemanding patron, he would be a local irritant, not a regional threat. In sustaining Syria as part of its ongoing rivalry with the United States, Moscow demonstrates its ability to keep a regional conflict perennially on the threshold of conflagration.

Soviet leaders avoid direct involvement in the local wars they make possible: their aim is "to profit from local conflicts without directly taking part in them."[16] But whether operating behind the scenes or through surrogates, they are deeply involved at every critical stage of the escalation — to the brink of war, and beyond. They may not want confrontation with the United States, but they readily accept the risks entailed in priming clients bent on besting a regional adversary or undermining U.S. policy. For example, during a visit to Syria in late 1985, Karen Brutents, deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee and an influential

[15] D. Volskiy, "Local Conflicts and International Security," *New Times*, January 28, 1983.
[16] Carrère D'Encausse, *Ni paix ni guerre*, p. 116.

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authority on Third World developments, lauded Arab opposition to Washington's "capitulationist solutions" to the Palestinian problem and, in particular, Syria's role "in confronting the imperialist plans aimed at imposing unilateral deals similar to the Camp David agreements" (a reference to Asad's undermining of the May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli accord). He also emphasized that those Arabs who resist "imperialism [read, the United States] have the support of friends and allies."[17]

Interestingly, despite the Soviet Union's role in aggravating regional tensions in the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Southern Asia, the settlement of conflicts in these areas does not require Soviet participation. Once regional adversaries opt for accommodation, they no longer need the Soviet Union. In the Arab-Israeli case, both Anwar as-Sadat and Menachem Begin decided to make peace. By the logic of this goal, they opposed a Soviet role and looked instead to Washington to broker the diplomatic process, with outstanding success.

For the Kremlin, the message of this settlement was clear: its position can be quickly and adversely affected by a reduction in regional tensions. It does not benefit equally with the United States (and the West) from an end to regional conflict. Indeed, though the Soviet experience with such situations is admittedly limited, nowhere in the Third World has regional reconciliation served Soviet strategic interests. Only as long as key local actors are wedded to the use of force to bring about political change is Moscow assured of a regional role.

Nowhere in the Third World has regional reconciliation served Soviet strategic interests. Only as long as key local actors are wedded to the use of force to bring about political change is Moscow assured of a regional role.

Thus, the clear presumption must be that the Kremlin will persist in the course that brings it leverage over developments in the Third World, especially in its rivalry with the United States. And that course is as a supplier of military equipment and a sponsor of hostilities. Well-armed clients are disposed to use force, and not to seek fulfillment of their national ambitions through bargaining and compromise. The resulting conflict and instability then create an arena for the

[17] Interview with correspondent of *Al-Ba'th* in Damascus, November 3, 1985; text given in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, November 14, 1985, pp. H4-H6.

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advancement of Soviet objectives. Moscow has adapted to these facts quite adeptly, and is unlikely to expend further effort or resources in quixotic attempts to bring "progress" or foster "socialism."

Implications for the United States

Moscow can look back to the 1950s and 1960s with a sense of accomplishment, for the U.S. position throughout the Third World is worse today than it was when Khrushchev launched his new policy. It has everywhere prevented the imposition of a *Pax Americana*. With increasing regularity, the United States finds its diplomatic, political, military, economic, and cultural aims and policies thwarted, as a consequence of Soviet actions. These actions have injured U.S. foreign policy in three specific ways — by limiting U.S. options; by raising the costs of safeguarding U.S. interests; and by intensifying anti-Americanism.

Limiting Options. Time and again — in every Arab-Israeli war from 1967 on, in Libya, in South Yemen, in Lebanon, in Nicaragua — Soviet power has limited Washington's military options. Vital U.S. interests have had to be interpreted more restrictively, and in a way that largely precludes the use of military means to bring about a political change or an improvement in the political-military situation of a U.S. client. This sharply narrowed strategic outlook is, of course, a consequence of the strong domestic pressures that have arisen out of the Vietnam experience. The fear of involvement in another Vietnam has changed the ability of the United States to act forcefully in ambiguous and complex political situations. And each succeeding administration has grappled with the constraints domestic politics now imposes on the use of force.[18]

Raising Costs. Moscow has used all available instruments of policy to force the United States into extensive outlays of resources in the Third World. Its aim, primarily political, is to elicit a U.S. effort that is disproportionate to Soviet outlays and to the intrinsic strategic importance of the region, the crisis, or the protagonists. For example, a minor theater like Lebanon has proved an expensive proposition for America.

So has Nicaragua. Subsidized by the Soviet bloc, the Central American conflict drains U.S. political assets and resources in an area that would otherwise be of little interest to the Kremlin. Though not the bargain that Vietnam was, Moscow's and Havana's modest aid to Nicaragua ($1 billion between 1980 and 1985 is the generally cited figure) has brought great political-military returns at the expense of the United States and is therefore a strategically sound long-term

[18] Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, February 1, 1984), pp. 36-37, 50-53, 173-184.

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investment. Not only does the conflict contribute to the militarization of politics in the region, thus carrying out Moscow's general Third World strategy, it also focuses attention on the seeming impotence of American power and exacerbates tension between Washington and the countries of Latin America and Western Europe.

In addition, such Soviet intrusiveness raises the costs to the United States of maintaining extensive commitments and interests in the Third World and requires the development of forces that can cope with a wide range of contingencies. As the Soviet Union keeps upping the ante of regional stakes, the United States follows suit, increasing defense spending on conventional forces and the aid packages given to prime clients. In the mid-1980s, Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan were the principal non-NATO recipients. El Salvador came fourth, receiving more than $1 billion in economic assistance and upwards of $500 million in military assistance between 1983 and 1986. That a strategically and militarily minor country attracts such sizable outlays suggests that the superpowers' "Great Game" will be a long and costly affair.

Anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is a complex cultural phenomenon resulting from many factors, including America's cultural presence around the world; the expanding role of the mass media; and the increasing importance of mass politics in the domestic calculations of Third World rulers. For Moscow, however, two propositions are self-evident: first, that anti-Americanism is growing in the Third World; second, that it complicates U.S. diplomacy and constrains pro-American clients from granting privileges to the United States. These two beliefs spur the Kremlin to foster and exploit anti-Americanism in its ongoing competition with the United States.

Conclusion

The USSR's overarching aim in the Third World is the weakening of American power. Within that strategy, it acquires clients for reasons as varied as their chance availability, the access they give to strategic choke points, and the difficulties their pro-Soviet stance creates for the United States. All are ultimately expendable, possibly even Afghanistan, whose contiguity brings into play traditional Russian ruthlessness toward weaker neighbors. But Moscow is a patient, imperial-minded patron. It does not require immediate returns or insist on complete compliance with all Soviet preferences. As long as a relationship furthers its strategy and keeps the U.S. off balance or at a disadvantage, the relationship will be sustained.

With comparatively modest outlays, Moscow has wrought changes that fully justify this strategy for weakening the United States. Aid to North Vietnam prompted a squandering of resources by the United States, draining American wealth. Of even greater

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long-term consequence, it hobbled America's self-confidence and willingness to exercise power. Vietnam was a stunning success, but so was support for Cuba, Syria, India, Egypt (for almost twenty years), South Yemen, Angola, and Nicaragua.

Indeed, Lenin's expectation that the Third World would prove the undoing of the capitalist world seems not as far off the mark in the 1980s as it seemed in the 1950s, although Khrushchev's confidence that the Third World would turn socialist is probably not shared even by his successors. The Third World is now far more anarchic, polarized, and conflict-ridden than it was; and its problems seem insoluble. But none of that vitiates the case for continued Soviet involvement.

In the Third World, Soviet leaders have found an arena for engaging the United States in conditions that not only keep all parts of the Soviet imperial system out of jeopardy but that also permit setbacks to be absorbed. Yet the reverse is not true for the United States, whose power, position, and prestige have been steadily eroded by confrontations in that region. In no other forum or arena has Moscow so much to show for its efforts in recent decades, and no Soviet leader will tamper with an approach that has brought such a remarkable array of successes.

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FRIENDLY TYRANTS: AN AMERICAN POLICY DILEMMA

Marcos and the Philippines

The Duvaliers and Haiti

The two essays that follow are part of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's program on "Friendly Tyrants."

This deliberately provocative label describes an effort to look systematically at a recurring policy problem: the national interests of the United States require good relations with regimes whose internal policies Americans morally condemn. From the ten case studies of the Friendly Tyrants project, we have selected two for publication in ORBIS: those concerning Haiti under the Duvaliers and the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos. By presenting American actions against the background of two dissimilar countries, these two cases clearly indicate the emergence of a new approach in Washington to this old dilemma, an approach that reflects lowered expectations and greater realism.

The Philippines and Haiti offer many contrasts. The Philippines, though geographically distant from the United States, may be politically closest to it of all Third World states; Haiti, though close geographically, is light years away in almost every cultural and political respect. The Philippines is strategically important to the United States; Haiti has only marginal significance in the context of broader regional considerations. In the Philippines there was, and remains, a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla threat; in Haiti there was none and is none. The Philippines enjoys a solid democratic tradition; Haiti does not. When Marcos left the Philippines, there was a clear route to the restoration of democracy through the Aquino government. When Duvalier left Haiti, the prospects for democracy were poor. After two-and-a-half years, the post-tyrant circumstances also differ, as Corazon Aquino has just managed to hold the pieces together in the Philippines, whereas the situation has badly deteriorated in Haiti.

At first glance, then, the only obvious similarity between the two cases is that Jean-Claude Duvalier and Ferdinand Marcos went into exile during the same month — February 1986. But a deeper look reveals a number of significant similarities.

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In both cases, human rights groups and the media strongly influenced U.S. policy toward the two states. In both, the Congress showed an uncharacteristic concern and exerted an important influence in time of crisis. In both, high American officials became directly involved in securing the tyrant's physical removal from the country. And yet, in both, the common people on the scene, by taking to the streets, undoubtedly did more to bring about the tyrant's downfall than did American policy as a whole or any American in particular.

Here, then, are the stories of two friendly tyrants: their rise, their years in power, their final crises, and the roles played and not played by the U.S. government.

— *The Editors*

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MARCOS AND THE PHILIPPINES

Theodore Friend

The Philippines ought not be dramatized as the greatest success story of American foreign policy in the 1980s. That case, in 1986, might indicate that for a while the United States hit its stride in promoting positive political change overseas. Was it the centerpiece of a shift in foreign policy, with Haiti as a fragile precursor, and South Korea a positive sequel? If so, Panama has since been a disappointment. The question remains: what lessons can be drawn from American policy toward the Philippines that may find application in another time and place?

No enduring insight will reconcile the security interests of the United States with its democratic sensibilities. No masterstroke will long fulfill both at once. Two-thirds of the world lives under regimes which are, arguably, as authoritarian as, or more authoritarian than, that of Ferdinand Marcos. Their peoples often look to the United States for moral and tangible aid. But many of the regimes in question do not impinge on American national interests; and others, although important to the United States, lie beyond the reach of American influence. Moreover, the processes of American policy making do not easily cohere. The bureaucracy tends to be arthritic; Congress spastic; lobbies virulent; the press myopic. America's inclination to extend its ways of life overseas is high, but its ability to do so by policy is low.

From this perspective, the Philippine crisis of 1983-86 and its immediate resolution must be considered uncharacteristic. All of the major forces came together in the end. Enabling these factors to converge was the long relationship between the United States and the Philippines, relations so close they may be called binationalism.[1]

[1] My view on the period 1983-86 follows in part from conversations with several major actors, including the late Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jaime Cardinal Sin, General Fidel V. Ramos, Salvador P. Laurel, and American Ambassadors Michael Armacost and Stephen Bosworth. I have also benefitted from the criticism of John Bresnan and Stanley Karnow. I have offered former President Ferdinand Marcos a full opportunity for rejoinder or correction, which opportunity he did not acknowledge.

Theodore Friend is President of Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc., based in Philadelphia. He was president of Swarthmore College (1973-1982). His latest book is *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945* (Princeton University Press, 1988).

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Background: Fil-American Binationalism

In Indonesia, cultural affinities to the Netherlands have become irrelevant. In Burma, Great Britain is of no consequence. In former French Indo-China, French politico-cultural influence has been rendered peripheral. Where else, forty years after independence, are affinities between a colony and its former ruling country as strong as in the Fil-American case? Perhaps Filipino gratitude toward the United States is disproportionate to the benefits they have received, but that issue changes neither facts nor feelings.

The slaughters of the Philippine-American War (1898-1901) were forgiven in part because of America's promise (in 1916) of eventual independence, and in part because of American colonial policy. Progressives in both American political parties saw to it that this policy was broadly consistent with the American domestic prescriptions of the times. Above all it emphasized the education and health of Filipinos. After that came roads and infrastructure, built for the development of the Philippines and not for exploitative imperial industries. American defense of the Philippines was paid for by American taxes, unlike the British, French, and Dutch imperial garrisons, which were supported out of their colonies' budgets. Some have argued an even more fundamental restructuring of the Philippines should have been undertaken in 1901. But this view underestimates the vast changes in health and education that did follow and takes for granted the considerable progress made toward representative government and a reliable civil service.

When the United States proved unable to defend its colony against Japanese invasion, Filipinos fought guerrilla actions against the Japanese in anticipation of the Americans' return and died with them in 1944-45 as they had in 1941-42. The human costs in losing and retaking the Philippines from the Japanese were terrible — perhaps half a million Filipinos died. At the least, we can say that Americans were such indifferent exploiters that few Filipinos hated them. At the most, we can note that Filipinos not only fought with Americans to secure their promised independence but afterwards helped to refashion a binational relationship.

Filipinos critical of the United States point out the contrast between American actions in their country and in Japan. In 1945 America transformed the Japanese government, cudgeled the corporations, achieved major land reforms, imposed social changes, and pumped in economic assistance. Why, they ask, was a similar effort not undertaken in the Philippines? This question ignores the delivery, on schedule in 1946, of independence and sovereignty. One may reform a defeated enemy, but one must allow a sovereign ally to choose its own path. At any rate, such was the rationale for postwar American policy.

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In 1953 another opportunity for major reform came and went with nothing more than tactical American intervention. Ramon Magsaysay won the presidency with a large majority and finished quelling the Huk rebellion that (with American military aid) he had begun to subdue as Minister of Defense. Magsaysay had the compassion to see the problems and the popularity to effect lasting social change, but he underestimated his power. Critics complain that American help, which could have been decisive at this juncture, was not forthcoming. If any opportunity was missed, however, it was missed by a popular president of a sovereign Philippines.

Despite post-independence restraints in its policies, the United States remained the Philippines' major source of constitutional ideas, political tactics, and administrative innovations. Everything from political styles to clothing, songs, Christmas festivities, television soap operas, and the ordinary clichés of public life tended to be American-based or American-biased. This condition continues even though economic ties between the two nations have lessened and are no longer controlling, and it continues despite the irritant of American military bases. This is not to deny indigenous levels of feeling or living styles sequestered from American influence. It is simply to say that a Fil-American popular culture, including the presumption of upward mobility, has predominated in the Philippines and has been for the most part cherished.

From Democracy to Autocracy: 1965-1975

In the fifteen years before Ferdinand Marcos was first elected president (1950-1965), the Philippines had an average annual growth rate and a political stability that surpassed all of Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and even South Korea. Only Japan was more prosperous and more stable. The Philippine authorities maintained peace among forty million citizens with armed forces of only 60,000 and no political prisoners. Two parties alternated in office. Democracy and the dynamics of the family structure produced a competitive patronage system which, whatever its shabbiness, helped to integrate and stabilize a great variety of regional and ethnic groups.

Nevertheless, erosive forces were at work, including the incipient growth of small private armies; an inequity in income distribution high for Southeast Asia (though far from the worst in Latin America); and a judicial system whose complexity and cost were beyond the poor. Freedom of expression was degenerating into wild journalistic license, and social anarchy began to threaten individual liberty. Police protection became inadequate except for those rich enough to hire their own forces. To his credit, Marcos saw these problems. His program of "rice, roads, and schoolhouses" went to the heart of Phil-

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ippine needs. He was re-elected in 1969, the first Filipino president to win two terms.

By 1972, however, momentum was slowing and a new impetus from above was needed to further socio-economic development. Marcos, like other Southeast Asian leaders, could have made an argument for constraining personal liberties to gain the means to further economic, social and educational development. But he went far beyond that and imposed martial law. To justify the event, Marcos created a drama of national jeopardy in the Philippines and then strode on stage in militant garb. His immediate excuse (later revealed as a pretext) was the shooting of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile's white Mercedes Benz. Marcos added to that a rhetoric about jeopardy from the communist New People's Army (NPA), then numbering in the hundreds. His motives for martial law probably tilted, even then, more toward prolonging his power than toward genuine national development. And by the time he was done, the NPA numbered over 20,000 armed men.

Still, there were a few years of measurable gains after 1972. And at the martial-law takeover itself, popular criticism was surprisingly light; real resistance almost nil; support audible; unexpressed relief considerable. Marcos improved public security by confiscating hundreds of thousands of weapons, prohibiting demonstrations and strikes, and introducing summary procedures to deal with street crime. He strengthened the powers of his best technocrats and introduced reforms aimed at economic growth and social equality. He implemented more land reform than had occurred in all the years since independence. Road building, subsidized credits for farmers, rural electrification, and irrigation works at last brought the Philippines close to self-sufficiency in rice.

Rebels nearly disappeared from Central Luzon, once the heart of the Huk insurrection. The political left came to Marcos's help. Former Huk supremo Luis Taruc, and Jerry Montemayor of the Federation of Free Farmers, became allies and advocates. Adrian Cristobal, a leftist intellectual, became his speech writer and spokesman. Blas Ople, a leftist labor leader, became Minister of Labor.

Marcos dropped import-substitution policies and tried to attract foreign investment, which brought support from the World Bank. He created the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, a consortium of construction companies that improved transportation and irrigation systems. Farm credit and a muting of the old landed oligarchy won the support of farmers; substantial roads won the approval of the middle class; the growth rates of the early martial law period won the adherence of independent businessmen. Improvements in law and order won the relieved gratitude of nearly everyone.

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As for the United States, in keeping with its hands-off policy, Washington did not intervene against martial law, but neither did the administration bless it. William C. Hamilton, then Deputy Chief of Mission in Manila, has acknowledged the most that can be said: "The declaration of martial law on September 22, 1972, was a tactical but not a strategic surprise." Assisting Ambassador Henry A. Byroade, he recalled that Marcos "deliberately refrained from privately signalling his intent," and left the ambassador without a clear sense of what might happen and when.[2] Byroade tried to dissuade Marcos from his course and took the problem to Washington, but he could not arouse high-level interest. Later the embassy concluded that Marcos sprang his surprise to avoid confrontation, and they found the controls light compared with the declaration of martial law in the Republic of Korea soon afterward.[3]

Raymond Bonner argues that the United States was passive with regard to Marcos's declaring martial law, and suggests presidential complicity. Bonner believes that "ultimate responsibility for allowing Marcos to become a dictator rests with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger."[4] Whatever those two men said, Bonner's analysis betrays an ignorance of Philippine history and political dynamics. Marcos wanted to rule by martial law and only the Philippine courts, Congress, press, or populace could have stopped him — not American leaders. Indeed, it was public outcry in the Philippines that stopped Manuel Quezon in the late 1930s when he proposed "Partyless Democracy."

During the early years of martial law, gross economic statistics showed some improvement, then a steady worsening. Dynastic petrification, the erosion of liberty, and the daunting of initiative through crony cartels grew serious in the late 1970s and terrible in the early 1980s. American action in 1972 might theoretically have prevented all this, but no one compellingly predicted in 1972 the decline of the Philippines under Marcos. Even in 1975, there was no authoritative Filipino or American forecast of how bad matters would become by the early 1980s. As in Iran during this era, strong American diplomatic intervention in the Philippines would have been inconsistent with the apparent strength, apparent popularity, and apparent dynamism of the dictator who later fell and fell hard. Furthermore, preemptive intervention for the sake of saving another nation from decadence is hard for any democracy to justify. For the United States

[2] William C. Hamilton, "United States Policy in the Period Leading to the Declaration of Martial Law and Its Immediate Aftermath," in *Rebuilding A Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy*, ed. Carl H. Landé (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1987), pp. 505-15.

[3] Hamilton, p. 511.

[4] See Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 112–13. Richard Nixon has declared (in a letter to *The New York Times*, June 7, 1987) that Bonner is wrong.

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of the early and mid-1970s, recoiling from Vietnam, reeling out of Watergate, it was beyond consideration.

The Morass, 1975-1983

By 1975, the Philippines' old oligarchy had given way to a new one — Marcos's cronies. Into their hands went the supposedly reformed land, and into their hands too went capital-intensive projects (in nuclear power, steel, copper, etc.), justified by a rhetoric of "economic independence." Ideologists believed the rhetoric; wiser analysts knew these projects were unsuited to the nation's skills and comparative advantages. The projects were devised to bring huge foreign loans, from which the cronies siphoned off large portions.

Cronies also developed commodity cartels in the coconut and sugar industries. Coconuts were controlled by Enrile, Eduardo Cojuangco, and Benjamin Romualdez, who appropriated the monopoly profits and used them for regime and individual political goals. In the sugar business, a decree in the mid-1970s centralized trading under the command of Roberto Benedicto. By 1986 more than half of the centrals, the sugar milling complexes, were unprofitable and owned by the Philippine National Bank. The creation of these commodity monopolies lowered the percentage of the farmers' receipts and reduced the standard of living for both farmers and laborers. But they created huge profits for banks and conglomerates, enriching cronies and centralizing politico-economic power in a Marcos oligarchy.

Good men left or lost influence as the cronies gathered around Marcos. Rafael Salas resigned in 1971, after four years as Marcos's executive secretary, reportedly over differences with the First Lady, Imelda Marcos. Late in 1975, Alejandro Melchor was fired as executive secretary because of direct conflicts with the First Lady and Enrile. Francisco "Kit" Tatad resigned as Minister of Information in the late 1970s. Other men of talent persisted but sank with the general decline. Early in his career as Minister of Finance Cesar Virata got high marks from world colleagues; he stayed on to supervise Philippine inflation, underproduction, and the ballooning of debt. As Minister of Education, O. D. Corpuz could do little but try to uphold standards. Minister of Agriculture Arturo Tanco was slowly stripped of power and relegated to what he called "Minister of Gardening."[5]

If more good men did not leave and speak out, it was partly because of fear, and more so as time passed. When the question is raised, knowledgeable folk lift their eyebrows and draw a finger across the throat. They mention Primitivo Mijares, the former head of Mar-

[5] Author's conversation with Arturo Tanco, December 1983.

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cos's Media Advisory Council, who disappeared after criticizing the ruling couple for their "Conjugal Dictatorship."[6] They mention Cesar Climaco, the outspoken opposition mayor in Mindanao, who was gunned down. Or Floro Crisologo, who "didn't come across,"[7] and was assassinated while attending mass. Marcos's use of terror was not naked or systematic, but it was enough to keep people in check. It was incorrect and unkind of whoever said it to speak of "one son of a bitch and fifty-five million cowards," but for a time criticism was smothered and courage checked by a national patriarch and matriarch and their sycophantic beneficiaries.

Reaching Bottom

Before the crisis of 1983-86 broke upon him, Marcos had wrecked the Philippines, politically and economically. He did so in six ways.

Crony socialism. Contrary to the popular expression, Marcos introduced not "crony capitalism" but "crony socialism." The concessions he gave to the business empires of Conjuangco, Benedicto, Romualdez and Antonio Floirendo pre-empted or smothered competition. Marcos gave away whole chunks of the economy, unmonitored, to the untrustworthy. The resulting corruption, overborrowing, underbidding, dollar salting, and gross inefficiencies sapped the economy. As for Marcos himself, according to a commission trying to recover his wealth, personal assets so far located in the Philippines amount to $1.5 billion. Four buildings placed under receivership by New York courts had a net value of about $110 million. The Marcoses' assets in Switzerland have been estimated at $5 billion.[8]

Semi-militarization of the government. Korean military leaders in the bureaucracy had helped spur the surge in productivity under General Park Chung-hee (1961-79), and their counterparts had contributed to economic growth in Indonesia under General Suharto. But militarization weakened the Philippine civil service and led to declining professionalism in the military proper, including a high incidence of corruption and torture. Marcos did not infuse the military with a theory of its dual function, including national development, as was done in Indonesia. His cronyism, practiced from the civilian side, infected the military too.

Mismanagement of the economy. Economic mistakes led to malnutrition, a 40 percent rate of unemployment or underemployment, and double-digit inflation. Global financial events contributed, no

[6] Primitivo Mijares, *The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I* (San Francisco: Union Square Publications, 1976). This book is now rare. As evidence, however, that Mijares's fate did not deter all other journalists, see Marcelo B. Soriano, ed., *The Quiet Revolt of the Philippine Press* (Manila: WE Forum, 1981).

[7] Confidential assessment given to the author by a former Marcos appointee.

[8] *The New York Times*, February 9, 1987.

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doubt, but South Korea also experienced global shocks and major scandals without succumbing to them. By the end of 1984, foreign debt in the Philippines equalled $26 billion, four-fifths of the GNP. By the end of 1985, real GNP had declined nearly 10 percent over the two previous years. Manila's bewilderment at how to manage the mess, and its crude tricks (such as the misstating of the debt) further reduced the government's credibility.

Gross will to power. Marcos was not always and never fully a tyrant. In the beginning, after all, he had to get elected. And even at the end, after the murder of Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino, Jr., when hundreds of thousands demonstrated against him, Marcos ordered the police to follow a line of maximum tolerance to the point of forgiveness. Nevertheless, the corruption of power grew within the Marcoses as their power grew. Its symbol was the project to carve the face of Ferdinand Marcos into a mountain side. An example on the other side of the conjugal dictatorship was the insistence of Imelda Marcos that there be no delays after scaffolding failed and two dozen workers died at the construction of her Philippine Film Center — they were left buried in cement. After she went into exile, 1,060 pairs of shoes and 508 floor-length gowns were found in Imelda's closets at Malacanang palace.

"Propintel." Marcos introduced propaganda and intelligence for purposes of control into the management of Philippine public opinion. His Ministry of Information aped the propaganda departments of absolutist states. Hired minds churned out interesting and insincere books in Marcos's name, advancing a theory of state that was pseudo-populist in profile but familistic-autocratic in essence. Marcos introduced surveillance and internal espionage on a scale never before practiced in the Philippines. And though his thought-police were bumbling, they were nonetheless a weapon of terror. Life in the Philippines began to suffer from the buzz of government propaganda, and the hush of intimidated private voices.

The undermining of institutions. The Supreme Court, once self-respecting and independent, was cowed. The legislature, in the term of a forthright analyst, was "caponized."[9] The financial institutions of the state were severely compromised. The media were government-controlled or censored. Marcos split the entrepreneurial class, which had once had an innovative spirit, into the traduced, the nullified, and the exasperated, with the latter pouring energy and funds into the opposition, staking their careers on change.

In 1983 came a critical moment to challenge this environment. A series of economic decisions went bad; attempts to accelerate the economy out of a trough spun it deeper into its hole. Marcos grew

[9] Joaquin G. Bernas, S. J., "Constitutionalism after 1972," in *Budhi Papers*, Vol. 6, ed. Ramon C. Reyes (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila, 1985), pp. 190-203.

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seriously ill, and in his absence, indecision was felt not only at the top, but throughout the government.

Then, on August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino was murdered on his return to the Philippines. Reportedly, Marcos was so angry at the assassination of his rival that, even weakened as he was, he threw a piece of furniture. Others in the official family probably gave the order, but however it happened, Marcos quickly had a national crisis on his hands. Filipinos had endured a declining standard of living and corrupt government. Now outrage was added. Two million marchers joined Aquino's funeral procession. Hundreds of thousands continued to make themselves available for demonstrations. Marcos governed from mini-crisis to mini-crisis within an extended major crisis that was to be his last. His perspective shrank from weeks to days to hours; his aim was to hold power. That power slowly ebbed from him; but never clearly until the last, when it went in a rush.

The American Role

As the Philippines fractured, what role did the United States government assume?

Washington had supported all Filipino presidents, even those it did not like and those against whom the CIA had maneuvered. There was never a consensus in Washington that would have said of Marcos what Franklin Roosevelt said of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Garcia: "Yes, he's an S.O.B., but he's our S.O.B." Knowledgeable official sentiment was more on the order of "He's *their* son-of-a-bitch."

Under Nixon and Ford, Washington had been concerned above all else with the security of the two American military installations, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base. Philippine governance was separate and secondary. But few believed the United States could keep Clark and Subic if Communists took over in the Philippines. By the end of the Ford administration, the decay of the Philippines was becoming apparent to the American bureaucracy.

At the same time, many Filipinos were asking why the United States had not prevented martial law or at least spoken out against it since its inception. The Carter presidency did speak out. Patricia Derian, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, began making strong representations on behalf of Benigno Aquino and other detainees, with some effect. In 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie spoke out for less dictatorship and more democracy. But no concerted pressure was applied to Marcos.

When the Reagan administration took office, it spoke foolishly but eventually acted wisely. In 1981 the newly elected Vice President, George Bush, attended Marcos's re-inauguration and declared that America stood with him because "We love your adherence to

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democratic principles and practices."[10] This spontaneous gush embarrassed many Americans, but members of the State Department, Defense Department, and CIA led a steady distancing. They recognized the tailspin of Philippine conditions, the dangers of the NPA, and the increasing impetuousness of power in Malacanang. A program of pressures and proddings slowly evolved.

When Aquino was killed, Ambassador Michael Armacost insisted on a credible investigative body and prevailed against a Marcos attempt to pin it on a "communist" gunman. The next year, 1984, Armacost spoke in an openly critical manner of the First Lady in an address to the Makati Business Club. Mrs. Marcos's credibility was low. Taking rhetorical aim at her as a target was a major step in the distancing policy. Armacost's successor, Stephen Bosworth, began a new policy of financial pressure that leading Filipinos had urged, even at the cost of pain to their economy. Bosworth also coordinated suggestions from military advisors who asked for a re-professionalization of the Philippine military.

Meanwhile, Congressman Stephen Solarz (Democrat of New York and chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs) continued his visits, his hearings, and his critical statements, helping to force the administration to explain its policy. When events caught the attention of the press, and a dramatic and readable crisis could be presented to American readers, a new dynamic was under way.

The Pressure for Democracy

The basic tests for intervention by the United States against a pro-American authoritarian should be: how bad is the regime? how weak is it? how good and how strong is the alternative? and how much does the country matter to American national interests? Applying these criteria illuminates American government actions after the Aquino assassination.

How bad was Marcos? Far more brutal and repressive regimes, including some in East Asia, made Marcos looked mild. But when stories appeared on the greed of the Marcoses, "how bad?" began to take the meaning of "how corrupt?" Americans began to suspect a gargantuan gluttony for cash and gold, art and pseudo-art, and a hoard of costly vulgar durables.

If bad, how weak? Though beyond his peak and descending, Marcos still looked strong. He controlled the armed forces through his crony and distant cousin Fabian Ver. Indeed, he appeared to control nearly everything, including the media, through crony con-

10 Carl Landé, "Introduction: Retrospect and Prospect," *Rebuilding A Nation*, 7-44, quotes Bush on p. 42.

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glomerates. And his fierce clutch on power, as Jaime Cardinal Sin and others privately remarked, could become a death-grip.

The alternative? There was none. The opposition was cowed and divided. Only Ninoy Aquino had visibility, and he was first in jail, then abroad, then murdered. But there was a paradox here. Ninoy's brother, Agapito "Butz" Aquino, told him there would be 75,000 people to greet him at the Manila airport in August 1983; the crowd was perhaps a tenth of that. The killing of Ninoy, however, produced a funeral march of two million people. Here was proof that the basis existed for an alternative to Marcos.

How did Marcos affect American interests? Private investment was modest; both imports and exports were steadily declining as a percentage of American foreign trade. Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base were the concern. The Soviets' build-up at Cam Ranh Bay, and their increasing naval presence in the Pacific made these all the more important. The primary American concern was to hold on to the Philippine bases at any reasonable cost. Building up Guam as a replacement facility for the Philippine bases ran not only into cost barriers (rough estimates have run from $2 to $8 billion and recently as high as $10 billion), but also into strategic and tactical liabilities. Guam lies at a distance of four "steaming days," for battle purposes, from the South China Sea.

Given the ambiguous context, it took time for official opinion in the United States to reach an anti-Marcos consensus. In October 1984, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published a staff report which asserted that, as things were going, the New People's Army could reach strategic parity with the armed forces of the Philippines in three to five years. In January 1985, the White House leaked to the press a national security directive calling for continued pressure on Marcos to bring about political, economic, and military reforms. President Reagan signed the directive and then signed a letter conveying the message to Marcos. Paul Wolfowitz, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, not only carried the message to Marcos, but in a Manila press conference he publicly made the same points.

Despite these efforts, nothing improved in Marcos or the Philippine situation. Nine months later, in October 1985, Senator Paul Laxalt (Republican of Nevada), carrying the authority that derived from his friendship with Reagan, visited Marcos in Manila to convey the administration's concern over the crisis. He suggested early elections to give Marcos a reaffirmation of popular support. Marcos, who had allowed relatively free Assembly elections in April 1984, had seen even a cowed and uncoordinated opposition gain fifty-nine seats, just short of the one-third needed to file a motion to impeach. To

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call off the dogs of American criticism might expose him to the tiger of native impeachment.

Wolfowitz and his counterpart in the Defense Department, Richard Armitage, kept up the pressure in hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, painting a grim picture of economic crisis and communist insurgency. On the first day of November, Senator David Durenberger (Republican of Minnesota and chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), took two unprecedented steps. He published a staff report which summarized existing intelligence on the Philippines, and he held a press conference at which he called on Marcos to step down. By late 1985 the official consensus against Marcos was remarkably complete, in agreement with American public opinion. It lacked only, and notably, the Chief Executive.

The Election and the Last Days

On November 3, 1985, Marcos announced early presidential elections. In retrospect this action looks like his crucial error. Probably he could have held on against increasing American criticism, rising Filipino opposition, and the growing communist insurgency. Instead, he chose a path of determined — but corrupt — legitimation of power.

Washington emphasized the preconditions of an honest election: empowerment of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) as a legal election monitor; accreditation of Laurel's United Nationalist Organization (UNIDO) as an opposition party; appointment of two independent commissioners to vacant positions on the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); and equal access to the media for the opposition. But Marcos harassed NAMFREL, packed COMELEC, and denied the opposition access to the media. He counted on the opposition to remain split and allow him a large margin of victory.

He miscalculated. The puppet court trying Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and 25 others for conspiracy in the murder of Ninoy Aquino acquitted the defendants on all counts. The next day, Corazon Aquino announced her decision to run for president. A week later, Laurel agreed to run as her vice president rather than launch a campaign of his own. Both of them — and the whole opposition — owed much to the intercession of Cardinal Sin, who personally brought them together and pleaded that they unite. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines issued a pastoral letter calling free elections a moral necessity.

Mrs. Aquino campaigned hard all over the country, drawing increasingly larger crowds. Marcos, required to show superior "popularity," went on the road with a dialysis unit, raised crowds with flagging charisma and fresh pesos, and then swamped television with

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rebroadcasts of his infrequent appearances. As he readied his political machine, he also accelerated the printing of currency.

On election day, February 7, a thousand foreign journalists and television crewmen roamed the Philippines with a twenty-member official American observer mission, led by Senator Richard Lugar (Republican of Indiana). Consequently, millions of Americans and other foreigners witnessed ballot thievery and ballot stuffing by Marcos forces, missing tally sheets, the intimidation of voters, the overnight switching of voting precincts, and commuting mercenary voters. NAMFREL reports from the field failed to reach Manila. Computer workers of COMELEC walked off the job protesting altered figures.

Marcos was declared the official winner with 55 percent of the vote.

In response, on February 11, President Reagan conceded there was "an appearance of fraud" but suggested it might be "occurring on both sides."[11] He urged the government and opposition leaders to "work together to form a viable government" and dispatched diplomatic trouble-shooter Philip Habib to consult with the two sides. This business-as-usual approach, however, would not dull the uproar in Manila or the consternation worldwide. An alarmed consensus in the House, Senate, State Department, Defense Department, and CIA agreed that the electoral triumph was corrupt. Then, on February 16, as Mrs. Aquino called for a nationwide strike before a crowd of one million at Rizal Park, Radio Veritas (the independent, increasingly pro-opposition Catholic station) interrupted its coverage to announce that Ronald Reagan had at last issued a statement deploring massive official fraud in the Philippine vote.

On February 22, the crisis broke open. Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile announced the withdrawal of their allegiance from Marcos, their transfer of loyalty to Mrs. Aquino, and their willingness to stand fast to death at Camp Crame. The White House called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But in speaking of its "reinforce[d] concerns that the latest elections were marred by fraud, perpetrated overwhelmingly by the ruling party,"[12] it at last shared the view taken by most Filipinos, most Americans, and most of Washington. The education of Ronald Reagan had been completed by transcripts of telephone calls from Malacanang to the COMELEC telling them how the numbers should read. That, it is said, "got him in the gut."[13] Enrile himself was soon to say publicly (as part of his "act of contrition," widely quoted in American news-

[11] John Bresnan, "A Chronology of Political Change in the Philippines," manuscript in the possession of the author.

[12] Bresnan,"Chronology."

[13] Private communication to the author.

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papers) that he had had the results in Nueva Vizcaya altered for Marcos by 350,000.[14]

But high drama was going on in Manila, where not only Marcos, but the Aquino-Laurel camp were in the dark as to what Ramos and Enrile intended to do. Marcos could have ordered an attack on them and the mere 300 men originally with them. A ruthless tyrant would have ordered it; a sharp chief of staff could have brought it off. But Marcos was never perfectly ruthless and Fabian Ver was not competent.

Two-and-a-quarter hours after the Ramos-Enrile press conference, Cardinal Sin appealed on Radio Veritas for Filipinos to guard the rebel camp and avert violence. Not until another two-and-a-quarter more hours had passed, at 11:15 p.m., did Marcos go on television to announce a coup plot and try to regain credibility and momentum through television. But by then hundreds of thousands were in the streets, a human buffer protecting Ramos and Enrile.

Tanks and two marine brigades moved out to attack the rebels on February 23 at 2:15 p.m. By that time the crowd of perhaps a million had the confidence and daring of its size and its nonviolent convictions. When the tanks came into view, women ran towards them, bread and flowers in their arms. The tanks stopped. Twice in a long, desperate afternoon, their commander ordered the tank motors kicked on. Twice the surrounding crowd hunched up towards them, kneeling, lying in the shadow of the tracks. Would the column proceed over the crunch of bone, the cries of prayers? Twice the engines stopped. The tanks retreated after a four-hour confrontation with the unarmed civilians, stopped by the courage of others and by their own pity.

They were surely affected also by uncertain orders, psychological warfare ploys from Ramos-Enrile, and unpropitious intelligence reports. Millions, including Cardinal Sin, believe they were stopped also by the Virgin Mary; or by a mysterious Blue Nun who appeared from nowhere and put her hands on the machines, a manifestation of divine power in the form of feminine mercy against which no man could proceed. In any event, many Filipinos, including military men, put family values and Christian mercy ahead of valorous performance. Theirs is not a *samurai* tradition.

By Monday night, February 24, the Sikorsky attack helicopter group had defected to Ramos and Enrile. Marcos's marines had had Ramos and Enrile in the sights of their cannons for hours and disregarded orders from the palace to fire. Fearless and festive crowds ruled the streets.[15]

[14] *The Miami Herald*, February 23, 1986.

[15] This account is largely condensed from Bryan Johnson, *The Four Days of Courage* (New York: The Free Press, 1987).

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At three in the morning on Tuesday, February 25, Marcos called Senator Laxalt and sought American help in brokering a power-sharing arrangement. Laxalt checked with both Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, and ultimately with President Reagan in Shultz's company. The answer in return, sometime after 5:00 a.m. Manila time, was "no." Friend to friend, Marcos asked Laxalt what he should do. "Cut and cut cleanly," Laxalt told him. "The time has come."[16] Marcos complied. American planes flew him and his family (as well as Ver, Cojuangco, and an entourage) to Guam and then to Hawaii.

Not long after the helicopter liftoff, Secretary of State Shultz recognized and welcomed Mrs. Aquino's government.

American Conscience in a Complex World

How applicable are the lessons of the Marcos case to other friendly tyrants? To the extent one moves among the fundamentally unlike, the credibility of comparisons weakens. The Philippine crisis of 1983-86 resonates most clearly in modern Latin American history and in Southeast Asia, where the socio-cultural and historical analogues are strongest. But even so, we must note, the regime of Ferdinand Marcos was not simply the regime of a friendly tyrant. It was also a regime that had largely lost the loyalty of four major national forces.

The church. In the late 1970s, the Church had opened up a critical distance from Marcos. By 1983, Cardinal Sin was privately urging American financial pressure on the regime. He escalated his involvement steadily to the point of going on the radio urging citizens to the streets to protect Ramos and Enrile. This action may later have drawn an admonition from the Pope. But under the circumstances, silence on his part might have suggested passivity to a regime which was not only corrupt and repressive but evil. And, in naked political terms, it must have long been clear to the cardinal that he would keep losing his clergy and their parishioners to the NPA and its ultraleft ideology if he did not exercise moral leadership in the temporal realm.

Independent businessmen. By late 1983 Marcos also had lost the support of progressive businessmen. The killing of Ninoy Aquino exacerbated the economic and financial crisis; much capital flew after much that had flown already. Quite apart from the Marcos family's hoardings, $10 billion in Filipino capital is estimated still to be held abroad. At the same time, businessmen like Jaime Ongpin, who were investing their resources and careers inside the Philippines, were increasingly prepared to stake their lives on change. Ongpin's suicide

[16] *The New York Times*, February 26, 1986.

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in 1988, after his resignation from President Aquino's cabinet, is too complicated a matter to analyze here. But at the very least it shows the extraordinary degree of his identification with ideas of a transformed Philippines.

The political opposition. By calling a snap election, in December 1985, Marcos counted on a divided opposition. But his opponents surprised him. At the urging of Cardinal Sin, Mrs. Aquino and Laurel brought the two major democratic factions together. The ultraleft boycotted the election and weakened itself by so doing. For a few key months, the opposition held together on the basis of a desire to overthrow the Marcos regime.

The armed forces. Divisions of opinion were clear in the armed forces for some time before February 22, 1986, but Marcos managed to prevail through his Chief of Staff, Fabian Ver. General Ver's only principle was loyalty to his boss, and he was suspicious of West Point graduates like Ramos and his followers. When Ramos and Enrile publicly broke from Marcos and pledged themselves to Aquino, at peril to their lives, the last major fracture needed to bring down Marcos was in place, except one: the United States.

In addition to its unique internal circumstances, the Philippine case satisfied all the conditions for American disengagement from a tyrannical regime. Corruption on an offensively large scale had been proven. Repression to an odious degree was documented. Internal order was unravelling. An already serious communist insurgency was accelerating, threatening American strategic interests. And finally, American political sensibilities were awakened in both the popular and official minds. This last factor was the key. When the media dramatized what officials realized — a dangerous situation, a bad and weak dictator, an opposition leader worthy of hopeful support — the rest was a matter of timing. Regarding the Philippines, American timing was good except for the slow education of President Reagan, a function of his own loyalistic and nostalgic character.

Had United States policy been determined by Ronald Reagan's friendship with Marcos and his well-meaning personal feeling, the crisis might have ended differently, and much more bloodily. But the advice of Solarz and Shultz, Armacost and Armitage, Lugar and Laxalt — plus the cry of the American public and the media's amplification of it — finally changed the president's outlook. On February 24, the United States government officially asked Marcos to step down. Marcos did not comply until he heard the same message from Reagan through Laxalt. Then, like Baby Doc of Haiti less than three weeks earlier, Marcos was chauffeured by the United States into exile.

A critic says that "the United States acquiesced over too long a period in the process of Philippine political and economic disinte-

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gration."[17] Maybe so. But for America to abjure intervention is not necessarily a sign of powerlessness in Washington, or moral corruption in the administration, or indifference on the part of the American people. With two-thirds of the world suffering under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, the United States clearly cannot intervene everywhere for democracy. And intervention involves enough potential costs and risks to warrant extreme caution. The United States must choose its moments, and, as a result, bear the criticism of being complicit in circumstances it usually does not arrange and may even detest.

There may in fact occur further dangers in the Philippines, with erosion from the peak moments of Cory Aquino's early regime. Corruption, oligarchic torpor, maldistribution of income, mass malnutrition — all remain or may return as problems, and to the degree the government does not help to deliver food, health, education, and justice, the alternative government of the NPA can always take root and find recruits. But the United States should play its hand with great care, because Philippine nationalism continues its incremental rise, and American presumptions of a special relationship ought to be decreasing towards an eventual vanishing point.

American handling of the Philippine crisis of 1986 may look like a model for handling problems in other places. But it is important to stress the limited comparability of cultures, histories, and circumstances, even in apparently similar cases.

For a brief time, American handling of the Philippine crisis of 1986 may look like a model for handling problems in other places. But it is important to stress the limited comparability of cultures, histories, and circumstances, even in apparently similar cases. In South Korea, standards of living go bounding forward, and meanwhile, fortunately, democratic practices advance there by increments. The same is less exuberantly true in Taiwan. In Chile, government corruption is not so rampant; the population has reason neither to like the government nor to think it incompetent. Mexico is analagous to the Philippines only in some aspects of Hispano-Catholic political culture; disanalagous by size and contiguity to the United States. Indonesia is geographically adjacent to the Philippines and ethno-linguistically akin; but it is vastly larger, with an army more skilled administratively, with a pervasive secular ideology of the state,

[17] Richard Kessler, "Marcos and the Americans," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1986, p. 57.

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and with modest economic progress holding it together. There are, in fact, no like cases. The Philippines is unique.

There have been three major crises over the last century in the history that may be called Fil-American. Two were international: the revolution against Spain, which continued into the war against America, 1896-1901; the war against Japan, 1941-45; and the crisis of 1983-86. The United States had a pivotal role in all three events: first as imperial conqueror, next as defender and liberator, and most recently as mentor and intervenor. The last not only has limited applicability elsewhere, it may even have highly limited utility as a precedent in the future Philippines.

The credit for the Yellow Revolution — for the sacrificial energy against the Marcos regime from August 1983 through February 1986 — belongs entirely to Filipinos. They vindicated their citizens' rights by ballot; they brought about the symbolic climax. When the tanks rumbled slowly toward the crowd on Epifanio de los Santos Boulevard, the people did not cower or scatter but streamed forward. It was their courage and devotion that saved the Philippines. So it will be in other countries. The task of overthrowing tyrants must be chiefly borne by those who would exercise the native right and duty of rebellion. And with that comes the obligation to build a better republic.

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THE DUVALIERS AND HAITI

by Georges Fauriol

Only two times in this century have events in Haiti held a high priority in Washington: in 1915, when the Haitian President's torn body was paraded through the capital, Port-au-Prince, in the midst of chaos and likely European intervention; and in 1986, when the Duvalier regime fell. Following both the 1915 and 1986 crises, U.S. policy aimed at four objectives: restoring order; keeping other powers out; attending to acute problems of economic management; and planting the seeds of modern and democratic government in Haiti.

Yet the 1986 crisis differed dramatically from the earlier one because the stakes at risk involved much wider regional goals. When the 1915 U.S. intervention did not realize American objectives, the failure had modest consequences that hurt mainly Haitians, not U.S. security. No similar result would follow from a failure of the 1986 intervention. If U.S. policy fails, Haitian problems will be added to a turbulent southern border and an unstable Caribbean Basin, increasing strategic concern with America's backyard, and creating another drain on American resources. Thus, the success or failure of U.S. policy toward Haiti transcends the future of Haiti itself in a way that few could have imagined in 1915.

Haitian Society

Lawrence Harrison's contention that culture conditions national development certainly fits the Haitian case.[1] In Haiti, development has been frustrated by a vision of the world that impedes socio-economic progress and political modernization. Indeed, Haiti has been characterized by long periods with no apparent development nor any strategy to create it. An explanation of this miserable record quickly turns into a study of the country's soul: its religion, history, cultural values, rural-urban polarization, and so forth.

Throughout the Caribbean, religion looms large. In Haiti, establishment churches have been displaced or absorbed to a degree by local cults, practices, and folklore. Voodoo, enriched by African rites and Christianity, provides Haitians with a powerful emotional outlet.

[1] Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985).

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Basic to Voodoo is the ancestral past and its impact on the present, and there is a fatalism in its cosmos that does not leave much room for shaping the present or future. Nature and Man contend with each other in a process forwarded by appeals to the many spirits who control all forces. An individual struggles to survive within an essentially static hierarchy.

The country's history has compounded Voodoo's fatalistic character. Through most of the eighteenth century, Haiti flourished as a French sugar-plantation colony, but the importation of 800,000 African slaves created an untenable socioeconomic milieu. Racial conflict exploded with the French Revolution, which gave rise to the Haitian Revolution of 1789-1804 and the first non-European postcolonial state in the modern world. Free from bondage, former slaves resisted returning to the environment of their misery and rejected the economic structures of slavery, such as the large production units of agricultural estates. When Haiti's leaders attempted to recreate the plantation system after independence, they encountered resistance and violence. Haiti's agriculture degenerated to subsistence farming, and the countryside became a collection of poor communities, isolated by Haiti's mountainous geography.

The heart of Haiti lies still in this inner country, poor and dedicated to subsistence agriculture, culturally shaped by African roots and the experience of slavery. But this Creole-speaking rural peasantry, 80 percent of the population, has been excluded from national decision making. Indeed, until this century, the government's presence in the countryside amounted only to a tenuous administrative system. In general, Haitian government appears to have been at its best when lightest. Local warlords managed local affairs, sometimes acting on behalf of the central government, sometimes against it. The Duvalier regimes modernized the administrative system and added a police presence.

The Africanism of the Haitian countryside contrasts with the Europeanism of the urbanized elite society. Literate and French-speaking, the urban world of Haiti is built around the capital and a few coastal towns, where the elite has dedicated itself to trading, as opposed to developing the interior. This community includes the lighter-skinned mulatto economic elite who work in an uneasy association with the black political classes. Neither of these two sectors has felt obliged to contribute to the country by working hard or opening the framework of traditional society. The elites viewed themselves as caretakers of Haiti; their job was to become rich without reference to the life of the rest of the population.

Haiti's recent crisis emerged from the contrast of these two worlds. The urban elite could still enforce the insularity and stasis of the traditional rural environment, but that insularity and stasis had

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begun to break down. Three processes had special importance in this change: the expansion of modernized society, through commerce, communication, and foreign aid; the presence of rival centers of influence, particularly the Catholic Church; and the inability of traditional governance to initiate social change and still sustain its distant relationship with the Creole-speaking rural peasantry. The wall between Haiti's two worlds finally began to crack. That is the meaning of the fall of the Duvaliers.

The Tyrants

François Duvalier was born in Port-au-Prince on April 14, 1907, the son of an administrative official. He attended Haiti's most prestigious secondary school and went on to medical school at the local university. Himself a black (by Haitian standards), Duvalier married a mulatto nurse, Simone, by whom he had four children, including one son, Jean-Claude. Duvalier's interaction with the United States began in the early 1940s when, as a young doctor, he worked for American public-health missions in Haiti. In 1944 he also studied public health at the University of Michigan, and his political life commenced shortly thereafter, in the late 1940s. A protégé of President Dumarsais Estimé, Duvalier became head of the public health service, and subsequently assumed a senior position in a new labor ministry. Prior to the Estimé government's fall in 1950, he had become Minister of Labor and Public Health. When out of power, Duvalier entered a period of political opposition and adopted a low profile that lasted until 1957.

Duvalier gained office relatively innocently: he was probably the more popular candidate in the disputed 1957 elections. He became President-for-life in 1964, but continued to play the low-key country doctor, emphasizing his simple tastes, low-pitched and almost halting speech, modest wealth, and well-read but not elitist education. Unlike many Haitian presidents, Duvalier was never a military man and, because of his writings, was perceived as an intellectual. His conservative dress was a trademark: dark suit, white shirt, black tie and shoes, a black felt homburg hat, and a pair of round thick-rimmed glasses.

These characteristics confounded most observers, and misled the United States into assuming Duvalier would differ from the norm of Haitian rulers. But Duvalier understood the Haitian psyche and used its political culture for his own ends. Adept at Voodoo and Haitian spiritualism, he was a keen student of Haiti's folklore and, like many of his predecessors as president, exploited Voodoo to sustain control. A large portion of the population believed "Papa Doc" to be in touch with the nation's innermost secrets through Voodoo intermediaries.

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Unlike "Baby Doc," the name "Papa Doc" connoted a respect and endearment reflective of Duvalier's paternalistic image.

At the same time, his contact with the modern world also made Duvalier a student of the French African "Negritude" movement — a belief in the value of Haiti's African heritage and a rejection of the superiority of European culture — and of Frantz Fanon's sociology of colonial violence. Duvalier was influenced also by a radical intellectual movement that originated during the U.S. Marine occupation of 1915-1934. It involved a form of Negritude which Duvalier later elaborated into a rationale of black power. He admired authoritarian figures such as Atatürk, Mussolini, Abdel Nasser, de Gaulle, and some of his own more brutal Haitian predecessors (particularly Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the efficient exterminator of white men in Haiti).

This combination of skills made Duvalier a shrewd autocrat who ruthlessly suppressed any challenge to his rule. He eroded the power of the mulatto trading elite; he reduced that of the Roman Catholic Church by demanding a say in the nomination of the Haitian Church's leadership; and he purged the army and brought it into line. A paramilitary organization (Volontaires de la Securité Nationale, or VSN) — the notorious Tonton Macoutes — protected the regime and enforced its directives. By the early 1960s, the VSN was twice the size of the regular Armed Forces.

"Duvalierism" was thus made up of Negritude, quasi-radical populist nationalism, and fascist tendencies. In theory, Duvalier was committed to a "new equilibrium," a shift in power from the predominantly mulatto elite to a new black middle class acting in the interest of peasant masses. In practice, this was little more than gesture. Haiti maintained its record of having the worst socioeconomic indicators in the Western Hemisphere. Corruption, income disparities, illiteracy, and environmental degradation were compounded by a continuing brain drain. David Nicholls notes: ". . . the fact that [Duvalier's] government did almost nothing to improve the lot of the average Haitian was irrelevant to his claims to legitimacy. No government in the history of Haiti had done anything significant to improve the lot of the masses. . . . At least Duvalier usually refrained from interfering with the life of the peasant, and this was all they could hope from a government."[2]

When François Duvalier died in 1971, he was succeeded by his nineteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude. Jean-Claude, who lacked an independent reputation inside Haiti or out, had lived at the presidential palace from the age of six and had left the country once as a teenager for a brief trip to Europe. He was chubby, shy, and had a gentle public disposition born less of refinement than indifference. He re-

[2] David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 247.

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ceived little formal schooling and acquired a reputation for laziness. Though hardly a playboy, he acquired an appreciation for worldly goods, notably cars, which in view of Haiti's poverty and poor roads, gave him an oafish and surreal reputation.

Jean-Claude had come to power through the political dictates of his father, buttressed by some chicaneries, including a nonsensical referendum that approved his accession 2,391,916 to 0. Yet, contrary to most predictions, Jean-Claude proved durable. In part, this was because he kept his own counsel, in part because the courtier system enabled political threats to be diverted to others, while a brutal security apparatus guaranteed their efficacy.

"Baby Doc" began with ambitions to build on his father's achievements and accomplish an "economic revolution." Official rhetoric suggested that the father carried out a political revolution while the son pursued an economic one. The reality differed. Operationally, "Jean-Claudism" meant louder importuning for assistance from major donors and a consortium of international and private lending agencies.

Jean-Claude's low-key personality contrasted with his entourage's brutality. Surrounded by family members, advisors, and security guards, he appears to have been influenced by two women: his politically powerful mother (Simone) and then his dynamic and controversial wife (Michelle). His marriage to Michelle Bennett, daughter of a mulatto businessman, drew attention not only for its cost ($2 million), but also for its political impact. It provided a link between the mulatto business community and the black government leadership. But Michelle's political activity, her Marie-Antoinette personality, and her family's financial rise following her marriage created new frictions.

Four factors finally brought the collapse of the Duvalier dynasty: ineptitude, a strong opposition, the attention of the U.S. media throughout the 1981-86 period, and actions by the U.S. government. In the end, Baby Doc had enough sense to pull the plug on his regime in a reasonably gracious manner. Though his wife continued to defend the regime from exile, Jean-Claude seemed inclined to fade into the gentle sunset of the French Riviera.

The Context of United States Policy

Strategic. Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that the Caribbean Basin is a peripheral zone of "special vulnerability," an addition to the "central strategic fronts" in the global U.S.-Soviet contest (Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Far East).[3] At issue are several key regional

[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), pp. 76-80.

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interests: the protection of the southern flank of the United States; access to regional resources; secure lines of communications (for trade and defense purposes); and the development of friendly and democratic regimes. This front differs from the others by its contiguity with the United States and a host of unconventional problems (such as massive flows of refugees, illegal immigrants, and the narcotics trade). In part because of these factors, U.S. administrations habitually take the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico, and the northern rim of South America for granted.

Through the late 1970s, the United States lived under the illusion that the Caribbean Basin was moored to American foreign policy and security interests. Preoccupied with events elsewhere, Washington paid little attention to the region, until several developments refocused American attention: the steady growth of Cuban military power and the confirmed patterns of ideological expansionism; revolutionary upheaval and cross-border tensions in Central America; continuing volatility in U.S.-Mexican relations, and doubts about the future of Mexico's political system; dramatic flows of refugees and illegal immigrants into the United States and among the states of the region; and a broad deterioration of U.S. diplomatic leadership in the western hemisphere.

To counter these developments, the United States sought to arrest decay in the region's sociopolitical fabric. The Carter and Reagan administrations launched initiatives that dealt with trade, investment, debt-relief packages, regional diplomacy, and increased security assistance.

Regional. The Caribbean countries began their careers as colonial jewels, turned into geopolitical pawns of European empires, and ended as slums. Political, economic, and cultural currents were fostered by the spread of the colonial enterprise from Europe, the slave trade from Africa, and an emergent global trading system. In this century, the United States added another dimension to the region's experience, as the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 demonstrated. What motivated U.S. policy here as elsewhere (the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) was a concern that internal disorder could trigger involvement by nonhemispheric powers.

This missionary vision of the early part of the century gave way to the Good Neighbor interlude of Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. American policies of this era emphasized relations with the larger countries of Latin America and paid less attention to the Caribbean Basin, though the CIA-engineered ouster of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 was an exception to this pattern.

The Caribbean then acquired a new significance owing to Castro's revolution and the region's decolonization. The 1962 Cuban

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missile crisis brought the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere and made it clear that geographical contiguity had not lost strategic significance even in the world of ballistic missiles. Fearing another Cuba, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the 82nd Airborne in 1965 to restore order in the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, Cuban influence in regional affairs grew, and 1979 saw the first Cuban-inspired *coup d'état* in the English-speaking Caribbean (in Grenada).

The late 1970s saw insurgent violence, teetering regimes, nascent democracies, and expanded American involvement. Democracy was reintroduced in Honduras and maintained with some difficulties in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic but was essentially lost in Suriname. In Guatemala a new military government beat back a guerrilla onslaught and introduced a democratic government in 1986. American resolve, tested several times in El Salvador, later achieved a moment of splendor by rescuing Grenada from a deepening commitment to Leninism and chaos. In the interim, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua institutionalized its Marxist government in the face of a spirited democratic opposition (including the Contras) backed by the United States.

Haiti, which had been a simmering issue since the early 1980s, was added to this regional agenda in 1985-86. The United States intervened to rescue Haiti from self-destruction. But the act had wider significance, too, in the context of U.S.-Caribbean Basin security. The early 1986 American effort to preside over the fall of the Duvalier regime in Haiti and then conjure up a democracy was closely related to regional security concerns.

U.S. Policy toward Haiti to 1981

Although commercial ties dated back to the eighteenth century, until the 1860s U.S.-Haitian relations suffered as a consequence of the sociopolitical character of U.S. society. Southern slave state Congressional views regarding the black republic of Haiti overruled any attempts by Washington to follow Great Britain and the rest of Europe, and even France, in acknowledging Haiti's status as an independent nation. It took the changing circumstances of the Civil War to modify U.S. policy, and then only grudgingly. At stake were three overlapping U.S. concerns, namely, the return of Spanish colonial power in the Dominican Republic during the 1860s, the need to provide coal stations for the U.S. Navy, and the need to shut out Confederate traders from Haitian ports.

By the turn of the century, Haiti's economy was deeply in debt to French, German, and U.S. financial interests. French banking interests had underwritten all external loans between 1825 and 1896 and owned the National Bank. Germans dominated the trading sec-

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tor. Most imports came from the United States; American interests expanded into banking after 1900.

The 1915 American intervention in Haiti followed on disarray in that country's politics. Of the twenty-two Haitian presidents who served between 1843 and 1915, fourteen were overthrown, one was blown up with the presidential palace, another was hacked to pieces, one was probably poisoned, three died a natural death while in office, one resigned, and one finished his term. Even more worrisome, Washington viewed the sorry state of Haitian finances as a potential Trojan horse for European intervention. The object of American policy, writes diplomatic historian Ludwell Lee Montague, was not to expose Haiti to American exploitation, much less spoliation, but rather to promote Haitian political stability, which would entail financial rehabilitation and economic development.[4] This solicitude was not pure altruism, but the advantage sought had to do with Caribbean strategy rather than the profit motive.

Yet Haiti was one of America's least successful interventions. True, a minimum of financial order was established, debt was reduced, and the administrative infrastructure improved; but the American presence did not lead to democratic virtues or greater management capabilities among the Haitian elite. In the end, Haiti was reminiscent of other contemporary experiences (the mini-Vietnam of Nicaragua in the late 1920s and early 1930s) and perhaps the Vietnam fiasco itself some three decades later. Violent expressions of anti-American feelings triggered in 1930 a review of U.S. policy by a U.S. presidential commission headed by W. Cameron Forbes, former governor general of the Philippines. Faced with similar problems in Nicaragua, President Hoover and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, became determined that the United States would exit from Haiti's tropical imbroglio as quickly as possible.

A policy of "Haitianization" among both military and governmental bureaucracies was speeded up. Present since 1915, the most visible features of American involvement (particularly the U.S. Marine Corps) departed in 1934. Subsequently, imported improvements decayed rapidly, and Haiti returned to the foul arts of constitutional manipulation. As an extensive assessment of this period wryly suggests, like France's collapsing Bourbon royalty in the face of revolutionary change, Haitian elites forgot nothing and learned nothing from the American occupation.[5]

Thus was the way prepared for Haiti's friendly tyranny, which represented a small but steady foreign policy challenge to Washington

[4] Ludwell Lee Montague, *Haiti and the United States: 1714-1938* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1940), p. 210.

[5] Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, *Written in Blood: the Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 513.

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for nearly thirty years. The two Duvaliers had an ambivalent relationship with seven U.S. presidents from 1957 to 1986. None of the presidents admired Haitian politics, but the Duvaliers received American favors anyway. The reason was Cuba. At first, the elder Duvalier played up his Cuban connections as a form of diplomatic blackmail. He lost no time recognizing Castro's administration in January 1959, fueling fears he might seek accommodation with Castro. American economic and technical assistance to Haiti quickly increased, and an American military training mission was dispatched, the first since 1934.

By 1961 American aid reached $14.5 million and accounted for about half of the Haitian government's operating budget. Washington also pressured Duvalier for reform, concerned that Haiti's deteriorating socioeconomic and political environment would provide the roots for "another Cuba." But Duvalier wanted the bait without the hook, and relations soured quickly in 1962, as Washington discontinued one aid program after another. When U.S. assistance was not forthcoming, Duvalier offered Haitian territory to the U.S. Navy as a replacement for the potential loss of its base at Guantanamo. When that did not get much notice, Haiti withheld its vote on the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS until an American offer of economic aid was made.

The White House, State Department, and CIA began to contemplate covert action against the Duvalier regime.[6] One of Kennedy's assistant secretaries of state for inter-American affairs, Edwin M. Martin, has suggested, the President wished to see Duvalier replaced but that the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis forced the United States to count all possible friends in the region, including Haiti, which offered its ports to the Navy.[7] In the spring of 1963, the Kennedy administration was focusing on prospects for democracy in the neighboring Dominican Republic under President Juan Bosch. The situation in Haiti was viewed as a threat to these prospects and thus a call to action against Duvalier. But the coup that overthrew Bosch later in 1963 put a damper on plans to move against Duvalier. Relations between Haiti and the United States, "suspended" earlier in 1963, resumed in early 1964.

Developments in Southeast Asia then turned U.S. attention away from the Caribbean. Up to the late 1960s Washington paid little attention to Haiti, and that little was unfriendly. Washington effec-

[6] As first suggested by Jeremiah O'Leary, *The Washington Star*, March 11, 1975. Jack Anderson alleged in *The Washington Post* (April 7, 1975) that other attempts were made in 1966. Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted later that "all sorts of efforts . . . and almost all techniques" were used to bring about change in Haiti, but that "Duvalier was extraordinarily resistant." (Heinl and Heinl, p. 622, drawing in part on a U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report of November 20, 1975.)

[7] Edwin M. Martin, "Haiti: A Case Study in Futility," *SAIS Review*, Summer 1981.

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tively cut off Haiti's multilateral assistance, but an emergency loan in 1967 by the International Monetary Fund received American support.

A change occurred with Richard Nixon's arrival in the White House. Duvalier had tempered his excesses and avoided a dalliance with Castro, and the United States saw no need to isolate a fundamentally friendly regime. The informal international economic blockade against the Duvalier regime was removed.

After François Duvalier's death, the United States waged a quiet effort to keep Haiti from slipping into chaos. By 1976 American economic assistance reached $23 million, compared to the total of $32 million dispersed from 1962 to 1969. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation resumed risk insurance for American investments in Haiti. As international organizations and other governments began underwriting development projects, multinational agency involvement in the 1972-76 period reached $119 million. American commitments to Jean-Claude Duvalier expanded further when export licenses were obtained for private arms sales to Haiti. The Defense Department contracted with a Miami firm to train a counterinsurgency force for the Haitian military, the "Leopards," created in late 1971. Closer ties were then established between the two defense establishments, and though on-and-off several times, these continued right to 1986.

But unsavory episodes continued to nag at U.S.-Haitian relations. Haiti's sagging economy made it a target for shoddy financial arrangements. The most damaging case involved Representative Daniel Flood (Democrat of Pennsylvania), who was accused of using his office to promote business and increase U.S. aid to Haiti. One of Jean-Claude Duvalier's ministers was caught in a macabre venture involving the sale of blood plasma on the U.S. market. Despite these difficulties, the Haitian authorities eased away from the abuses and paranoia of the 1960s. Some even talked of a political opening, and the U.S. government reported no new political arrests in 1978.[8] Jean-Claude encouraged exiled Haitians to come home and work for the country's development.

In retrospect, there was a window of opportunity in U.S.-Haitian relations between 1975 and 1979. The first years of the Jean-Claude Duvalier presidency appeared to suggest that the regime was willing to relax, if only minimally, its political stranglehold on the country and entertain some semblance of economic development programs. The initial response from the international donor community was positive, if reserved. But the political reaction of the regime diehards (known as the "dinosaurs") canceled any successful modernization.

[8] U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 19.

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This in turn reinforced external critics who after the mid-1970s again began to take notice of Haiti. A tone of angry frustration set in with the Carter Administration, as vividly expressed by United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young, who suggested it was easier to deal with South Africa's white supremacist government than to talk about human rights with Haiti's black dictator.[9]

Ties began to unravel in 1980. The flow of Haitian "boat people" to the Bahamas and the shores of Florida in the fall of 1980 brought Haiti's misery to world attention. The refugees seemed to confirm the impression that conditions in the country had dropped below minimal standards of civilization. By late 1980, up to 1,500 Haitians a month were arriving in Florida. After a brief physical exam and processing, most were released, their legal status to be determined later. All of this activity pushed Haiti into an unaccustomed prominence; the number of entries for Haiti in *The New York Times* index increased from 13 in 1977 to 123 in 1981. Haitian refugee affairs also began to receive editorial attention.

The initial American response was humanitarian more than political. The Congressional Black Caucus requested fair treatment of Haitians already in the United States and attempted to negotiate Congressional understandings about what to do with Haitians as they arrived. Then, things got political. The outpouring of refugees caused exile Haitian communities in New York, Miami, Paris, Montreal, and Caracas to be galvanized, and they began to focus on developments in Haiti itself. The refugee flow to the United States mobilized new organizations — the Haitian Refugee Project, the Haitian Refugee Center, and the Committee for the Defense of Haitian Refugees — mixing humanitarian concerns, anti-Duvalier sentiments, and progressive ideology. The Catholic church began to play an active role in the United States, providing financial resources and an advocacy voice, particularly through the Archdiocese of Miami. Details of human rights violations and other political abuses appeared in reports and newsletters from Americas Watch, the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights (Haiti Project), the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Washington Office on Haiti, and other organizations.

American Policy: Baby Doc, 1981-85

The Reagan administration came to power disposed to closer ties with the Duvalier regime, and the latter was disposed to cooperate, shaken as it was by the refugee crisis, economic downturn, and troubles with foreign aid. Successive crackdowns since 1979 had set a somber tone, and the government's reputation was further

[9] *The Miami Herald*, August 18, 1977.

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tarnished by the technical weakness and incompetence of the country's judicial system. Growing political mobilization and an expansion of the trade union movement had panicked the business community and regime hardliners. In November 1980 the government responded with a crackdown on journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, and party leaders. Later a campaign of intimidation was undertaken against the Catholic church.

The Reagan Administration showed a willingness to accept slow progress toward political reform if gains could be achieved in three other areas. The first involved a solution to the immigration problem. But truly to solve the immigration problem, the Haitian government had to produce economic and social development — the second item. Toward this end, the Duvalier government directed its efforts in 1981 toward improving economic management. A year later, Duvalier named Marc Bazin, a distinguished World Bank economist, as his finance minister and Bazin brought with him an infusion of able exiled economic technocrats. A shake-up at the National Bank of Haiti seemed to give Haiti a boost. A deal with the IMF made it appear the government would comply with its economic agreements.

The third element of U.S. policy revolved around foreign aid. Early in 1981 two Congressional groups developed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance bill, the so-called Mica Amendment, which made U.S. aid to Haiti conditional on that government's cooperation in stopping illegal immigration, improving the performance of aid programs, and ultimately improving human rights.

In December 1981, Jean-Claude suffered his first exile invasion attempt, which fizzled quickly. But it suggested the exile community was becoming more audacious. The regime's response was surprisingly mild, and four months later (April 1982), Duvalier announced a framework for gradual "democratization" that involved free and open elections in 1983, a national human rights commission, and an open invitation to Haitian exiles to return home. The details were vague, but the timing was important, for it preceded a series of Congressional visits to Haiti relating both to the immigration question and to Haiti's incorporation into the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Buoyed by these promises and by their visit in June 1982, the Congressional Black Caucus, and especially House of Representatives Delegate Walter Fauntroy (Democrat of the District of Columbia), called for a dialogue on non-violent change in Haiti.[10]

But government policy changed in July 1982, as key cabinet members were dismissed, including Bazin. As a result, the cabinet's technocratic capability was reduced. This action suggested a retreat in Duvalier's on-and-off efforts to open Haiti to modernization. Ba-

[10] Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on Haitian Refugees, "Statement of Purpose: Fact Finding Mission to Haiti" (Congressional Black Caucus, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1982).

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zin's ouster was followed by arrests and intimidation, as allies of Simone Duvalier and the old Papa Doc guard replaced the departed technocrats.

Reaction from the U.S. government was slower. Although Congressional delegations were discontented, assistance programs and CBI initiatives had already entered the bureaucratic pipe line; little change occurred in U.S. policy in the fall of 1982. Indeed, the January 1983 visit of Assistant Secretary State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders confirmed the American policy of "critical satisfaction," that is, giving the Haitian government the benefit of the doubt.[11] The upshot was that U.S. economic assistance increased from the $30 million range in fiscal year 1981 to close to $50 million by 1984, an increase matched by other principal donors (France, Canada, and West Germany) and international financial institutions (the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank).

On the surface, the situation appeared stable. Until 1984 Haiti's investment climate showed marginal improvement. To be sure, an austerity program in 1982-83 had cut back what limited consumption existed. And after 1982 the AIDS epidemic wiped out tourism, which went from $62 million in 1979 to practically nothing by 1984.

But Haiti began to benefit from the Caribbean Basin Initiative as well as existing GSP-related treatment (General System of Preferences, that is, favored trading partner consideration) on trade. By 1984 total U.S. investment in Haiti reached $90 million, chiefly in assembly operations — electronics; cassette tapes; sewed, fur, and leather goods; toys; wigs; office furniture; and sporting goods (including 90 percent of the world's baseballs). Some of these were foreign-owned subsidiaries, others were U.S.-Haitian joint ventures. Haiti's industrial parks employed 50,000 people. According to a publication of the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Haiti offered American business a close location and a dedicated work force willing to work for three dollars per day.[12] With no monetary controls and the U.S. dollar circulating freely, exchange rates were not an issue. Nevertheless, between the troubles of late 1985 and Duvalier's departure in early 1986, a considerable number of foreign-owned operations closed or stopped investing new money until the political situation clarified.

In March 1983 Pope John Paul II visited Haiti. Historically the Catholic church had played a limited part in Haitian politics, but the pope's visit changed that. His airport sermon referred to "injustices" and the need for a more equitable society. These remarks were seen

[11] See Ernest H. Preeg, preliminary draft of "Haiti and the CBI" (Coral Gables, Fla.: The Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, 1985), pp. 54-75, which studies Haiti during the years 1980-83. Preeg was American Ambassador to Haiti from 1981 to 1983.

[12] *Business Haiti*, April/May/June 1981.

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as an indication of the church's intent to champion change by taking on an active political role. The Catholic church's new militancy helped mobilize Haitians and create socially legitimate ways of expressing opposition. The church even encouraged Haitians to protest in the streets, a process that led to a war of nerves with the government in late 1985 and January 1986. The church acted in cooperation with international and U.S. human rights groups to focus on the regime's corruption and human rights abuses.

The racial element of U.S.-Haitian relations played a crucial role in catalyzing American perceptions of Duvalier, for American blacks took a special interest in change on Haiti. Racial, religious, and humanitarian concerns had in fact focused black community interest on Haiti earlier than the American policy community as a whole. As far back as the 1915-34 period, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had expressed the interest of American blacks on Haitian matters. In the early 1970s, the black Republican senator from Massachusetts, Edward Brooke, had visited Haiti to draw attention to Jean-Claude's modest efforts toward reform. For years afterwards, leaders of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) largely represented American concerns for Haiti. The Black Caucus formed a special task force on Haitian refugees in 1979, headed by Fauntroy and Rep. Shirley Chisholm (Democrat of New York).

In the 1980s the CBC kept an eye on the plight of Haitian refugees in the United States and their treatment by the Justice Department. Other organizations, including the National Urban League, Operation PUSH, and the NAACP challenged the American government to develop a policy that did not discriminate against black refugees while appearing to give special treatment to Eastern European political exiles, for example. This concern had civil rights overtones and so drew more black interest in Haitian affairs. With the advent of the Reagan administration, the Black Caucus took a more aggressive stance, characterizing official U.S. policies as inadequate. A Congressional majority skeptical of the U.S. government's optimism about Haiti's political progress soon emerged.

During these years U.S. policy toward the Duvalier regime was shaped by the annual debate over the U.S. foreign aid budget. This in turn was shaped by the State Department's *Human Rights Reports* and the status of reform in Haiti. A cat-and-mouse game developed between Duvalier, the U.S. Congress, and the State Department. Thus, in November 1983 — just six days after the Congress allotted $34 million to Haiti but required political progress — Duvalier announced legislative assembly elections for February 1984.

Those elections did not go well, and the new U.S. ambassador, Clayton McManaway, expressed American disappointment.[13] Duva-

[13] See his remarks on the 1984 elections quoted in *Election 1984: Duvalier Style* (New York: Americas Watch and Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 1984), p. 7.

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lier reacted by announcing anticorruption reforms, judicial reforms, and greater respect for the press. Though nothing happened, the State Department nevertheless determined on May 14 that progress was being made. Congressional response was unenthusiastic. The House of Representatives attached new conditions to the FY 1985 aid package it had approved for Haiti in May.

The Duvalier regime's errors of commission, omission, and timing helped reverse American policy. In July 1985 a referendum was held guaranteeing young Duvalier his position as President-for-Life and the government announced 99.9 percent of the electorate had voted in favor. The summer and fall of 1985 saw the killing of foreign priests. These and other events led to an increase in the street violence, arrests by Haiti's security forces, and shootings.

Collapse and Aftermath, 1985-88

The collapse of the regime began in November 1985 with a series of riots in Gonaives that turned into a major antigovernment protest. The government's security forces responded harshly, and more protests swept the country. Arrests of opposition figures infuriated the public, which was being given a blow-by-blow account of events through domestic radio reports. In December 1985 the government shut down Radio Soleil, the Catholic church's radio station, which had become the most popular source of information. When, in January 1986, the government hoped to defuse tension by freeing some opposition leaders and lifting the ban on Radio Soleil, it was too late. Indeed, this eleventh hour flexibility only persuaded critics of Duvalier's imminent departure.

What we now know of U.S. involvement in the demise of the Duvalier regime showed strong if tardy action. Diplomats were suggesting in private as early as Thanksgiving 1985 that Duvalier could not last. When street protests escalated in January 1986, the suspension of American aid indicated that those private feelings had become policy. The administration was perhaps encouraged by the democratization successes in Central America (a new government had been freely elected in Guatemala in December 1985) and the coming February 7 election in the Philippines. By January 1986 the administration concluded it should not support Duvalier. How would the cut be made?

Reports from the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince suggested after mid-January that the government did not control the countryside and barely managed affairs in the capital. The reliability of the Armed Forces became uncertain and the regime's Tonton Macoutes on their own could not contain street demonstrations.

The American government delayed certification for FY 1986 assistance to Haiti. Secretary of State George P. Shultz's announcement on January 29, 1986, doomed the Duvalier regime's attempts

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to sustain levels of foreign assistance. It also signalled the Duvalier regime that a transition had to be arranged. The U.S. embassy indicated its preference for Duvalier's leaving power sooner rather than later. American policy had shifted from toleration to direct support for change, and everyone knew it.

Jean-Claude Duvalier's last week in power, January 31-February 6, 1986, was extraordinary. It appears that he opted to leave the country on January 31, but then turned back (either because he changed his mind or because others changed it for him). Not knowing that he had stayed, the White House inaccurately announced that the regime had been ousted. This action had the effect of deepening Duvalier's nervousness because most Haitians interpreted it as deliberate pressure.

The Duvalier family then fell to arguing. The president's mother wanted to stay and fight; Michelle opted for a trip abroad; Jean-Claude put up a display of courage but secretly began negotiating his departure. The American sense of urgency was relayed privately to the Duvaliers through several channels, including an aide to Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica (President Reagan's best Caribbean friend), who urged Duvalier to leave.[14] But no government contacted by the Duvaliers would accept them in exile. In the end, Paris agreed to give Duvalier and his entourage temporary entry permits.

Finally, on February 6 at 2:00 p.m., Duvalier informed the U.S. embassy that he planned to leave and needed assistance. Already on high alert, the White House approved an evacuation plan within four hours. The escape plan involved bringing a U.S. C-141 Starlifter cargo plane from Charleston, South Carolina, to Port-au-Prince. There, it sat on the runway for several hours as Duvalier and his entourage enjoyed a last champagne bash at the national palace. The plane took off at 3:46 a.m. carrying with it President Duvalier, his mother, his wife, their four children, and seventeen others.

The Duvaliers landed the following day (February 7) at a French Air Force base at Grenoble. When attempts to entice French-speaking African countries to take the fallen Haitian dictator failed, Duvalier's stay in France turned into a minor political crisis as well as a moment of friction with the American government. In the wake of scandals involving former Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa (a man so vile as to make Duvalier look like a saint), France had to explain the arrival of another dictator. Paris initially insisted it had agreed to provide Duvalier temporary refuge as a favor to the United States to ensure a peaceful transition. But this appears to have been

[14] *The New York Times*, February 8, 1986.

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a cover for domestic French political consumption. As of late 1988, Duvalier and his family reside comfortably in southern France.

Other aspects of the final act were less simple. Duvalier's opposition had long been fractionalized and inept, a fact brought out in the final moments of the regime. The danger was not that the archaic government of the Duvaliers would be replaced by totalitarianism but by a vacuum of authority. Even as the collapse of the regime was about to occur, there was no clear opposition organization other than the Catholic church. It looked like a recipe for anarchy. When the moment came in February 1986 to develop a transition regime, the cast of characters was small. Nor was the election alternative available, as in Central America or the Philippines; despite Secretary of State Shultz's call for democracy in Haiti, this could not be accomplished in the near term. This gave the transition an old-fashioned imperial quality, harking back to 1915.

The danger was not that the archaic government of the Duvaliers would be replaced by totalitarianism but by a vacuum of authority.

That quality was enhanced when the American ambassador played a decisive role in patching together an interim government from elements of the outgoing regime and the opposition. This action led to the establishment of a new entity called the National Council of Government (CNG), headed by Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy. Namphy, a fifty-four-year-old career military officer, then generally regarded as a good administrator with a pragmatic bent, was a former chief of the armed forces; he appears to have been Duvalier's choice, sanctioned by the American embassy. Upon assuming his CNG post, Namphy did not appear to have close ties with the United States or American friends in Haiti.

In exchange for the CNG's pledge to bring democracy to Haiti, the United States took steps to alleviate the country's plight. Secretary Shultz announced a resumption of economic aid in late February 1986. With Duvalier gone, the administration could now honestly determine that Haiti was making progress in the area of human rights and democratic government. But the process of building a new political framework in Haiti has been slow and uneven, and the magnitude of the sociopolitical challenge seems even more daunting when Haitians themselves articulate the problem.[15]

The first actions of the incoming CNG were very tentative. A timetable for the return of Haiti to democratic stability was an-

[15] Richard M. Morse, ed., *Haiti's Future: Views of Twelve Haitian Leaders* (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1988).

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nounced and generally accepted. Presidential elections were set for November 1987. Barely 5 percent of the electorate bothered to vote for the Constituent Assembly elections of October 1986, yet a new constitution was publicly ratified in late March 1987. These actions were sanctioned by the U.S. government, which in the aftermath of the Duvalier collapse, became the critical external support of the CNG. The U.S. Congress, in a moment of bi-partisan consensus, increased FY 1987 foreign assistance to $102 million, almost double the FY 1985 figure ($56 million).

Despite this American embrace (accompanied by significant assistance from France, Canada, West Germany, and Venezuela) the Haitian political environment did not mature. A year after Duvalier's departure, the credibility of the CNG was in decline. Ill-advised decisions to curtail the authority of an electoral council led to public outcry and violence in the streets.

Instead of coalescing around a coalition of figures and key issues, the multi-faceted opposition to the CNG manifested itself primarily by random and wavering moments of violence, political rhetoric, and acts of purification or so-called "dechaukage." In tandem, political elements from the Duvalier period reappeared. The political equation began to change dramatically to the extent that the army, generally on the sidelines during the last hours of the Duvalier regime, now became the agent of law and order. For its part, the Catholic church, lacking internal cohesion, lost the decisive capability to push forward sociopolitical dynamics in the manner it had done in 1984 and 1985.

But the timetable for presidential elections proceeded anyhow. Openly fighting the CNG, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) pushed forward against extraordinary odds — in a country that for all practical purposes had never experienced modern elections. It made the electoral experiences of Central America appear as models of orderly political development. As suspected, the November 1987 elections were called off in the wake of violence in the early hours of the balloting. This collapse of Haiti's "democratic" experiment occurred within sight of international observers, the media, and a U.S. government elections delegation. A truncated "election" was nevertheless scheduled for January 1988, in which Leslie Manigat, an exile scholarly politician of a moderate conservative bent, won the presidency. Despite his personal credentials, few within or outside Haiti rose to his defense.

The outcry that followed this tragic sequence was to be expected. In late November 1987 the U.S. government halted much of the aid program (except humanitarian assistance to private groups and small drug enforcement programs) and sustained this policy under pressure from the Congress. The latter began demanding more sanctions to

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force Manigat to his knees and push Haiti to a new set of elections. Regardless of the specific outcome, the outlook remained bleak.

The role of Washington in this 1986-88 period was less than inspiring. The United States did contribute $8 million of the $10 million cost of the doomed November 1987 elections. And there is no doubt that for a while Haiti's new experience garnered sympathy on Capitol Hill. But something was missing. Although pronouncements from Secretary of State Shultz and visits by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams suggested high-level involvement, the administration's attention to the region was in fact engaged elsewhere, principally Nicaragua.

Policy distractions, combined with the sheer magnitude of the political challenge in Haiti, suggested to some senior policy officials (in the National Security Council, for example) that the chances for U.S. success in Haiti were mixed at best. But in public, the Department of State, the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince especially, continued to express overall confidence in Haiti's political process. Considering the U.S. investment in this matter, such public pronouncements were to be expected; more worrisome was the apparent disbelief among State Department and intelligence community officials that Haiti might not "squeak" through the scheduled presidential elections. The subsequent debacle made it relatively easy for administration critics (including a fairly large liberal/moderate block in the U.S. Congress) to put full pressure on the administration to take a tougher stance. How the latter would effectively address Haiti's government-building process was less clear.

Conclusions

The problem is now fairly obvious, if not easily addressed: a "friendly" tyrant faces trouble at home; in the Haitian case this was not, significantly, in the form of a Marxist guerrilla threat. A growing chorus of extreme and also moderate voices demand changes, which the tyrant only half-heartedly addresses. The situation deteriorates further, now leading a broader spectrum of the U.S. foreign policy community to call for American action; strategic considerations are invoked — not only is a traditional friend of the United States about to bite the dust, but fears of a geopolitical setback rise to the surface. In this now-familiar situation, the American government comes in at the eleventh hour to untangle an urgent crisis.

What insights does this experience suggest and what conclusions might be drawn? First, aside from geographical proximity, the ethnic and racial element of U.S.-Haitian relations played a major role in American perceptions of Duvalier as a tyrant. It is one thing to galvanize public interest against tinhorn dictators of Central America; Haiti, however, involves more than authoritarianism and corrupt

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government — it alludes to freedom marches, the civil rights movements, and other features of recent American social history.

Second, U.S. policy was not easily engaged in changing the perceived imperfections of the Haitian regime. Ultimately, Jean-Claude Duvalier ran afoul of U.S. policy only when dead Haitians on Florida beaches generated uproar and embarrassment. Images from the Vietnam and Cambodian refugee crisis of 1978-79 were still fresh. A sense of public panic overcame American diplomacy, now unprepared for simultaneous refugee flows from Haiti and Cuba.

Ultimately, Jean-Claude Duvalier ran afoul of U.S. policy only when dead Haitians on Florida beaches generated uproar and embarrassment.

Third, although prone to some excesses and likely to offend American values, the Haitian regime was considered stable. In the early 1980s Haiti was paradoxically attracting attention as a safe place to manufacture apparel and electronic components while the country's image was suffering from the effect of the refugee crisis, AIDS, and other calamities. When did Haiti become a crisis threatening American interests? With the refugees of 1980. But a threat to what? Although people were fleeing by the thousands, the regime appeared no less stable than before, nor was it on the verge of crisis. Had Washington viewed Haiti differently, it would have moved much more harshly against Duvalier. But the events of 1980 were viewed essentially as a humanitarian issue and this perspective shaped the American response.

Fourth, Duvalier and his associates failed to appreciate the fact that after 1980 the refugee crisis cemented a coalition of Congressional, humanitarian, and racial interests in the United States. The hardline Duvalierists made the further error of assuming (as did some of their Central American colleagues) that Ronald Reagan's election would extinguish American concerns for human rights. Instead, the Haitian regime was faced with a double-barreled threat: an evolving concern by the new administration for democracy and a broad-based Congressional concern regarding misuse of U.S. foreign aid.

Fifth, the Haitian collapse of 1986 suggests that tyrants are not all equal. The dynamics were uniquely dependent on the character of Jean-Claude himself. Analysis of his character as well as an assessment of his statements suggests that he ultimately lacked the passion for power of a Marcos or Somoza. For Papa Doc, money was a way of keeping power, but for his son, political power was a way of making money and expanding the family treasury. The deeply flawed, pa-

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thetic character of Jean-Claude made it relatively easy for the United States to ease him out of power.

Normal tools of American pressures did not work well in Haiti. Both Papa Doc and his son were fundamentally uninterested in national economic development. U.S. foreign aid was viewed as surplus funds, and when not forthcoming, Haiti simply went on its own hungry way. Haiti remained until the end a poor country, so miserable that humanitarian concerns consistently and legitimately intruded into U.S. political designs.

Duvalier's opposition was so fractionalized, if not inept, that it left few actors with which Washington could conceivably have schemed to overthrow the regime. In fact, the United States was for a while more concerned with amateurish Haitian exile invasion attempts breaking U.S. neutrality laws than with the real probability of seeing Duvalier fall.

When it came to developing a transition regime in February 1986, the cast of characters was frightfully narrow, seriously limiting American policy options. No one was really in charge of the movement that brought down Duvalier, even though the Catholic church provided some institutional cohesion. There was no one person or group that appeared to be a logical or politically acceptable successor to Baby Doc. Nor was the Central American or Philippine election alternative readily available. Secretary Shultz's call for democracy in Haiti a week before Duvalier's collapse covered up the fact that this electoral objective could not be accomplished in the near term. It catapulted American policy designs into the future without defining the near-term process. Washington paid the price for this lack of definition when the elections of late 1987 did not match expectations, and when the short-lived Manigat government subsequently collapsed.

The United States played a modest but positive role in the Haitian rebellion. As in the Philippines, the people themselves had to make possible the tyrant's collapse; only Haitian blood was expended in the riots of 1985-86. The American government continues to have a stake in seeing that the record stays positive. Although badly tarnished, most recently by General Namphy's ouster of President Manigat in June 1988, the Haitian story is still being written.

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Correspondence

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS

To the Editor:

The requirements of a first-class review include explaining to the reader what a certain book is about, (if applicable) how it is being interpreted or misinterpreted elsewhere and, finally, what the reviewer thinks of it all. Even though I gasped with relief at Richard Haass's comforting, near penultimate remark [Summer, 1988] that "Paul Kennedy should not be singled out for too much blame here," I still didn't feel that his review qualified for high honors. This was for two reasons.

The first was that a considerable part of his review — perhaps more than half of it — consists of points which themselves appear to be presented as corrections to *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* when in fact the same points were made in the book. I kept wondering whether those who only read the ORBIS review will know, for example, that I myself argue:

i) that the USA's decline relative to Europe and Japan was, in part, a natural and intentional result of rebuilding those economies after 1945?

ii) that the Soviet Union much more closely resembles the overburdened military Empires of the past, and has far more problems than the USA today?

iii) that there is no single state or constellation of powers likely to replace the USA as Number One. (How could there be, if I argue that we are heading to a *multi*-polar system?)

iv) that the United States enjoys many advantages not available to Britain in the age of Victoria or since?

v) that Japan will, for a variety of internal and external reasons, be reluctant to become a Great Power in political-military terms despite its economic growth?

vi) that the PRC's future will be affected by how it handles the population explosion and domestic political controversies?

vii) that — in the historical chapters — "domestic economic mismanagement" as a, if not *the*, major cause of imperial decline is repeatedly pointed to (from Imperial Spain on pp. 51-55 to France in the inter-war years on pp. 310-14)?

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viii) that — similarly — the quality (or lack of quality) of a country's political system is also repeatedly alluded to, from the Mughal Empire (pp. 12-13) to Tsarist Russia (pp. 235-44)?

Thus, although Haass cautions ORBIS readers to distinguish between Kennedy and his (unspecified) "popularizers," his own review repeatedly fails to make clear to the reader what is, or is not, contained in the book's text.

The second weakness of the review concerns those parts which *differ* from what I myself actually wrote. That the review's focus is unbalanced — giving far more attention to the final chapter than to the preceding seven — is perhaps unremarkable; for, although there are some notable exceptions, far too many political scientists today still display very little interest in events prior to 1945. But Haass's very concern about just how well the United States may be faring in the contemporary world drives him into an array of upbeat but vague statements, such as: "The economic determinism animating much of Kennedy's work underestimates the adaptive power of capitalist economies and democratic societies"; and "It ignores the capacity of the United States to put its economic and political house in order. . ."

Yet such statements, far from rebutting anything I wrote in the book, simply beg a myriad of questions (especially perhaps in the minds of ORBIS readers who worry about the difficulty the United States has experienced in putting "its economic and political house in order"). The obvious reply to the second quotation above is that it in its turn appears to *assume* an American capacity to put things in order.

If the controversial section of my final chapter (pp. 514-35) is read as carefully as I tried to compose it, it will be seen that the book neither ignores that possibility, nor does it assume it. Nations, like human beings, make their own history; but they make it within a context of strengths and weaknesses, of opportunities and obstacles, of insights and errors. Few of us, I suspect, would deny that proposition. But does a scholarly review which reduces itself to a declaration of faith in American "adaptive power" and "capacity" advance the discussion at all? Even in a brief review, Haass might have been more specific about the areas in which he sees signs of hope (applications for patents? engineering Ph.D.s? skills and knowledge of the average American seventeen-year-old? the Federal budget deficit?).

Finally, let me repeat again that, if *carefully* read, I believe the book will not be seen as "economically determinist" in the proper sense of that word. For reasons which mystify me, this seems particularly difficult for scholars living alongside the Charles River to grasp. Like previous Number One powers which possessed extensive overseas obligations while its economy was slowing relatively, the United

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States is faced with a number of options in order to ensure that it can preserve the balance between ends and means. It could reduce the ends (i.e., reduce the obligations). It could increase the means (i.e., try to ensure long-term economic growth). It could do a mixture of both. It could do *nothing at all*. The same is true of Gorbachev's Russia. It will be interesting, to say the least, to observe how things unfold, both in the USA and in the USSR, as we head into the twenty-first century. But how on earth can that be labelled economic determinism?

Paul Kennedy
Dilworth Professor of History
Yale University

To the Editor:

Richard Haass sets up a straw man, pummels it full of holes, and then declares that it is "difficult to be harshly critical of someone who tries intelligently to bring history to bear on current events." This will not do.

Poor Haass. He has an argument, and one worth listening to, but not with Paul Kennedy. His argument, as he eventually admits, is with those "less careful" people who have been Kennedy's "popularizers" and have used his book to justify their own policies. Unfortunately in this review Haass seems to have joined those people.

He continually berates Kennedy for "economic determinism" (though Kennedy's is hardly the kind of detrminism any Marxist would recognize), but then agrees that Kennedy is "certainly correct to argue that there is often a close tie between economic power and military power."

What Haass wants us to understand is that there is not a yardstick link between the two, and exerting military muscle does not necessarily induce terminal economic fatigue. But of course Kennedy never says it does. All he says — indeed Haass actually quotes a passage that underlines this point — is that the broad trend toward the *relative* erosion of America's economic position in the world requires us to avoid "imperial overstretch" in our overseas commitments.

Haass, to be sure, does not come out with a hurrah for overstretch, but neither does he like the idea of any kind of retrenchment. What he seems to say is, yes, we are indeed relatively weaker than we used to be, but, no, this should not affect our geopolitical commitments in any way.

Consider, for example, his assertion — as though he were refuting Kennedy — that "a principal objective of American foreign policy since World War II has been to engineer the economic decline of the United States relative to Western Europe and Japan." Of course it has, although policymakers might phrase it differently and say that

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we wanted to restore the war-wracked economies of our trading partners.

But Kennedy would hardly deny this. What he would say is that because Western Europe and Japan are now economically rich and politically healthy societies, they have the ability to take over some of the military burdens the United States assumed for them temporarily, pending their recovery.

This, however, Haass doesn't like. He wants the United States to maintain the same military role with less than 20 percent of world production that it did when it had 50 percent of world production. It might be nice if such conjuring acts were possible. But they rest on the willingness of foreign investors to underwrite the colossal debts the United States has incurred (and which will eventually have to be paid off with a lower standard of living in the United States) by trying to do precisely that.

Haass tells us that "to say that the challenge for U.S. policy makers is to manage American decline begs the key questions of how far and how fast that decline might be." Precisely. But that is not the question Kennedy begs, for his book is one of historical analysis, not of policy recommendations. It is the question Haass begs. Having accepted Kennedy's thesis that the United States has undergone a relative economic decline, and having addressed himself to policy issues, he would be more helpful were he to address the impact of relative decline on those issues rather than to reassure us that everything will turn out all right so along as we keep whistling.

Ronald Steel
Professor of International Relations
University of Southern California

The Author Responds:

Paul Kennedy has written an important book that contains a basic message: the foreign and defense policy costs associated with maintaining great power status can, over time, undermine the economic foundations of states, in the process undermining their great power status as other countires not similarly burdened overtake them. He endeavors over the course of some 540 pages of text to demonstrate that this explains a good deal of the past, present and (possibly) even future.

It should not be surprising in a book of this length that qualifications can be identified. Of course they can. But qualifications should not be allowed to obscure the essential thrust. Indeed, Kennedy seems to want to have it both ways: a book that drives home to its many readers a central message of the relationship between overseas overcommitment and domestic economic decline, to be followed by op-

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eds, and now letters to the editor, saying that he has been misread and that the relationship is really a lot more complex. It is, but you wouldn't come away from even a careful reading of his book with that impression.

I will not bother to repeat all or even many of the criticisms contained in my original review, but I will repeat the fundamental one, namely, that the economic costs of great power status are not all that great, and that culprits accounting for relative economic decline (other than alleged "imperial overstretch") will have to be found. One can point to all sorts of factors leading to this country's relative and absolute economic woes, ranging from the erosion of the family and poor teacher training to unimaginative unions and incompetent management. What they and other candidate explanations have in common is their lack of anything to do with the costs of foreign and defense policy. The link that constitutes the heart of the Kennedy volume simply does not exist.

The corollary to this point is that the way out of our difficulty is not to be found in revamping Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon, much as both could use revamping. In this vein, I should have thought the adaptive power of this country was obvious. We did, after all, conclude a cease-fire in Korea, leave Vietnam, and cut our losses in Lebanon rather than indulge in what might be described as imperial excess. The Nixon Doctrine of increased dependence upon regional friends and allies for common security aims remains intact. At home, meanwhile, the successes of both the Scowcroft MX Commission and the Greenspan Social Security Commission suggest that the current National Economic Commission just might produce a budget fix that can meet with broad political acceptance. And if it does not, and if the Social Security surplus does not bail us out, the decline in living standards that will befall us will be real but again not the consequence of spending some 6 percent of our GNP on our security.

Ronald Steel's effort to come to Paul Kennedy's defense is, on one level, admirable; I hope that I can count on colleagues of his reputation and skill to come to my defense after someone writes a tough review of one of my books. On another level, however, Steel fails to do Kennedy much good. He, too, links our budget deficit to our foreign and defense policies, suggesting the answer lies in increased allied burden-sharing, i.e., the United States doing less. Again, it would be reassuring if just once one of the advocates of devolution considered the possible costs of doing less if it proved to be not good enough. History is a guide here too.

One last point merits a response. To say (as Steel does) that *The Rise and Fall* is a book of "historical analysis, not of policy recommendations," is disingenuous. One does not devote approximately 100 pages to the contemporary world in a book of history. More

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important, Kennedy has consciously placed the United States in the historical context of great powers no longer great. If one subscribes to Kennedy's history, the only conclusion possible — and one with obvious policy implications — is for the United States to pull back before it too falls. This, however, would be as dangerous as it would be unjustified, resulting in less order abroad but not necessarily higher (and quite possibly lower) living standards at home. If space limitations prevent me from doing little more than assert this, Steel can relax with the knowledge that I am writing a book developing this theme, one which he can review in turn as he sees fit.

Richard Haass

SOUTH AFRICA'S BOMB

To the Editor:

Michèle A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell's article ["South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option?" Summer, 1988] is an excellent example of a well-researched and objective assessment of South Africa's nuclear capabilities and options, two subjects that are rarely approached with objectivity. A major strength of the authors' analysis is their detailed consideration of the varied levels of interdependency that exist within the region of southern Africa and within the global environment. Their very considerable information and arguments would be strengthened, however, by the proposal of policy options or the definition of steps to initiate crisis-lessening measures.

The authors note that the increasing cycle of externally imposed economic and politicial isolation, coupled with pressure, is perceived by the near-paranoid Afrikaner minority as a threat to its very existence. To date, this perception in South Africa has been followed by intransigence and aggression on its part. For example, the article indicates that South Africa has turned to military strength and is very well prepared to use nuclear force, rather than turning to the purported outside governments' objective of compromise or change, resulting in a new round of economic, political, and military isolation for the country. In my opinion, South Africa's increasing isolation can only continue to increase Afrikaner racial fear at the same time that external punishment continues to provide a perceived justification in South Africa for retaliation and intransigence.

The responsibility for the current state of affairs cannot be assigned only to the government of South Africa. The continuing U.S. disengagement results in U.S. impotence by reducing this country's ability to positively affect conflict resolution. It also tends to support a crisis, which the authors apparently believe the South Africans may attempt to resolve through the threatened or actual use of nuclear

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weapons. Flournoy and Campbell implicitly acknowledge the impotence of the United States in this situation when they state, "Although diplomatic disincentives certainly exist, the ability to constrain South Africa's nuclear actions may decrease as the country becomes ever more isolated internationally."

On the other hand, the authors apparently believe the United Nations arms embargo has proven to be effective. They state, "Although some arms imports have slipped through, the embargo is taking its toll." In my opinion, the record of the last twenty-five years demonstrates conclusively that "diplomatic disincentives" or punitive policies have little chance of constraining South African actions. For example, the United Nations arms embargo did not reduce South Africa's military capabilities nor did it constrain its ability to produce advanced weaponry, including nuclear weapons — two points demonstrated in this article. These facts do not appear to support the hypothesis that the embargo is "taking its toll" if by this it is meant that South Africa's level of military capability and the potential for conflict in the region has been reduced. What is clear is that the military build-up of South Africa and the Front Line States has come at a severe cost to economic development and social welfare, which in turn are destabilizing influences. This aspect was not addressed.

The challenge posed by the military situation in southern Africa is to ensure peaceful resolution of a racially, as well as politically, complicated conflict. Past increases in the military capabilities of the Front Line States (especially Zimbabwe) have not deterred South African aggression but rather have increased the frequency of aggression. A continuing build-up of military capabilities in the Front Line States can only escalate an arms race on the sub-continent and thereby increase the probability of sustained military conflict and the potential for nuclear deployment.

From the context of evaluating South Africa's nuclear option and capabilities, this article is excellent and certainly timely. The authors' concluding statement, however, that "it is only by debating policy options before a crisis is upon us that we can hope to react wisely and swiftly when South Africa plays its atomic ace," leaves us hanging. What are the authors' policy options for the much-needed crisis-lessening measures?

Paul R. Thomas
Economics Institute
Boulder, Colorado

The Authors Respond:

Paul Thomas raises several important points in his letter responding to our article. He identifies a fundamental tension from which Western policy toward South Africa cannot escape. On the

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one hand, a policy of engagment with Pretoria has become unacceptable in domestic political terms for most Western leaders. On the other, a policy of disengagement, while popular at home, may diminish one's influence in South Africa and pave the way for Pretoria to engage, with less diplomatic cost, in increasingly provocative activities. The connection between South Africa's growing isolation and its escalating belligerence toward the surrounding Front Line States is clear. It is also one which will continue to complicate Western policy making efforts.

As we see it, the primary policy objective vis-à-vis South Africa is to help foster change as rapidly as possible without dramatic domestic upheaval or ravaging regional consequences. The most urgent and difficult task at hand is to translate this objective into concrete, workable, and effective policy prescriptions.

At this stage, the United States should focus on securing South Africa's signature to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. South Africa recently requested talks with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to discuss renouncing its nuclear weapons option and opening all its nuclear facilities to international inspection. President Botha first stated his country's interest in the NPT last year in the wake of an unsuccessful attempt to suspend South Africa from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although Pretoria's overtures may be nothing more than a desperate and empty attempt to stave off further international isolation, we would be wise to treat this proposal seriously. The United States should engage its allies and the Soviet Union in an effort to involve South Africa in highly visible consultations on its accession to the NPT. The more public the process, the higher the price South Africa would pay for withdrawing from the negotiations. The success of such an approach may be seen in the strides that have been made in the multilateral discussions being held to resolve the protracted conflict in Namibia and Angola.

As a longer term measure, the United States should initiate a series of confidential, high-level discussions with several other actors who have a stake in seeing the peaceful resolution of a South African crisis if and when it occurs: particularly the Front Line States, South African opposition groups, Western allies, and the Soviet Union. These discussions should focus on how to deal with the possibility that Pretoria may use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons. Options for concerted action in the event of a crisis should be defined and assessed through a process of extensive consultations.

Finally, in taking issue with our claim that the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa "is taking its toll," Thomas is correct to suggest that the embargo has had mixed results. It has had the unfortunate result of spurring the development of an indigenous arms industry which has provided South Africa with a formidable

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arsenal of weaponry. But the embargo has also succeeded in denying South Africa a range of advanced weaponry that its military planners want, and need most.

Michèle A. Flournoy
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WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Ambassador in Paris: The Reagan Years. By Evan Galbraith. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987. 160 pp. $16.95.

As U.S. Ambassador to France from 1981 to 1985, Galbraith was one of the most colorful political appointees of Ronald Reagan's first term, certainly one of the most colorful to serve abroad. Admirers

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hailed Galbraith's flamboyant, combative style, saying it was precisely what American interests required in France during the socialist era of François Mitterrand. Foreign service officers and others not enamored of the Reagan outlook saw Galbraith as the quintessential bull in the china shop of diplomacy — thoughtless, unserious, playing to the media.

Whatever one's evaluation of Galbraith, this diary-like essay communicates the man. Whether recounting day-to-day life at the embassy with wife Bootsie or pontificating on such policy issues as the natural gas pipeline, Soviet hegemonism, and France's special role in Europe, his verve shows through. Just like the man, the book is bold, supremely confident, and robustly opinionated; like the man, too, it is not especially well-organized, careful, or articulate. (The best writing here is the four-page introduction by William F. Buckley, Jr.) If you like the man, you will like his book; if not, not. It is as simple as that.

Betraying the Bishops: How the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace is Being Taught. By Matthew F. Murphy. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987. 124 pp. $19.75 ($7.95, paper).

The U.S. Catholics Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter on war and peace raised a tempest within the church and without. It also created major problems for some individuals, Murphy among them. Murphy, who works for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and is sympathetic to the Reagan Administration's position on nuclear and strategic issues, takes his religion seriously, including the bishops' attempt to grapple with the notion of a "just war." After explaining what the pastoral letter said, he judges it fair and balanced. But he sees the church's teaching of it as very different; Murphy details the "veering toward pacifism" that has characterized explication of the letter. Finally, he tries to put the document back in perspective for those who would teach it to the laity.

Murphy's arguments about the content of the letter and about the selective way that it is being taught are convincing, but miss an important point. The pastoral was designed by radical pacifist clergymen as a means to aid the nuclear freeze movement, then was toned down by more conservative bishops. Accordingly, the final version was one step in a continuing political struggle. Issuance of the pastoral did not end that struggle but transferred it to the pedagogical plane — on which, as Murphy demonstrates, the conservatives have been bludgeoned. Perhaps Murphy chose not to say all this in the interest of persuading his lay Catholic reader, but lacking the interior political dimension, his analysis of the pastoral letter is incomplete.

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Covert Cadre: Inside the Institute for Policy Studies. By S. Steven Powell. Ottawa, Ill.: Green Hill, 1987. 469 pp. $29.95.

Most Americans are too nice to believe that there are many among us who hate the U.S. government and everything for which it stands . . . and who would lie about it to boot. According to Powell, however, the Institute for Policy Studies contains just such people: it is a far left, revolutionary institution whose members lie about their views to penetrate and influence liberal institutions. To support his thesis, Powell has done a yeoman's job of reviewing IPS activities, networks, and literature. But though his research is valuable, and his basic thesis correct, Powell's book is doubly flawed: by the attempt to show IPS as pro-Soviet, and by an exaggeration of IPS's influence.

As to the first, Powell seems not to grasp the varieties of independent leftism that have sprung up since the Vietnam war, nor the diversity of the IPS staff, which contains Marxists, libertarians, radical pacifists, and others. This misleads him into a futile attempt at demonstrating harmony between Soviet and IPS views, when in fact the true common theme is anti-Americanism, not pro-Sovietism. When Powell tries to show the IPS impact, his narrative falls prey to specious reasoning. For example, he wrongly claims the Cambodia/Kent State college demonstrations of May-June 1970 resulted from the national antiwar demonstration in Washington on May 9 of that year. He then argues that, since organizational meetings for the Washington demonstration involved IPS staffers (among dozens of others), IPS catalyzed the campus disruptions. More nuance and less vitriol would have improved this book, which nonetheless has something important to say.

Dictionary of the Vietnam War. Edited by James S. Olsen. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 603 pp. $65.00.

Anyone doing serious research on the Vietnam War had better pull out the checkbook for this invaluable research aid, another in Greenwood's expanding series of "dictionary" reference works. The first 500 pages offer an alphabetic compendium of brief articles on Vietnam War-related topics. Within each article, every subject and proper noun covered elsewhere in the book is marked by an asterisk, a fine touch that allows the reader to arrange his own tour. Each article is followed by an incisive bibliography. After the "dictionary" section come six appendices: on the population and provinces of Vietnam circa 1971; on minority groups in Vietnam; on acronyms and slang expressions (a treasure in itself); an extensive bibliography of books on the war, divided into logical groupings; a chronology of the war, 1945-1975, which correctly includes domestic events in the United States; and finally three maps of Vietnam. An index completes the volume's fine organization.

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Diplomacy and the American Democracy. By David D. Newsom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 226 pp. $25.00 ($9.95, paper).

Newsom, an experienced Foreign Service Officer, has been U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and his reflections in these 16 brief essays naturally tend to look at U.S. policy from the perspective of the developing world. Many of his subjects deal with diplomacy and another topic: the Congress, the media, economic assistance, and human rights. Others deal with relations between diplomats and the military, the role of intelligence, and the terrorist threat to democracy. Many of his reflections concern what Newsom calls the long struggle between "assertive nationalists" and "cautious internationalists," with the Reagan Administration representing the former, and he himself representing the latter.

Despite Newsom's experience — and a few very good paragraphs about the relation between American diplomacy and political culture — most of these essays are rather simply cut, extremely useful to students but disappointing to those more advanced. This may result in part from so many topics being covered in such a brief space. The best elements in the book are anecdotes from Newsom's diplomatic career, as when he captures Lyndon Johnson's laconic style by reporting the following statement to a small group of ambassadorial appointees: "Now, if you get out to where you're going and you don't like it there, please let me know. I'll bring you home, because I don't want any of you messin' me up." But the anecdotes interspersed in the text only make one wish that Newsom had chosen to write either a memoir and or a serious analytical work. *Diplomacy and the American Democracy* is not enough of either to commend itself beyond the undergraduate classroom.

Game Theory and National Security. Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 199 pp. $49.95 ($19.95, paper).

Game theory's many critics accuse it of earning its rather poor reputation. This approach to military issues gave us, they say, mutual assured destruction and graduated response; the former misguided Washington in strategic policy, the latter brought death and failure in Vietnam. However flimsy such a reading of game theory, there is enough truth in it that one expects a certain defensiveness when a political scientist (Brams) and a mathematician (Kilgour) team up. They flaunt a hubris untouched by the historic record. The authors assure us that their conclusions are practical and important for all the subjects they discuss, including arms races, deterrence, de-escalation, Star Wars, crisis stability, and verification.

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Their assurances are far from persuasive. The problem lies with the authors' epistemological presumptions. They assume that limited rationality can be defined and plotted mathematically; that governments are monolithic decision-makers; and that formal mathematical modelling bears a resemblance to the world in which policy is made. On this final matter, the authors admit they are only at a theoretical stage, not an operational one. Yet they insist that, in theory, their formulae can be made operational. No doubt they can, in theory, but so far they have not, in fact.

The Impact of Illness on World Leaders. By Bert Edward Park. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. 373 pp. $24.95.

History is the lengthened shadow of a man — and not infrequently the shadow of a sick one. But to what extent does the sickness shape the shadow? To find out, Park examines some major twentieth-century leaders. His cases include several leaders from the interwar period: Woodrow Wilson, Germany's President Hindenberg, Great Britain's Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, and Poland's Premier Pilsudski. Hitler and Roosevelt are studied during World War II, then Churchill and Anthony Eden as British Prime Ministers in the 1950s.

Park's approach is enlightening but limited, for in only a few cases are pertinent medical records available, making historical diagnosis a risky business. But even knowing the leader's medical condition in detail, how does one infer its influence on his political judgment? For example, Park reveals that after the July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, his doctor prescribed a treatment including large and regular doses of cocaine. We know Hitler's judgment became ever more erratic at this point, but he was more than a little strange before the attempt on his life. How can we know what difference the cocaine made? Despite these limits, Park has done a service for the study of international relations, making a persuasive case for the recognition of a new variable.

Infinite in All Directions. By Freeman Dyson. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 319 pp. $19.95.

Laser propulsion, Star Wars, Japanese politics, DNA, the Austrian State Treaty, butterflies, nuclear power reactors, space exploration and the balance of power are among Dyson's topics in this study of (the author says) the tension between unity and diversity in all things. Setting a new standard for eclecticism, Dyson offers evidence of a broad-ranging mind; but the result, though captivating, does not cohere as did Dyson's earlier works — *Weapons and Hope* and *Disturbing the Universe*.

And when Dyson talks about Star Wars and arms control, most of what he has to say is old hat — although he may not realize it.

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After pronouncing the grander designs of Star Wars strategic and technical nonsense, he argues that a combination of strategic defense and offensive reductions would be a good thing, and he thus concludes that the perfectibility of strategic defense is impossible but irrelevant. Dyson does not mention the idea of another physicist, Alvin Weinberg, whose notion of a defense protected build-down predates Dyson's similar but less formed notions by some years. Nevertheless, Dyson provides a good read. With a little patience and much tolerance for diffuseness, there is plenty to be learned here.

Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva. By Herbert F. York. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 359 pp. $22.95.

The inter-penetration of the scientific and defense communities during the past forty years has changed both. York, born in 1921 and a nuclear physicist by training, was an integral part of that change. Although *Making Weapons, Talking Peace* is a memoir, it is also a contribution to the sociology of postwar science.

After participating in the Manhattan Project, York worked for the Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon, and was the U.S. ambassador to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) negotiations in 1977-79. Toward the end of his book, York gives his thoughts on the failure of the CTB negotiations, and reveals much of the origins of both Midgetman and the ill-fated Multiple Aim Point missile deployment scheme. There is much new anecdotal data here, some of it revealing and some of it amusing, as when George Kistiakowsky, after a Pentagon briefing, screamed at York for "selling out" to Defense Secretary Harold Brown.

York concludes with a few modest ideas on how to prevent a nuclear war and heal the world. Doing something radical about the "Soviet Threat" or the "Nuclear Arms Race," he believes, are misguided impulses. A military balance, including a nuclear component, combined with classical diplomacy designed to limit arms and keep the peace, is what's needed — while carefully and patiently figuring out a way to a safer world. That sounds about right.

The 1987 Political Risk Handbook. 7 volumes. Edited by William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary. New York: Frost & Sullivan, 1987. $1,000.00.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran spawned a cottage industry for consultants — country risk analysis. By the nature of things, the banks and multi-national corporations who support this work are charged so much that the results are rarely seen by academic or government specialists. This gives the results both a certain mystique and notoriety. How good are these studies, anyway?

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One leading consultancy, Frost & Sullivan, recently decided to make its product known; it sent out one half of its Middle East volume (containing analyses of seven countries) to reviewers. The result certainly makes for fascinating reading, for the risk analysts (in each case, three specialists) do not shy from bold predictions. Offering quite precise percentages, they forecast (over both 1 1/2 and 5 year periods) the likelihood of turmoil and the risks involved in financial transfers, direct investment, and export markets.

But perhaps most interesting is the prediction of the "most likely regime." It would seem that, not wanting to appear hidebound, the analysts err in favor of too much volatility. In the 1 1/2 years between late 1986 and early 1988, they rated Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria only a 70 percent chance of staying in power; Husni Mubarak of Egypt, 65 percent; the IRP of Iran, 80 percent; Saddam Husayn of Iraq, 70 percent; the National Unity government of Israel, 60 percent; the Sabah family of Kuwait, 70 percent; and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, just 50 percent. Statistically, Frost & Sullivan is saying there was a 19 out of 20 chance of change in regime in one of the seven countries. Yet, more than 1 1/2 years later, all seven remained in power; which leads one to think that country risk analysts do not, after all, have much of a future. D.P.

The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History. By David H. Bennett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. 509 pp. $29.95.

America has always had a social and political right-wing. But, unlike the European right — which stems from a dispossessed aristocracy, yearns for old privileges, and disdains the rabble — the American right stems from a religio-ethnic nativism with a distinctly populist tone. *The Party of Fear* is a detailed, engaging, and fair-minded description of the evolution of nativism from the beginnings of the American Republic until today.

As Bennett approaches modern times, he no doubt encountered a temptation to extrapolate past nativism into present conservative politics. Were he a less professional historian, he might end up sounding like People for the American Way, which holds that the Reagan administration represents the hard right. Instead, Bennett argues that the nativist right permanently left the American mainstream when the Klu Klux Klan's popularity died in the 1920s.

He does, however, find divisions on the right that reflect nativist roots. Among more populist conservatives, particularly on the religious right, nativist traces remain. But he also sees a form of "inverted nativism" among more intellectual, elitist, and secular conservatives. Bennett is not entirely successful in explaining this "inverted nativism" in our own times. With luck, his next effort will ponder the

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present period more deeply and tell us more about "inverted nativism." Still, this is an absorbing and serious work.

Peace and Revolution: The Moral Crisis of American Pacifism. By Guenter Lewy. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1988. 283 pp. $19.95.

As many writers have noted, American pacifism has evolved since the Great Depression from a moral position into an integral part of the political left. Lewy's chronicle goes over this familiar ground but does so with the most meticulous documentation, and with a calm spirit. For the most part, Lewy lets his subjects speak for themselves. The War Resisters League, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the American Friends Service Committee come to life through letters, internal documents, and public literature. The many quotations from sources long buried are extremely useful. While Lewy disagrees with the pacifists, he also respects them and never accuses them of dishonesty, only of the kind of error that flows from naïveté.

If Lewy's book has any flaw it is this: he says little about the social background of American pacifists, and he cannot seem to make up his mind about how much pacificists have mattered within the political culture as a whole — admittedly a tricky and difficult task. These missing pieces notwithstanding, Lewy's archival research and perusal of pacificist literature has produced a fine book. And for those who happen to agree with his judgments on moral issues, the book is downright satisfying.

Revolutionary and Dissident Movements: An International Guide. Second edition. (First edition published as *Political Dissent* in 1983.) Edited by Henry W. Degenhardt. Detroit: Gale Research, 1988. 466 pp. $140.00.

Based on materials taken from "Keesing's Record of World Events," the *Guide* surveys "other than legal" opposition movements and parties dealing with 166 states. As the editor notes, most of the revolutionary movements have failed, especially the extreme left-wing groups in West Europe and Latin America.

Of course, there is a certain arbitrariness as to which groups are included and how much space they are allotted, but there is some interest in the quantitative results of this fine survey. Among the states listed as facing no revolutionary or dissident movements are Iceland, Norway, and New Zealand, and one intuits the accuracy of this assessment. But in most cases, the absence of groups suggests only the inadequacy of categories or reporting, not a peaceful polity: this applies to Mongolia, Qatar, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Mali, Guinea, Belize, Brazil,

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and Uruguay. It is also noteworthy how many of the supposedly non-revolutionary states are islands, including Fiji, Western Samoa, Nauru, Kiribati, Mauritius, Maldives, Madagascar, Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Grenada, Barbados, Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, Jamaica, and Haiti. At the other end of the spectrum, movements against the governments of India, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, and El Salvador fill up 9 pages each. These are exceeded only by those against Poland (11 pages), Lebanon (13), France (14), and Israel (21). D.P.

The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship. By Murray Bookchin. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987. 288 pp. $22.95.

Bookchin tries to explain why many of us who live in large cities have a nagging suspicion that democracy and citizenship become degraded concepts once the farmland stops and the asphalt begins. He also tries to persuade us that there is a solution. His method is to ransack world history — more or less at random — first to show how the rise of cities has corresponded to the erosion of freedom at different places and times, then to point out how some communities have fought the trend. Ultimately, the author blames the phenomenon on a dearth of political participation, and ends by urging maximum direct civic action to realign the balance between state and citizen, city and country, industry and agriculture. While his analysis is global, his prescriptions are geared to America.

Bookchin has a rare gift for intellectual provocation. As America's foremost anarchist critic, he manages to combine the sensibilities of Edmund Burke, the assumptions of Thomas Jefferson, the inclinations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the analysis of Lewis Mumford — without talking much about any of them. Scholarship, though, is not his point, or his achievement. As in many of his earlier works, notably *The Ecology of Freedom* and *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, Bookchin's achievement is to put forth an eclectic, unorthodox presentation that forces the reader, in attempting to answer, to educate or re-educate himself. Along the way, Bookchin proves that a book with a real idea, even a slightly twisted one, can be worth more than all the turgidly footnoted tomes in the library.

The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work, and U.S. Foreign Policy. By J. Bruce Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 337 pp. $24.95.

There are millions of refugees, political and otherwise, in many parts of the globe. Americans rightly take pride that the U.S. government and a host of private American organizations seek to help these dispossessed. But this does not mean the relationship between government and non-government refugee agencies is simple, har-

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monious, or easily understood. On the one hand, public and private agencies have become interdependent financially and operationally. On the other, refugee affairs have become politicized in ways mirroring post-Vietnam divisions over foreign policy. At any given time, the government has a political agenda that affects the direction and level of its relief work, and so do many of the private agencies, from the American Friends Service Committee to the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. This tension makes for uneven performance. Citing current problems in Thailand, Honduras, and the Sudan, Nichols shows the many ways that public and private agencies get tangled in each other's ambitions and interests. He concludes by noting the danger these pose to the American tradition of humanitarian aid, and in a well-titled section called "Middle Axioms of Humanitarian Renewal" suggests ways to ameliorate the difficulties before us. One positive step, for example, would be for government to recognize the danger of overwhelming private efforts, for those efforts provide independent perspectives. Another would be if religiously oriented groups recognized that they must work in both a political and a pluralist environment, and that ignoring either only ends up hurting the people they are trying to help.

Nichols raises important questions and succeeds in answering most of them in a crisply written narrative of breadth and detail which is historically informed and currently relevant.

U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievement, Failures, Lessons. Edited by Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 746 pp. $42.00 ($18.95, paper).

Regime theory is an approach to inter-state relations that emphasizes institutions, procedures, and structures over mere motives and capabilities. Regime theory is also the unifying approach in this collection of twenty-nine essays on post-war U.S.-Soviet attempts at cooperation. The cases, ranging from prominent to obscure, are divided into sections on European security, arms control, and a grab bag called "Regional Security, Crisis Avoidance, and Crisis Management." A final section of six essays, by the editors, sums up the lessons of the case studies.

The work is valuable for recalling undramatic or forgotten dealings, such as the Austrian State Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and an attempt at the naval demilitarization of the Indian Ocean in 1977-78. The theoretical aspirations of the editors are admirable and suggestive, and a half dozen of the essays are first-rate.

Unfortunately, many of the authors shy away from ascribing failure to basic political motives, or explaining success in non-serendipitous ways. There is an air of unreality about some of the essays,

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particularly those on strategic arms control, as if willfulness, ideology, and ambition had nothing do to with international politics. Also, a number of the essays are very narrowly focussed, so that when Alexander George concludes that "cooperation in specific security matters may also be hindered or facilitated by the over-all relationship that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union at any given time or by the type of relationship they are trying to create," it reflects poorly on some of his co-authors.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Arms Sales and the U.S. Economy: The Impact of Restricting Military Exports. By William Bajusz and David Louscher. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 135 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Those favoring fewer controls on arms sales to Arab countries often argue that exporting military equipment to such buyers would have a positive impact on the U.S. economy. Bajusz and Louscher here maintain that the impact would not only be positive but significantly so. By their estimate, present restrictions on the sale of arms to Jordan and the Arab kingdoms of the Persian Gulf mean that "the total income loss to the U.S. economy could be as high as $60.7 billion" over the period 1986-2000.

In arriving at this figure, Bajusz and Louscher make reasonable estimates of the arms market in Arab countries, but they use techniques that greatly inflate the cost of U.S. restrictions. For example, they assume that without export controls the United States would win all sales to the region, a highly dubious proposition. Too, Bajusz and Louscher believe that the price of foregone sales equals America's loss of income, as though resources used to make weapons for the Mideast sit idle when not employed for that purpose. In fact, the U.S. economy loses only the amount by which alternative uses are less productive than making Mideast arms. Finally, even if Bajusz and Louscher were correct in their estimate, the loss to America's GNP would be less than one-tenth of one percent — not a compelling economic argument for shifting strategic policies.

External Deficits and the Dollar: The Pit and the Pendulum. Edited by Ralph Bryant, Gerald Holtham, and Peter Hooper. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988. 139 pp. $29.95.

The orthodox refrain of economists throughout the 1980s has been that America's trade deficit is caused by the high value of the

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dollar and can be reversed only by allowing the dollar to decline. Popular opinion, by contrast, has held that the deficit arises because America's trading partners are, in some sense, not playing fair.

The Brookings Institution has put together the results of a 1987 conference on the U.S. trade deficit (the "pit") and swings in the value of the U.S. dollar (the "pendulum"). With an emphasis on empiricism, the authors set out to test the explanation offered by economists, employing several major models of the interactions among the world's capitalist economies. Unsurprisingly, the results support economic orthodoxy.

But the arguments are unconvincing for one overwhelming reason. The authors' analyses fail to consider the principal alternative explanation for the U.S. trade deficit, namely, that the East Asian trading partners are mercantilists who want to export as much and import as little as possible, no matter what the economic price. What the authors have ended up proving, therefore, is that empirical work becomes illuminating only when it is used to test the validity of competing theories.

Phases of Economic Growth, 1850-1973. By Solomos Solomou. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 194 pp. $44.50.

Economists have generally been unfriendly to the idea of long-term trends in economic growth, largely because they have no theory to explain them. Solomou provides a nice summary of the empirical and theoretical reasons for this opposition. He shows that the evidence for long-term trends is not clear cut and notes the lack of any systematic explanation for those trends that do seem to exist. He is also right to observe that overall trends do not apply fully to individual countries, and that national patterns of economic growth must be understood partly by specifically national factors.

Nevertheless, the history of the post-war period seems to support the theory of a long-term growth cycle, as first suggested by Kondratieff in the 1920s. From 1950 to 1973, the growth rate of the world economy reached probably unprecedented heights, despite occasional recessions and individual back-waters. Since then, growth rates have generally been lower in the advanced industrial countries, the Eastern bloc, and the developing countries (with a high variation among the latter). Given such broad contemporaneous changes, it would seem important to search for a common cause. Solomou, like most economists, is too eager to leap from the ambiguities he identifies to the conclusion that there is no trend.

Russia and America: The Roots of Economic Divergence. By Colin White. Beckenham, England: Croom Helm, 1988. (Distributed by Routledge, Chapman & Hall.) 260 pp. $39.95.

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On a certain level, American history and Russian history have much in common: both nations possessed huge empty areas that were rich in natural resources; both were settled by pioneers but employed servile labor until the mid-nineteenth century. Why then do Americans exalt entrepreneurship and downplay the security offered by the state, while Russians reverse these emphases? Is it simply a result of the Russian Revolution?

White thinks not. He argues that differing human and physical environments have shaped the two countries' attitudes and institutions. Those of the Russians have been shaped by catastrophe: famine, due to a climate unfavorable for growing grain; war, due to the vulnerability of settlements on huge undifferentiated plains; and disease, which spread quickly in towns densely packed for greater protection. As a consequence, Russians see the world as an insecure and uncertain place. In contrast, Americans have been shaped by a freedom from such physical disasters, and therefore have become more willing than Russians to undertake the risky life and investments of the entrepreneur.

White's thesis is intriguing, but useful only as long as the social and environmental difference is understood to be just one element (albeit an important one) in analyzing American-Russian divergence.

What Should Banks Do? By Robert Litan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. 198 pp. $26.95.

Should banks be allowed to offer a full range of financial services, including those now offered only by stockbrokers and insurance companies? Most economists favor deregulation, for they believe it would increase competition and stabilize banks' profits — a downturn in profits from lending could be offset by profits from other services.

Litan sides with this view, but he has provided an eminently readable guide to the entire debate. He has also made a powerful case that Congress should resolve the dispute in some fashion, rather than permit the present messy process of lawsuits and loopholes to continue.

One exception to Litan's basically free market approach is his simple but practical proposal for retaining government-backed deposit insurance. He would require banks to form separate subsidiaries for their deposit-taking activities, which would be highly regulated and insured, while their other activities would remain free from such close regulation.

Unfortunately, Litan may be overly optimistic when he assumes that today's poor regulatory environment is the principal hindrance for U.S. banks in international competition. Even after deregulation, U.S. banks might continue to lose market share. After all, the Amer-

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ican record in other service industries suggests banks may simply lack the skills to compete with Japan.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid. By Benjamin M. Joseph. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 184 pp. $35.00.

Enemies of Israel revel in the alleged similarities between Israel and South Africa, and point to their tacit alliance as evidence of a spiritual affinity. Friends of Israel emphasize the more substantial differences between Israeli and South African society, and characterize relations between Jerusalem and Pretoria as a product of need, not rapport. While the evidence supports the second view, it is no simple matter, and Joseph's analysis of the complexities is a good place to start if one seeks refuge from propaganda. Benjamin surveys Israeli-South African ties from the early 1970s to date, in as matter-of-fact and nonjudgmental a manner as he can muster. He succeeds at that and more. After discussing the military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions of the bilateral relationship, his final two chapters — "Separatism at the Wrong Time in History?" and "Some Call These Sanctions" — achieve a level of philosophical sophistication generally absent from the discussion. Partisans of each side will find much to annoy them in this volume. Such, evidently, is the price of objectivity. A.M.G

Double Jeopardy: PLO Strategy toward Israel and Jordan. By Asher Susser. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987. 59 pp. $3.00.

Using original documents of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Susser establishes that PLO doctrine requires the takeover of Jordan as a prerequisite to destroying Israel. This ambition powers a central but usually neglected dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely the Jordan-PLO rivalry, which boils down to "whether the competition will culminate in the 'Jordanization' of the Palestinians or the 'Palestinization' of the Jordanians." The rest of this short but extensively documented and finely argued monograph pursues the implications of the Jordan-PLO relationship, with special attention to their February 1985 accord. Susser argues that cooperation between the two parties cannot last long, for their goals are mutually exclusive. His analysis makes clear much that the conventional dis-

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cussion omits and confuses, and is therefore very useful and highly recommended.

Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. By Matti Moosa. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988. 608 pp. $37.50.

"Extremist Shiites" in this context are not, as one might expect, the terrorists and suicide bombers who have become politically so prominent since 1978. They are, rather, the theologically heterodox groups which have been spinning off from mainstream Shi'ism since the first years of Islam in the seventh century. These are Shi'is who deify the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law, 'Ali, or his descendants; except for the 'Alawis of Syria, they tend to stay away from politics.

Moosa offers an ambitious, large-scale survey covering the Bektashis, Ahl-i Haqqis, Sarlis, Bajwan, Ibrahimis, and 'Alawis in a solid and workmanlike book. The author's erudition is massive, the subject complex, and the information made available helps one comprehend some of the smaller religious groups which give the Middle East its unique ethnic diversity. Nonetheless, this reader wishes that, his research done, Moosa had given greater effort to producing a more elegant presentation and a more coherent organization. The chapters follow no particular order and the allocation of space makes little sense: why, for example, does the discussion of 'Alawis take up more than one-third of the text?

The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939. Edited by Uriel Dann. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988. 434 pp. $59.50.

Not only does the Middle East include an unusually high number of countries that managed to avoid rule from Europe (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen), but even those that fell under imperial power had to endure it for only a few decades. This was the last region to be colonized and the first to win independence. On the premise that the brief imperial era needs "yet another reappraisal," Dann brought twenty-eight historians and political scientists together in 1982. The result is a highly satisfactory survey of international politics during the two-decade heyday of imperial power in the Middle East. In part, the results are so good because of the consistently high quality of the authors (who include Elie Kedourie, Bernard Lewis, Barry Rubin, and Jehuda L. Wallach); in part, because the authors have access to the British, French, German, Italian, and Israeli archives. The relative paucity of Arab sources prompts one question: is the external history of the Middle East fated always to be better understood than the internal history?

Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in a Persian Village. By Reinhold Loeffler. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. 312 pp. $44.50 ($15.95, paper).

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Loeffler offers a unique street-level view of the ways in which Islam's role has changed for Iranians, having spent three years in a large tribal village of southern Iran before the Islamic Revolution, and one year following it. Unsurprisingly, there are troubles in a society where girls at weddings have had to substitute slogans like "Salute to the martyrs," for traditional songs. Out of a sample of twenty-one men interviewed at length, all but two felt alienated by the new regime. "These men say they cannot find anything new in the new Islam . . . nor can they find much Islam in the Islamic government. . . . They see the infusion of current political issues into the public religious rituals as a corruption of their original spirit, and deeply resent it. In an amazingly uniform, though in no way organized reaction, they express this resentment as well as their resentment against the regime in general by boycotting all regime-led rituals." This unhappiness has created a new and unhappy situation in Iran, one where the outlook of most Iranians, as well as their religious tradition, have now become "the schismatic sideline to a dominant state religion."

Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970. By Jonathan Shimshoni. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. 247 pp. $32.50.

Conventional deterrence seems to be Israeli scholarship's obsession of the moment. The problem has been confronted by Yair Evron (see below) and Avner Yaniv (ORBIS, Summer 1988) among others. Shimshoni tries to take key concepts from the field of strategic nuclear deterrence and reformulate them for the conventional arena where, he correctly insists, they have much wider applicability. He argues that conventional deterrence is more complex and has a different calculus than its nuclear counterpart. Fear matters less in conventional deterrence, while mutual assessments of will and skill matter more. Therefore, the causes leading to a breakdown in conventional deterrence must differ from the causes leading to a breakdown at the nuclear level. This is all perfectly sensible and well-argued, as is Shimshoni's modest conclusion that there is no royal road to a "parsimonious predictive theory."

He looks at three topics in three periods: Israeli-Jordanian border tensions in 1953-55; Israeli-Egyptian border tensions in 1953-56; and the War of Attrition, 1967-1970. Original research on all three of these episodes makes Shimshoni's work a real contribution, as does his insight that, by shaping perceptions and expectations, these relatively minor tussles had important influences on the wars of 1956 and 1973. A.M.G.

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A New Iraq? The Gulf War and Implications for U.S. Policy. By Frederick W. Axelgard. Washington Papers no. 133. New York: Praeger, 1988. 122 pp. $29.95 ($9.95, paper).

Axelgard answers the question in his title with a hedged affirmative; nothing more definite can be proffered in the midst of Iraq's many changes. The Iraq-Iran war "has changed Iraq's internal politics as well as its relations with the outside world." This assessment flows from a brief but careful review of the English-language literature on Iraq. While Axelgard brings little new information to bear, he does a useful and sensible job of collecting what is known into a single, readable account.

One issue strikes the author as especially important in the emergence of "a new Iraq": the war's effect in turning the country from a motley of tribes and ethnic groups into a nation. He notes, in particular, the signs of Shi'i assimilation, of the military's reorientation from domestic to external concerns, and the greater flexibility of Baghdad's foreign policy.

Axelgard concludes that "these changes justify a serious rethinking of U.S. policy toward Iraq," and he is right. The time has come for the U.S. government to put aside the assumptions of 30 years, to take full advantage of the changes in Iraq, and to do its part to insure that those changes are lasting.

The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures. Edited by Hisham Sharabi. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 347 pp. $39.95.

Twenty-two authors met in 1985 at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University to peer ten years into the future. Dull as this sounds, the mixture of disappointment and hope make many of the articles surprisingly interesting. Taking just the book's first section, which deals with issues touching on democracy and human rights, one finds that the authors are not happy with recent trends. We learn from Ibrahim Ibrahim that "the authoritarian, bureaucratic state has exhausted itself"; from Michael C. Hudson that "the trend since the beginning of the 1970s has been toward more authoritarian rule"; from Saad Eddin Ibrahim that "the last ten years witnessed an unprecedented scale of atrocities committed by several Arab governments against their own citizens"; and from Sharabi that the Arab world is in crisis.

In light of these comments, it is peculiar to find some of the same authors sporting a visionary optimism when it comes to the future. I. Ibrahim predicts parliamentary rule, confederation between Egypt, Sudan, and Libya, and a whole new format for inter-Arab relations. S. E. Ibrahim flatly submits that "the next decade is going to be one of human rights and democratization in the Arab World."

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The abyss between these two positions suggests wishful thinking and immaturity of thought.

The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. By Muhammed Y. Muslih. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. The Institute for Palestine Studies Series. 277 pp. $30.00.

Muslih has done years' worth of archival research and interviewing, and the result is the uncovering of a substantial and valuable new body of information about nationalist ideas in the Levant during the all-critical 1918-20 period. Unfortunately, the author lacks any sense of what to do with what he has discovered, so the result is a profoundly confused and misconceived study. Of many problems, by far the most damaging is the persistent presentation of Palestinian nationalism and Pan-Arab nationalism as the two main choices facing the residents of Palestine; Muslih's own data clearly and repeatedly show that the real choice was between Palestinian nationalism and Pan-Syrian nationalism. His blindness to Pan-Syrian ideology renders much of his analysis worse than useless, for it muddies an already complex issue.

On another matter, "this book was made possible in part by a grant from the Institute from Palestine Studies." It is extremely distressing to see a respectable university press stooping to accept funds from the Institute for Palestine Studies, an arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Shall we soon see the Irish Republican Army publishing with Harvard University Press? Or the Red Army with Yale University Press?

Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A Comprehensive Study. By Sami Hadawi, with Atef Kubursi. London: Saqi Books, 1988. 330 pp. $60.00.

Hadawi has little to say about Palestinian rights, but he analyzes property loss in great detail. It would take an accountant years to verify his mountain of data, but anyone can judge for himself the results of Hadawi's effort. Converting the 1948 Palestine pound into 1984 dollars, adjusting for inflation, and including what the authors call "human capital losses," the total indemnity owed Palestinian refugees is $147 billion. Given that some 600,000 Arabs fled Palestine in 1948–49, this comes out to a forfeiture of $245,000 per man, woman, and child — rather a high value for a poor agriculture country! In fact, this figure is wildly unrealistic.

Moreover, it is meaningless, for the Arab exodus from Palestine was closely matched in numbers by a Jewish exodus from Arab countries. The Jews were mostly urbanites, so they undoubtedly experienced a higher per capita loss than the Palestinians — and where does this leave us? Maybe the Iraqis, Yemenis, and Egyptians who

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profited from the fleeing Jewish population should directly recompense the Palestinians? Or, since these lack so many billions, the oil-rich states should hand over virtually their entire savings? Instead, let's call the whole thing off.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society: The Politics of Socialist Transformation. By Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) 183 pp. $35.00 ($12.50, paper).

The Ismaels' treatment of South Yemeni politics brings to mind the Soviet analysis of Afghanistan since 1979: both rely on euphemisms (such as the "socialist transformation" of the subtitle), both emphasize statistical progress, and both substitute intention for reality. One would never know from the book's chirpy, optimistic language ("Social policy in the PRDY . . . relates directly to the State's objectives of transforming society from the conditions of tribalism, feudalism and colonialism to the conditions of socialism and sovereignty") just what a wretched, oppressed country South Yemen has become in the past two decades. Nor does its measured tone ("the twin themes of anti-imperialism and social revolution dominate the foreign policy of the contemporary PDRY") reveal how the government has made the country a virtual colony of the U.S.S.R.

As if these faults were not enough, the authors have the gall to complain that other Western analyses "distort the complexity and internal dynamics of South Yemeni society and politics beyond recognition." Don't take the Ismaels' word for it; if you want to learn about the country, read Robert W. Stookey's fine 1982 account, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia*.

The United States in the Middle East: A Historical Dictionary. By David Shavit. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 480 pp. $65.00.

What does the eighteenth century American financier Robert Morris have in common with the twentieth century radical novelist John Dos Passos? As one learns from this addition to Greenwood's fine series of historical dictionaries, both have been part of America's presence in Middle East over the last three centuries. Organized around individuals, this volume spells out that presence in detail: the missionaries, scientists, travelers, explorers, artists, diplomats, soldiers and businessmen who showed the American face in the Middle East since the early 1700s. The personalities listed are then regrouped in an appendix by occupation. In addition the book contains a broad chronology of the Middle East, and a helpful compendium of U.S.

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chiefs of mission going back to 1831. An (improvable) bibliographical essay brings up the rear.

Though designed as a reference work to aid historical research, this volume is captivating in itself, for it includes so many well-known Americans usually thought of in other contexts: Herman Melville, John Dewey, John Singer Sargent, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and NAACP founder John Haynes Holmes, to name but a few. Finally, the profusion of nineteenth century travelers, listed with the accounts of their journeys, suggests rich materials for a historical essay.

A.M.G.

War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue. By Yair Evron. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. 246 pp. $39.95.

Piece by piece, the story of the 1982 War in Lebanon is becoming known. Evron's scholarly volume on the Syrian-Israeli relationship provides one more piece. He takes interest is this relationship as an instance of conventional deterrence, and he succeeds on this account. Yet the real value of this volume is its meticulous account of what happened on the battlefield and in the seats of power in Damascus and Jerusalem. Evron interviewed a number of top Israeli decision-makers and this book is the first to shed light on many heretofore obscure topics, relating both to the war and to its background. A prime case is the U.S. effort in 1975–76 to act as an intermediary between Israel and Syria in the effort to establish "red lines" in Lebanon. The book's detailed notes also offer surprises, such as the revelation that Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tallas supervised the writing of an internal Syrian account of the war, which the Israelis have acquired, translated into Hebrew, and which may be available to scholars.

The book's only flaw is the political-science style of writing, and even that is not too egregious. General readers should be forewarned: they are unlikely to have the patience or background to make proper use of Evron's contribution; its detail and analytic sophistication mark it as a work for specialists only. A.M.G.

EAST ASIA
by Arthur Waldron

China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands. By Thomas E. Stolper. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985. 183 pp. $30.00.

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Although his subject is the Formosa Straits Crisis of 1954-55, and its 1958 sequel, Stolper's search is for an invariant in Chinese foreign policy, and not only in the Strait. According to Stolper, the fighting in the Strait was not really about the offshore islands, nor even intended to capture them. Rather, it was about the future of Taiwan, and Peking's concern was to prevent the United States from supporting independence for Taiwan, as the USSR supported independence for Mongolia. Stolper's invariant is the quest for national sovereignty and his case is subtle, well-documented, and largely convincing. (At least one PRC scholar, however, maintains that in 1958 Mao really did plan to take Quemoy, but backed off in the face of unexpected U.S. and Soviet responses.)

Still, one wonder why the "invariant" varies so much? Why do China's territorial claims (most recently in the South China Seas) flare up and then subside. Stolper's explanations look mostly to the policies of other countries. In fact, China's internal politics are at least equally important. Stolper alludes to them, but (perhaps wisely) does not attempt to treat them with the same rigor he devotes to his main argument.

The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 1921-1985: A Self-Portrait. By Laszlo Ladany. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 608 pp. $44.95.

Others have written more comprehensive histories with longer bibliographies and more complete scholarly apparatus. Nevertheless, Ladany's book seems destined to become the party history that the professional China-watcher keeps handy on his desk and consults first, simply because of Ladany's originality. For example, when did Mao take control of the Chinese Communist Party? Most history books say it was at the Zunyi Conference of 1935. Ladany disagrees — and that is just one of the many provocative theses offered by this Hungarian Jesuit.

Ladany, who possesses a knowledge of China few can match, spent nine years in China before moving to Hong Kong in 1953. There he founded *China News Analysis*, a newsletter quickly recognized as authoritative. Over the next thirty-five years, Ladany followed a single method to get at the truth about China: the relentless application of logical analysis to official sources. For this book he has analyzed documents and memoirs published since Mao's death and extracted a "self-portrait" of the Chinese communist party that is strikingly new, particularly for the pre-1949 period.

Ladany presents his story clearly and with great insight. He stresses the importance of personal rivalries and violence, but avoids reducing history to personalities — some of his best passages deal with ideology and the Chinese understanding of Marxism. Though

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not without defects, among them shocking errors of romanization, this book is clearly from a master.

Human Rights in the People's Republic of China. By Yuan-li Wu, Franz Michael, John F. Copper, Ta-ling Lee, Maria Hsia Chang, and A. James Gregor. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 343 pp. $35.00.

Human rights, like peace, is a topic of great importance about which scholars find it difficult to say anything interesting. The book under review illustrates this point. Readers will certainly not be surprised by its contention that human rights, even today, barely exist in the People's Republic of China. Nor will they be amazed by the assertion that this results directly from the nature of that country's government — and not from some oversight by the authorities.

Yet despite the fundamental simplicity of what the authors have to say, their volume repays a look. It examines problems of human rights in theory, across time, and through different segments of the population. The strongest sections are those that are most specific: the treatment of "counter-revolutionaries," attitudes toward economic rights, the rights of religious believers, the non-Chinese nationalities, and women. An appendix presents a statistical analysis of judicial practice since 1949 based on over 38,000 cases reported in the Chinese press. Compared to other books on the topic, this one is wider in scope, more thoroughly documented, and more soundly historical in perspective.

The Japanese Way of Politics. By Gerald L. Curtis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 317 pp. $30.00.

Japan has been ruled for more than thirty years by a single party, an unusual record for a genuinely democratic country. In seeking to explain how it has happened, Curtis stresses two points: the adaptability of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, and the failure of the opposition parties. He notes that in almost every area, the LDP has shown an ability to "track changes in its social and economic environment and to adjust its policies accordingly." Given the speed of change in Japan over the last thirty years, this has been no mean feat. It has required skillful policy reversals — on taxation and spending, on subsidies to agriculture, on public services — and great flexibility in the Party itself. The opposition parties, by contrast, have been too wedded to evanescent single issues, and too inflexible in their relationships with each other to provide an effective challenge.

Curtis expects the LDP's success to continue unless the Party itself should split. In fact, such a split offers the most likely scenario for change, for LDP leadership contests are bitter, and the party's majority is now small enough that a break-away group might find

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enough allies among the opposition to outnumber the remaining LDP members.

Curtis makes no attempts to present either a complete history or a full-blown theory of Japanese politics. Rather his book effectively sums up the accumulated insight of a leading expert on the Japanese political process.

The Languages of China. By S. Robert Ramsey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 351 pp. $45.00.

The role of language in China may puzzle the outsider. Speech is often unintelligible across regional lines, yet these differences have never led (as they did in Europe) to the formation of new political units. Ramsey clearly describes contemporary China's dialects and minority languages (such as Uighur, Mongolian, and Tibetan), recounts their histories, and explains their relationships.

Of greatest interest is Ramsey's discussion of how twentieth-century Chinese governments dealt with linguistic diversity. The possibilities considered have ranged from abolishing Chinese (one scholar wanted to substitute Esperanto), to the acceptance of regional forms as co-equal national languages. In the end, however, both the Nationalist and the Communist governments chose the same policy: the universal promotion of a simplified version of the Peking dialect. The result is that, while possibilities for linguistically-based fissure still exist (notably in Tibet and Taiwan), China today is more unified linguistically than ever.

SOUTH ASIA
by Shaheen Ayubi

Environmental Crisis in Pakistan. By Muhammad Nasir Gazdar. Kuala Lumpur: The Open Press Kuala Lumpur, 1987. 62 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Pakistan's area is less than one-tenth that of the United States, yet its (rapidly growing) population is now more than one-third that of America's. The result has been the crisis of Gazdar's title — an expansion of needs that far outstrips the country's ability to expand its resources. But Gazdar contends that Pakistan's development problems are not inherent in its condition; he argues that they stem from past neglect and present mismanagement. He also believes that an alternate approach exists for the development of agriculture, trade, and industry, one which, by taking a long-term perspective on land, energy, minerals, water, and people, would integrate resource development and environmental management.

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Unfortunately, the dimensions of the problems Gazdar details — in population control, food, and energy supplies — seem overwhelming. To make matters worse, further degradation of the environment looms. In the end, therefore, Gazdar is more persuasive in his descriptions than in his prescriptions. For a book evidently intended to have an effect on public policy, this is a serious shortcoming.

Gandhi on War and Peace. By Rashmi-Sudha Puri. New York: Praeger, 1987. 244 pp. $35.00.

Few admirers of Gandhi, at least in the West, realize the extent to which he associated himself with war and violent groups. Given Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence, this aspect of his life strikes many as troubling, even paradoxical. Puri, professor of Gandhian Studies at Punjab University, writes for this audience, and seeks to remove their doubts. The author draws on an enormous bank of data to show that Gandhi never wavered on the issue of war, and unconditionally rejected violence and war throughout his long career in South Africa and India. His involvement in the Boer War, the Zulu Rebellion, and World War I, Puri argues, followed instead from a belief in discipline and a dedication to duty. Whatever genuine inconsistencies can be found in Gandhi's work and life reflect merely the growth of his ideas, which were indeed constantly evolving. Puri also discusses Gandhi's views on such topics as fascism, Indian independence, and the making of peace treaties, as well as his more philosophical reflections on the foundations of peace and global cooperation. In all, this thorough examination of Gandhi's personal attitudes and philosophical reasoning on the subject of war and peace is insightful, balanced, and trustworthy. It is also one of the best works on Gandhi published in recent decades.

India and the United States, 1961-1963. By B. M. Jain. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1987. 302 pp. $25.00.

The three leading factors in Indo-American relations, at any given time, are the personal rapport between their leaders, the two country's shared democracy, and their strategic concerns. According to Jain, ties between India and the United States during the Kennedy administration, when Nehru was India's Prime Minister, were shaped principally by the first and third, much less by the second.

Jain closely examines the impact of the personalities of Nehru and Kennedy and concludes that, as a result of Kennedy's favorable attitude towards India, its economic and social problems came to be viewed with greater sympathy in the United States. This in turn created a positive attitude toward America in India. Jain rightly stresses the impact of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 which — despite a long proclaimed desire to remain free of both the Western

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and the Eastern bloc — impelled New Delhi to strengthen military and economic ties to the United States. Conversely, Washington saw the war as a means to lure India from its neutrality.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that what Jain has to say here is of more than historical interest, for there is a distinct end-of-an-era sense about the brief period he covers. Kennedy and Nehru died within five months of each other and the Vietnam War soon engulfed the U.S. government with other concerns in Asia.

The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics. Edited by Satish Chandra. New York: Sage Publications, 1987. 334 pp. $28.00.

The integrating force of a body of water was perhaps most forcefully demonstrated in history by the Mediterranean Sea, during many ages. And today people speak of the Atlantic Alliance or the Pacific century. Is there a unity created by the Indian Ocean? Chandra brings together essays that consider the integrating force of the Indian Ocean from ancient times to the present. The thirteen chapters cover a wide range of issues, including trade and commerce; the growth of naval technology before the coming of the Portuguese; indigenous understanding of the monsoon and of ocean currents; the significance of Chinese naval expeditions to the coast of East Africa; the role of Japan in the Indian Ocean trading network during the seventeenth century; and the European colonial domination from the fifteenth century until the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the twentieth century. The essays hang together well and constitute an intriguing, informative book; but they sorely lack a concluding chapter to sum up and assess the validity of an Indian Ocean perspective.

In Pursuit of Lakshmi. The Political Economy of the Indian State. By Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 529 pp. $42.00 ($16.95, paper).

Lakshmi is Hinduism's goddess of prosperity and good fortune, and here she serves the Rudolphs as a metaphor for aspirations to wealth and power felt by Indians. According to the Rudolphs, pursuit of wealth and power have led the Indian people, both as private individuals and as officials, to develop the state as a powerful "third actor" in the political-economy, along with capital and labor. The effect is to diminish the significance of the other two, as well as class politics. The state derives this dominating power in part from its control of investment and employment, and in part from its ideological advantage (in India) of posing as the defender of the collective social interest and the enemy of private gain.

The Rudolphs' analysis shows that periods of greater state intrusiveness have brought about a distribution of wealth that most

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Indians believe to be more equitable, and that this in turn has enhanced the state's perceived legitimacy. But their analysis also reveals that rising levels of social mobilization and personalistic rule have contributed to political and economic decline. In sum, even egalitarians learn that Lakshmi's favors can be won only by skill; they cannot be taken by force.

Issues in Indian Agricultural Development. By M. Zarkovic. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 203 pp. $24.95.

Students of Indian agriculture all too frequently adopt a crude macro-economic approach, looking at India as a whole and at agricultural production as a matter of "factors of production versus output." This method is convenient for the writer but it ignores the realities of his vast, complex subject. Refreshingly, Zarkovic takes a more nuanced approach in this study of agricultural change since the 1950s. Rather than talking about India as a unit, he addresses the issues in each of India's ten agricultural states. Rather than looking at agriculture merely as an economic equation, he offers a multidisciplinary consideration of such issues as the transformation of the female labor force, population migrations, and changes in human welfare. Finally, Zarkovic compares India's experience with agricultural growth to the experiences of other developing nations. The result is a coherent and comprehensive analysis of agricultural issues in India, with as much to offer students of politics and sociology as economists.

Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagration. By Akhtar Ali. Karachi: Research on Armament and Poverty, 1987. 225 pp. No price given.

The explosion of an Indian "nuclear device" in 1974 dealt a terrible blow to non-proliferation — even greater than China's detonation of a nuclear weapon ten years earlier. Part of the impact, undoubtedly, had to do with Pakistan; with India a member of the nuclear club, would Pakistan soon try to join it? In this sequel to an earlier book, *Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma,* Ali examines the ways in which the Pakistani regime might face the challenge of India's nuclear arms. Ali examines the domestic and foreign factors that influence the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan; he explores mechanisms that could help prevent a South Asian nuclear arms race; and he lays out the courses of action — including deterrence strategies and ballistic missile defense — that Pakistan's policymakers may adopt if such mechanisms fail.

Ali hopes that confidence-building could at minimum postpone a South Asian nuclear arms race, perhaps even prevent one from coming into being. One dearly hopes he is right, for not only would

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such a race severely harm the Indian and Pakistani economies, it could also lead to nuclear conflagration.

The Security of South Asia. Edited by Stephen Philip Cohen. Champaign, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 290 pp. $29.95.

One typical route to understanding bilateral or multilateral relations is to have nationals from the different countries put forward their respective outlooks. In this work on South Asian security issues, Cohen has adopted an intriguingly different approach: to have sixteen strategic experts from India, Pakistan, and the United States put forward the perspective of one of the other two countries. The result, constituting the first part of Cohen's work, is an illuminating discussion of the future of the subcontinent and the region's implications for the rest of the world. In the second part, four strategic analysts speculate on various scenarios for the region. The editor's concluding chapter summarizes the arguments and discusses the prospects of peace in South Asia, which he sees as both gloomy and hopeful. Appendices on regional nuclear proliferation and the conventional arms race help makes this balanced volume an excellent source.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Born Guilty: Children of Nazi Families. By Peter Sichrovsky. New York: Basic Books, 1988. 178 pp. $17.95.

Many Germans have the fate of being born into a Nazi family. Some try to conceal it, some try to ignore it, some make it an obsession. Sichrovski, an Austrian Jew, probes the mental universe of the Nazis' children in the belief that "a new German generation that does not question its parents would be the ideal matrix for a new fascism."

He has mostly interviewed those whose parents served as petty bureaucrats and ensured the functioning of the totalitarian machine. Typically, Sichrovsky finds, Nazi parents have chosen silence rather than explanation, and generational relationships are still obstructed by the parents' refusal to confide in their children, to avow their own moral turpitude, and to engage in a tormenting but exorcising dialogue. In such families, too, the father appears as an extremely authoritarian, almost dictatorial, figure.

Despite their parents' silence, of course, the children have learned about the horrors of the Nazi regime and have tried, futilely, to understand how apparently decent parents could have participated

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in such criminal undertakings. Frustrated in their attempts to understand, many of the children end up hating their parents, not only for what they did but for their refusal to deal with it. As with his last book, which studied the children of the Nazis' Jewish victims, Sichrovsky offers a fascinating look at one psychological consequence of this century's greatest catastrophe.

Fear No Evil. By Natan Sharansky. New York: Random House, 1988. 428 pp. $19.95.

How is it possible to behave like a free person, despite the most formidable constraints of a police state? Sharansky's memoir shows how, by taking us on a visit to the Soviet Gulag, where life as a civilized human being requires unending moral heroism.

Arrested in 1977, condemned in a parody of a trial, Sharansky spent nine years in Soviet prisons. There, throughout his long detention, he continued to believe in the ultimate triumph of good. Indeed, looking through Sharansky's eyes, we believe in it, too. Most of his fellow inmates remained loyal to their creed of solidarity, despite the KGB's relentless efforts to induce mutual betrayal. Sharansky explains their loyalty thus: "With each word we speak and each step we take, we touch other souls and have an impact on them. Why should I put this sin on my soul? If I have succeeded once in tearing the spider's web, breaking with the difficult life of double-think and closing the gap between thought and word, how is it now possible to take even one step backward toward the previous state?"

Sharansky lives today in Israel with his indefatigable wife and champion, Avital. A citizen of a free and democratic country, he has not forgotten those who remain behind, still refusing to bow to dictatorship — those whose struggle should be remembered if we want to understand how the Soviet Union is ruled.

The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation. By Moshe Lewin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 176 pp. $16.95.

Will Gorbachev's efforts to modernize the economy, loosen the ideological constraints, and renovate the political system make the Soviet Union into a different type of society? Lewin, one of the most knowledgeable and controversial interpreters of Soviet history, believes it will. He argues that current changes in the USSR aim to integrate the educated classes into the country's political decision-making process. To this end, new party leaders are ready to turn the party into a genuine political institution, by facilitating a free flow of information, and standing the judgment of public opinion, however critical and daring. Indeed, Lewin affirms that this new Communist party is already in the making; and if Gorbachev is radical enough for two or three more years, a new political body will govern the

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Soviet Union. As for opponents of *perestroika*, Lewin believes they have long since run out of alternatives to such a dramatic mutation.

This optimistic assessment raises two major questions. First, will the party apparatus endorse a political evolution that almost certainly entails the loss of its entrenched privileges? Second, what will the party do about forms of political activity, like Solidarity, that arise independently of the party? Lewin brilliantly explores the party's need to accommodate the educated classes; but he fails to assess the possibility that this educated class might not need or want the Communist party, and might soon jettison the party's sclerotic ideology, including the dogma of the one-party system.

Letters to Olga: June 1979–September 1982. By Vaclav Havel. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. 397 pp. $25.00.

Were they written by a playwright and civil rights activist in America, the following sentiments might seem pious and banal: "I want to remain open to the world, not to shut myself up against it; I want to retain my interest in other people and my love for them. I have different opinions of different people, but I cannot say that I hate anyone in the world." But context is all: Havel is Czech. He was arrested in 1979 for what the regime called subversion and was sentenced to four-and-a-half-years hard labor. These letters, sent from prison to his wife Olga, illuminate the major values by which Havel remained human under totalitarian oppression.

Knowing the authorities wanted him to feel humiliated, to suffer doubt, to be tormented by nostalgia for the outer world, and eventually to emerge embittered and resentful, Havel chose a path of mental resistance, with an unshakeable commitment to his own definition of human dignity. Rather than despair, he controlled his passions, and meditated on the ways history shapes human destinies. In this fashion, he turned the prison years into a time of self-discovery. Not once does Havel abandon himself to self-pity; not once did he ask the question that would subvert his efforts to survive with honor: were his sufferings worthwhile? This book ranks high as a source of inspiration even among the now abundant first-hand literature concerning dissent in Soviet-type regimes.

Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency. By Ed A. Hewett. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988. 404 pp. $16.95.

When Gorbachev became general secretary in March 1985, he promised economic reforms that would bring the Soviet Union into the technological era. In June 1988, the Communist party conference overflowed with complaints about the state of Soviet economy. What happened to the Gorbachev reforms, and what is likely to happen?

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Hewett offers a valuable guide. Reform, he believes, took definite shape with the June 1987 Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. Under that program, the Soviet economy will remain planned, but only with regard to its most important variables; responsibility for economic failure will be individualized instead of anonymous; enterprises will get autonomy in making operational decisions; and the participation of workers in decision-making will be increased. Implementation of such reforms, Hewett predicts, "will be extremely tricky from the economic point of view, and sensitive from the political one." Before producing results, they will exact a costly toll, and this in turn could lead to unrest and discontent.

Why, then, should Gorbachev press ahead? Not merely because he is aware of his countrymen's economic hardships, Hewett says, but because he knows the danger backwardness poses for the USSR's status as a great power. In the end, Hewett thinks Gorbachev will succeed. Perhaps so. But right now things seem to be moving very slowly. And how long will Gorbachev keep support for a policy that unsettles so many, risks so much, and apparently delivers so little?

Soviet Global Strategy. By William R. Kintner. Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1987. 273 pp. $24.95.

Kintner's long career has spanned the spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations from the period of wartime alliance, through the bipolarity of the late Stalin period, up to the limited but erratic détente of the 1970s and 1980s. He offers an overview of the Soviet challenge, motivations driving the Soviet leadership, and lessons to be learned on dealing with the Russians. His somber, stern assessment may well give Moscow more credit for accomplishments than is merited.

While differentiating between peacetime and wartime, Kintner sees Soviet strategy aiming at: control of sea lines of communication; strong positions astride key choke points; resource denial; and the breakup of the Western Alliance. He postulates these as long-term goals of Soviet foreign policy but does not demonstrate that the actual policies pursued by successive Soviet leaders in Europe, Asia, or the Third World have been driven by these concerns; or that Moscow has advanced very far toward their attainment. The attempt to identify the essentials of "Soviet Grand Strategy" focuses more on terrorism than on broader principles. Absent is a systematic analysis of general principles that can be traced from 1917 to the present.

Kintner expects Gorbachev to follow the same ambitious, expansionist course as his predecessors: to "focus on conflict, on preparations for war, and on [the] continuous assault on free societies." He does not see Gorbachev's apparent willingness to accept on-site inspections, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the easing of tensions in Europe as signs of a less confrontational

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Soviet policy. Kintner's skepticism may derive from his tendency to consider ideology the driving force behind Soviet policy and his belief that Kremlin leaders see the "tensions and the economic dislocations confronting most of the industrialized democracies . . . as indications that the final 'crisis' of capitalism is imminent." His unrelenting suspicion of the Soviet Union cannot be dismissed out of hand, for believers in détente and meaningful accommodation have been disappointed in the past. Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Soviet Succession Struggles: Kremlinology and the Russian Question from Lenin to Gorbachev. By Anthony D'Agostino. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988. 274 pp. $44.95.

How are changes made at the top of the Soviet political system? Succession in the Kremlin may be the most intriguing issue in the workings of the Soviet government, but for D'Agostino it involves much more than a horse race. In fact, he maintains, succession goes to the heart of the Soviet political culture. In his analysis, D'Agostino discovers a pattern of party programs alternating between a "Moscow line" and a "Leningrad line" — the former standing for stability, the latter for dynamism. He does not infer from this that the party has competing centers or pressure groups. Rather, he says, alternance is the means by which the party's center safeguards its hegemony. The winners in succession struggles, he points out, have not been the advocates of a consistent approach on either side (Zinoviev, Bukharin, Zhdanov, Malenkov), but those who espoused various programs, "and have succeeded by virtue of being centrists."

To sustain his hypothesis, D'Agostino seems to overstate the significance of certain personalities, such as former Leningrad party boss Grigoriy Romanov. Moreover, his theoretical model derives from the regimented party of the last seventy years, and it is not clear to what extent the same theory will continue to suit the party if it resumes a tradition of tolerance for faction.

Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Alienation. By Jaroslaw Bilocerkowycz. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 242 pp. $27.50 (paper).

Ethnic turmoil in the USSR has recently demonstrated anew the Soviet regime's striking failure to resolve the tensions of a multinational state. Although Armenian nationalism has been most in the news, the Ukraine — with 42 million inhabitants, a tradition of autonomy, and a strategic location on the Western border of the Soviet Union — may offer the greatest potential for ethnic fissuring.

In this study of Ukrainian dissent, however, Bilocerkowycz uses a concept of alienation rather than of nationalism, and thus includes not only nationalist protest and opposition, but also non-nationalist

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disaffection among Ukrainians. He pays attention to Ukrainian dissident activities in favor of human rights, law, democracy, and the practice of non-nationalist (e.g., Protestant) religions, as well as activities in opposition to Russification. The investigation of religious practices and dissent in the Ukraine, including the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, is particularly informative. From his detailed analysis of the socio-demographic profile of the Ukrainian dissidents, Bilocerkowycz concludes that they are mostly atypical of the population, being better educated and coming from the Western Ukrainian region. He concludes that nonetheless they represent a permanent catalyst for forceful popular opposition activities.

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

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ERRATUM

In the Summer issue of ORBIS, a Brief Review misidentified the author of *Japan: Facing Economic Maturity* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988). He is Edward Lincoln. The editors regret this error.

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Many Andean leaders are concerned that the suggested cures [for drug trafficking] would be worse than the disease. To a degree, that concern must also be the concern of Washington, which wants to encourage stable, economically viable governments in the region; promote democracy; and suppress leftist insurgent movements. America's war against its drug addiction is not necessarily compatible with these priorities. In fact, the argument can be made that the U.S. and its Latin American allies have an interest in minimizing the drug war.

Rensselaer W. Lee III
"Why the U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine"

An examination of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, and the procedures for using them, shows that they are technically and operationally incapable of performing their mission of deterrence. To restore that deterrence, NATO must modernize its land-based tactical nuclear missiles; to carry out that modernization and make it effective, NATO must also begin to transfer control of these weapons to the Europeans.

Andrew Goldman
"NATO Needs a New Missile"

In the Third World, Soviet leaders have found an arena for engaging the United States in conditions that not only keep all parts of the Soviet imperial system out of jeopardy, but also permit setbacks to be absorbed. In no other forum or arena has Moscow so much to show for its efforts in recent decades, and no Soviet leader will tamper with an approach that has brought such a remarkable array of successes.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
"Soviet Success Story: The Third World"

Nations, like human beings, make their own history; but they make it within a context of strengths and weaknesses, of opportunities and obstacles, of insights and errors. Few of us, I suspect would deny that proposition. . . . If carefully read, I believe [*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*] will not be seen as 'economically determinist' in the proper sense of that word. For reasons which mystify me, this seems particularly difficult for scholars alongside the Charles River to grasp.

Paul Kennedy
"Correspondence"

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